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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the problems inherent in teaching on war in schools. The 
focus is on the moral acceptability of killing in war, and the issues this raises for 
educators. It argues that war can only properly be presented in the curriculum as a 
controversial issue. 
In the first chapter it is maintained that war is undeniably a moral matter. Beliefs 
about aggression are explored to show that international military conflict is not an 
unavoidable feature of human existence and that war is a prima facie evil. Grounds 
for the absolute prohibition on taking life are then examined in Chapter 2, to 
demonstrate that pacifism is not an uncontestable stance. Just war thinking is 
investigated in Chapter 3. The immunity of civilians demanded by just war theory 
is shown to present particular difficulties in relation to twentieth century warfare. 
From the analysis in the first three chapters, the controversiality of war becomes 
plain. Some reactions to Peace Education, explored in Chapter 4, reflect the 
anxieties felt by many at the prospect of the moral dilemmas of war being debated in 
the classroom. The problems for the educator are exacerbated by fears of 
indoctrination and doubts over the value of teaching on war in schools. 
In Chapter 5 principles which ought to inform all teaching on war are identified. It 
is claimed that war must be explicitly presented as a controversial issue and that the 
teaching should be unbiased, balanced and impartial, adhering to coherence and 
consistency. Application of these principles to methodology is followed by 
reflection, in Chapter 6, on the selection of content for teaching on war. 
Consideration is given to knowledge and understanding, skills, values and 
dispositions. It is argued that nuclear war should be included and that the value of 
peace can legitimately be taught. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Teaching about war presents various difficulties for educationalists today. Central 
to these is the moral problem of whether or not killing in war can ever be justified. 
The intentional taking of human life is typically perceived as the ultimate 
wrongdoing, yet it is rarely questioned in the context of war. 'War is, for most 
people, the big exception,' (Norman, 1995: 1). Whether or not homicide in war is 
appropriately viewed as a special case is important to the way in which the subject 
is approached in the classroom. Clarification is needed, for teachers' beliefs are 
likely to affect what is taught and learnt in school. 
The topic of war is already included in the school curriculum in various subject 
areas and there is no reason to suppose that it will suddenly disappear. For many 
who left school some years ago, history seemed to comprise a series of wars. 
Despite many recent changes to the content of history lessons, it is still difficult to 
imagine students completing their schooling without having heard war mentioned 
by a teacher. Increasingly past wars are examined from differing perspectives, but 
in history the attempt will be primarily aimed at gaining a more, rather than less, 
accurate description of events. Nevertheless questions of justification are inevitable 
in discussion. Attitudes to war may be more directly confronted in literature 
classes, where, as in First World Poetry, they are often inextricable from and can 
constitute the subject matter. In other lessons too, war is likely to figure - as an 
explanation in geography perhaps. In all these examples war is part of the explicit 
content of lessons, but it is also likely to be tackled in another way in Personal and 
Social Education or as part of moral education. Here the issue of war may be used 
to explore the students' own beliefs and to develop thinking in the moral sphere. 
War, as a topic, may be used as a vehicle for other learning. Discussion of war is 
not only confined to what might be called the Tounalt curriculum. Children's 
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private reading and the films they enjoy frequently concern warfare and our pupils 
see media coverage of current wars on television and in the newspapers. 
Consequently the subject may be raised by them informally and talked of at length 
in tutor periods. 
What teachers say about war in all these situations is likely to have some effect, if 
not always the desired one, and so could count as teaching on war. Their own 
beliefs are likely to be reflected in the way they treat pupils and the way in which 
they present their subjects. Our attitudes to war and peace generally may be implicit 
in our teaching and figure on the hidden curriculum in addition to what is made 
explicit in syllabuses. 
War is a difficult topic for teachers to address in the classroom. This is not to 
suggest that it is conceptually more difficult than other subjects, in the sense of it 
being somehow 'harder to learn' in the way that it is often suggested that physics, 
for example, is particularly difficult to grasp, but that it is a controversial issue 
which is peculiarly and politically sensitive. It raises fundamental moral questions 
about the taking of human life in a legal pursuit - the waging of war. Many aspects 
of war raise deeply disturbing questions, but the focus here will be narrowed to 
whether or not war is morally justifiable, in that it involves intentional killing, and 
reflection on how this is best dealt with in schooling. 
Before discussing how the subject of war should be presented in the educational 
context, it is necessary to examine the pre-eminent underlying difficulties. 
Firstly, in Chapter 1, it will be argued that war undeniably falls within the moral 
sphere. It is important to recognise that the degree to which war is perceived as an 
unavoidable aspect of the human condition affects the extent to which it is seen as a 
proper object of moral judgement. Although it does not seem conceivable that 
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killing in war could ever be thought of as something human beings have no control 
over, children in school, echoing their elders perhaps, frequently speak as if this is 
the case: 
Some people say it is pointless to discuss the 
morality of war, since, even if it is always immoral, 
it can never be eliminated, for reasons having to do 
with human nature. (Glover, 1977: 253) 
Consequently it is relevant to expose the muddled reasoning that can lead to the 
assumption that we are naturally aggressive animals and, as such, carry little or no 
moral responsibility for the prevalence of war in our existence. It will be shown 
that aggression may be a human characteristic, but that it is not one we are 
biologically pre-programmed to act upon. It will be maintained that all aggressive 
behaviour is open to moral scrutiny, and that claims based on aggression, to the 
effect that war is entirely unavoidable, are mistaken. 
War surely should not be simply set aside as the exception to the widely held 
conviction that deliberate killing is morally abhorrent. This is not to say that all 
intentional killing is plainly murder, or that warfare is necessarily always wrong. 
Nevertheless consideration must be given to the claims of pacifism. In the second 
chapter it will be argued that killing is a prima facie evil, but that the absolutist 
position prohibiting all intentional taking of life is untenable. This is not because 
pacifism is logically absurd in being self-contradictory as Narveson (1979: 447) 
believes, but because examination of the different grounds for believing that human 
life should be inviolate will reveal that an absolute prohibition on homicide cannot 
be upheld. 
Whether or not killing in war could ever be the lesser of two evils is a further 
question. If it is not clear that pacifism is the only possible moral stance to war, 
attention to ways in which people's deeply felt abhorrence to killing are thought to 
be reconcilable with warfare is illuminating. The just war tradition is based on the 
presumption that war is an evil, but sometimes a necessary one. It charts attempts 
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to limit the evil, by identifying the circumstances in which it is justifiable. 
Exploration, in the third chapter, of the just causes and the right conduct of war 
embodied in the tradition will make clear that few wars in this century would satisfy 
the criteria. Modern just war thinking addresses particularly those problems that 
technological progress has brought to the waging of war and adds to our 
understanding. Just war thought, both traditional and modern, outlaws the killing 
of 'innocents'. There are difficulties in identifying exactly who should count as 
non-combatants, but it will be maintained that the prohibition on military action 
which will certainly destroy centres of civilian population should be an absolute 
principle. The practice of war in the late twentieth century rarely seems to conform 
to this condition. It might seem that the Doctrine of Double Effect could be invoked 
to distinguish circumstances in which violation of the immunity of civilians could 
be permissible. However, analysis of the criteria of Double Effect will demonstrate 
that methods of warfare which inevitably bring about the deaths of 'innocents' 
cannot be justified. Even if wars and the killing of soldiers can in some limited 
circumstances be justified, it seems impossible that killing non-combatants could be 
similarly allowable. 
In the light of these moral considerations, reflection on how we should present war 
in the classroom is obviously vital. Chapter 4 will address Peace Education, that 
specific approach to teaching issues of war and violence more generally, which was 
widely debated in the nineteen eighties. The principles and guidelines, detailed in 
the literature on Peace Education, must be an invaluable basis for any further 
commentary on teaching with respect to war. Its critics were vociferous and their 
objections cannot be ignored for they include charges of indoctrination and other 
accusations which, if true, ought to be taken seriously by any educator. 
Plainly war is controversial and, in the final chapters, it will be claimed that it 
should be explicitly presented as a controversial issue in schools. The nature of that 
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controversiality implied by the description, 'a controversial issue' in the context of 
the curriculum, will be explored and it will be argued that it is possible to teach on 
war without indoctrinating or otherwise contravening educational principles, despite 
the apparently intractable moral dilemmas raised. War needs to be understood as a 
moral issue, but it is also undeniably a political matter, and it should be addressed 
within both moral and political education. To be effective, cross-curricular 
implications must be recognised. Principles will be identified for how war should 
be treated in schools. These in turn will be shown to inform the selection of content 
for teaching on war. 
There is no intention to provide a blueprint for all teaching related to war: the 
situations in which the topic arises, both in lessons and in other areas of school life, 
are too varied for this to be a profitable exercise. Rather, it is hoped that attention 
will be drawn to the educational principles and considerations which should 
underpin the choice of methodology and content when teaching on war as a 
controversial issue. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Aggression and the Moral Status of War 
Fundamentally war is a moral problem. This may seem self-evident, but teachers 
should remember it is a truth not always recognised. It is obvious that people 
worry about war, the shedding of blood and the devastation of the land, but it is 
often believed that when there is talk of rights and wrongs, this is an expression of 
feeling and not a debate about morality. Many seem to consider war to be outside 
the sphere of moral judgement. In this chapter it will be argued that such a belief is 
untenable and that war is essentially a moral matter. 
The conviction that war is beyond morality seems most commonly to be based on 
an assumption that war is a consequence of a human characteristic - aggression. 
The connection between war and aggression is easily made: 
War is a special type of aggression. It involves 
aggression between groups in which the individuals 
are in some degree organised towards achieving a 
common goal. It is usually institutionalised, with 
individuals occupying distinct roles (soldier, general, 
munitions worker etc.). (Groebel & Hinde, 1989: 
5). 
When human beings are fighting in conflicts between tribes, states or countries, we 
call it 'war' and those who start wars are called 'aggressors'. 
However, the reasoning, which leads some to conclude from this that war is 
unavoidable, is confused and confusing. Some clarification is needed. 
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Aggression is seen as natural. Conceived of as inborn and a deteimining influence, 
it is sometimes believed to be uncontrollable. If this were true, then we could not 
avoid violence and war, and all talk of the morality of war would be otiose in a 
context where we should have no choice and so no responsibility. The wildness of 
such an assumption does not make it any the less dangerous and it will be necessary 
to demonstrate its absurdity. 
Of course, it cannot be the case that no one ever has any option over whether or not 
to engage in fighting, since very obviously, in individual instances, some will lash 
out and others not. People recount how they have exercised control and refrained 
from hitting another, and, as far as we can tell, they are relating how they have 
chosen to avoid violence (and expecting approbation for making the right choice.) 
Pacifists may choose to become conscientious objectors and refuse to be soldiers. 
The suggestion cannot be that, due to the way human beings are, going to war is 
some sort of reflex like the knee-jerk and yet some notion of aggression as an 
irresistible impulse persists. 
It is not the belief that human beings are programmed to fight and kill at each and 
every opportunity, such that war is completely beyond the sphere of human 
responsibility, which primarily occupies me, although I do think this is implicit in 
some assumptions and therefore its foolishness needs to be exposed. Instead, my 
interest centres on the way in which beliefs about aggression can make it seem that 
war is unavoidable, in a weaker sense, in the long term. 
This view is probably more accurately expressed as the idea that we cannot avoid as 
a species warring with each other. The feeling seems to be that violence will occur 
sooner or later, because it is in our nature. In one of his thrillers, Straight, Dick 
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Francis (1989: 296) tells the fable of the horse that consents to carry the scorpion 
across the river: in mid-stream the scorpion stings the horse. In its death throes, the 
horse asks why, since they will both now perish. 'Because it's my nature', comes 
the answer. The conviction that people cannot help but go to war may be 
analogous: we do not have to kill on every occasion offered, any more than the 
scorpion does, but eventually our aggressive nature will lead us to wage war. It 
may be possible to check it for the time being, but it cannot be completely eradicated 
from human existence. Some choice and responsibility can be exercised, but it is 
limited. Ultimately, whatever the cost, reason will be swamped by instinct and we 
shall find ourselves at war. 
Goldstein includes in his 'mythology of aggression' exactly this cluster of beliefs: 
War is an expression of the aggression instinct. It is 
unavoidable because humans have an inborn need to 
satisfy their aggressive urges. Peace is an 
aberration, a temporary period between wars. War 
has always been, and hence will always be, with us. 
(Goldstein, 1989: 11) 
I am sure Goldstein is right in suggesting that these myths lie behind many beliefs 
about war and that they colour our efforts to deal with international conflict. It is 
crucial to appreciate that aggression and war are not inescapable features of our 
lives, since, as Bateson points out, 
The prophecy that, in time, humans are bound to 
fight each other is liable to be self-fulfilling. 
(Bateson, 1989: 47) 
Teachers and pupils alike need to understand the weakness of the evidence and 
reasoning that underlie these myths. Sociobiological assumptions will be examined 
in this chapter to show that there are no good grounds for a deterministic view of 
aggression and to emphasise that aggression is open to moral scrutiny. 
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To see war as the outcome of ultimately ungovernable aggression would be to 
accept a dangerously abridged sphere of moral decision making, but, even if it is 
conceded that our capacity for aggression does not doom us to warfare, thinking of 
aggression and war as somehow 'natural' may still distort moral judgement. 
'Natural' frequently carries evaluative implications which can obscure or cause us 
to suspend proper assessment. These too will be addressed. 
Finally, it will further be argued that aggression itself is morally dubious and war, 
an expression of aggression, must be a prima facie evil. 
In this chapter, my concern is with the erosion and diminution of the supposed 
extent of our moral responsibilty with regard to war. I do not assume that people 
generally feel none whatsoever about killing in war, but it is clear that many 
unreflective claims imply the inevitability of aggressive behaviour and the futility of 
moral disapproval, so my criticism does not focus on a straw dummy. There is real 
cause for anxiety and the issue is serious, for the degree to which we presume we 
are subject to 'natural' impulses is the degree to which our autonomy and capacity 
for moral choice is impaired. 
Since so much hangs on various perceptions of aggression,_  the first task will be to 
clarify what is meant by aggression. 
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I What is aggression? 
I i) 	 What does 'aggression' mean? 
Aggressive behaviour is usually defined as a hostile act, offensive rather than 
defensive; verbal or physical behavior intended to cause harm. By extension, 
aggressive feelings involve the wish to harm and to strike first. Characterising 
aggression as offensive rather than defensive, does not, I think, preclude or make 
nonsense of the aggressive defence of territory, children or anything else. It can 
suggest merely the readiness to engage in hostilities or the pre-emptive strike 
thought necessary to defence. 
The main problem with this definition seems to revolve about the intention to do 
harm, since, it is claimed, people can act aggressively or feel aggressive without 
any such intent. 
I am happy to agree that people can behave in a way typical of aggression, but 
unwittingly and thus without the intention to wound. In this instance it seems 
perfectly proper to describe conduct as appearing aggressive, much in the way that 
we might identify jealous behaviour while those exhibiting the signs claim sincerely 
that they feel no such thing, merely a sense of righteous anger. In both cases the 
claims not to be aggressive or jealous may or may not be true and the behaviour 
consequently may be the reality or the lookalike appearance of reality. 
Given a broad, but not vacuous, interpretation of notions like harm, wound, and do 
ill, this surely is a characteristic of aggression. Assertion is establishing and 
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maintaining one's own rights without encroaching on another's (Hicks, 1983: 16), 
and it is distinguished from aggression in exactly this respect. To be aggressive is 
to subordinate the rights of others to one's own and to infringe upon them. This 
certainly conforms to everyday experience where in ordinary social intercourse 
assertion is acceptable, even desirable in some situations, while aggression is 
frowned upon. 
Attacking the keyboard or mowing the lawn aggressively seems to have little to do 
with overriding anyone's rights, but this is because we do not attribute rights to 
piano keys or lawns. To act aggressively still suggests action careless of the harm 
which may be done. 
It may be argued that people are often exhorted to be aggressive in the context of 
games or sports without any connotation of overriding rights or inflicting damage. 
However, in team games the language of war is commonly used metaphorically. 
Pleas from the terraces to 'slaughter' the opposing team, even to 'kill 'em' are 
surely rarely to be taken literally. It may be that talk of aggressive play in football 
is just so much vivid imagery. Alternatively, when no metaphor is intended, what 
is in question may be a misuse of language. Groebel and Hinde suggest that, 
phrases such as an aggressive salesman' confuse 
aggressiveness with assertiveness and, in our view 
lead to unnecessary confusion. (Groebel & Hinde, 
1989: 4) 
Perhaps when aggression is demanded in football it is a confused exhortation to be 
assertive. 
There is no reason to accept that 'aggression' does not imply a willingness to 
wound. 'Aggression' can mean merely taking pre-emptive action, but this should 
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not obscure the wider usage which implies a willingness, if not the full blown 
intention, to override the rights of others and to do them harm. 
I ii) 	 Feeling and being aggressive 
It is important to recognise that to speak of 'feeling aggressive' or 'experiencing 
aggression' is to talk of having an emotion, distinguishable from a sensation. 
Whereas feeling hot or nauseous is to have a sensation, feeling aggressive is not. 
Aggression is not even generally locatable in the way a sensation is. (There would 
be something very odd about feeling aggressive in one's arm.) Aggression may be 
accompanied by sensation, just as we may feel hot or cold with anger, but no one 
specific sensation can be related to aggression. Furthermore, we may feel 
aggressive without experiencing any identifiable sensation at all. Aggression is not 
the same as nor reducible to a sensation, but, along with other emotions such as 
jealousy, it has a cognitive element. The degree of aggression felt, or indeed 
whether or not any aggression at all is experienced, is dependent on an appraisal of 
circumstances, however minimal that might be. 
To be aggressive may be to act aggressively. The action is not evidence for some 
inner state of aggression: there need be no 'ghost in the machine' (Ryle, 1963: 17). 
To engage in aggressive action, physical attack perhaps, is not necessarily to act in 
addition to or because of experiencing feelings of aggression. Just as to be happy 
may be to caper about with delight, so to be aggressive may be to hit someone. 
Such action is not necessary to being aggressive: one may be aggressive in a 
variety of ways. Some people show little when they are happy and some may be 
aggressive without engaging in any hostile actions. So there is no reason to 
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suppose that aggressive behaviour is an automatic consequence of some inner 
aggression or unavoidably accompanies it. Fighting wars is not an inevitable 
consequence of aggression. Even if it could be demonstrated that human beings are 
characteristically aggressive, the rotweilers of the higher mammals, it still would 
not follow that war is unavoidable. 
Obviously conduct and emotion are distinguishable one from another, but we do 
not have to assume that the former is caused by the latter, and aggressive feelings 
do not have to be seen as motives for aggressive behaviour. When we explain 
people's actions in terms of 'because they are aggressive', we are not always giving 
a causal explanation or identifying a motive. As Ryle (1963: 86) suggests in his 
analogy of the glass shattering when hit by the stone, the implication may be that 
the behaviour is characteristic of a propensity (to be aggressive in our case), not a 
consequence of an inner 'event'. I may have a propensity for aggression, but this 
need not cause me to act and lash out any more than the glass causes its own 
shattering. 
When we term someone 'aggressive' we are noting a disposition or tendency to 
behave in certain ways in certain circumstances. We may be judging an inclination 
to view situations hostilely. It would, of course, be mystifying to attribute 
aggression in the dispositional sense if there had never been any instances or 
episodes in which aggression were evidenced. We infer that others are aggressive 
from the frequency or degree/intensity of a range of different behaviours, including 
personal reports of feelings, rather than simply assuming the existence of an 
inaccessible, nebulous, inner state. 
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I iii) 	 Aggression is not a thing 
Aggression clearly has no concrete reality, locatable in space. To conceive of it as a 
thing is obviously absurd, but aggression is sometimes talked of as if it is an object 
or an entity which is fixed and measurable. Such reification cannot be ignored in 
exploring what aggression is, for it all too easily obscures the fact that aggression is 
a human reaction to people and events. 
We do not have aggression in the way we have arms and legs. We experience 
aggression in situations, towards some thing or person. Aggression itself is not an 
object; it has an object. 
Some scientists who have attempted measurement of aggression seem to reify it, 
not as a thing in the outside world, but nevertheless as some thing which has finite 
existence within a person. This can lead to extraordinary misconceptions - that it is 
a trait reducible, for example, to mouse-killing behaviour and that it is something 
individuals have in fixed quantities. These are sufficiently outrageous to deserve 
attention here. 
Aggression has been conceived of as something, not directly observable, but an 
intangible underlying quality that animals have. Nebulous qualities are not open to 
direct scrutiny, but associated behaviour may be. It is assumed that examination of 
behaviour can provide evidence to throw light on the quality or trait. Consequently, 
'aggression' in rats has been measured by observing the speed with which they kill 
mice. 
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I am drawn to agree with the authors of Not in our Genes when they note, 
Sometimes this is described under the name 
'muricidal' behaviour in the literature,which 
presumably makes the experimenters happier that 
they are measuring something really scientific, 
(Rose, Kamin & Lewontin, 1984: 90). 
What is also likely is that circularity of argument immediately creeps in. Once 
measured, aggression can be perceived as measurable and pinned down as 
something rats have in greater or smaller quantity. The quality underlying muricide 
in rats is yet more worryingly taken to be identical with aggression in other species, 
despite any absence of mouse-killing behaviour. Human aggression may be 
expressed in shouting, kicking, grimacing or going to war, but it has been assumed 
that, 
the underlying quality is identical with that which 
underlies muricide—in rats. (Rose, Kamin & 
Lewontin, 1984: 91) 
The fact that aggression has apparently been measured under experimental 
conditions gives 'scientific' credibility to this strange assumption. 
Talking of aggression as a thing seems to reinforce perception of it as an entity 
which is fixed and measurable. It seems odd to imagine that people have an amount 
of aggression which is fixed in the way that I.Q.s have been thought of as 
unalterable, but that does appear to be the implication of some 'scientific' measures. 
Geneticists today are unlikely to believe that the measurement of a trait such as 
aggression is an appropriate scientific exercise to attempt. Since Mendel's work 
with peas, it has long been recognised that counting instances of specific, easily 
identifiable characteristics provides strong evidence in genetic enquiry, but that 
traits such as aggression are not reducible to these. (Having said this, it is relevant 
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to note that, despite some objection from the scientific world, the media have 
recently made much of the supposed discovery of genes for homosexuality and 
criminality. People could hardly be blamed for believing that there are genes for 
aggression and that aggression is quantifiable.) Quantification alone is not enough; 
broader terms of reference would be needed if we were to essay measurement. Any 
meaningful measurement of aggression would need to resemble the measurement of 
I.Q. or musicality and rely on evaluative notions of better, worse, more or less 
complex etc. Measuring aggression is thus evaluative in a way that straight 
counting is not. 'How aggressive?' is not the same type of question as 'How 
many?' 
We do speak of people being more or less aggressive, but very often what is meant 
is surely that some react aggressively more often than others or under different 
conditions. Whether or not people behave aggressively depends for different 
people on different things. A minor collision in a car provokes aggression in some 
and not in others. We do not just carry with us a certain amount of aggression 
waiting to be unleashed. Scientific measurement is either a non-starter, because we 
do not all experience aggression at any one particular stimulus and so reliablity in 
testing will be a problem, or so specific, measuring particular aspects of behaviour, 
as to be worthless in shedding any light on aggression in general. The speed with 
which a subject might resort to hitting an experimenter could be measured in a 
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variety of situations, but it would reveal little more than a description of what 
happened on those occasions. It would not tell how aggressive the person were. 
People do not have aggression in the way they may have long legs. Because 
aggressive behaviour is at least in part a response to external circumstances, it is a 
more complex matter. There is no reason to suppose that it is some thing of we 
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each have a fixed quantity. However we talk of it, we have aggression only in the 
sense that we feel aggressive and behave aggressively, or have the propensity to do 
so. 
Aggression then is a human attribute, and, in a sense, 'natural', but to describe it as 
such should not be taken to lend weight to the mistaken belief that we should or 
indeed can do little to curb it. 
The following is an attempt to show that there are no good grounds for assuming 
that aggression is 'natural' in the sense of being an inescapable part of the human 
condition and something over which we can have no control. In so far as we can 
do otherwise, it is pertinent to raise questions about the morality of aggression and 
war. 
II Is aggression natural? 
sociobiological assumptions examined 
nnn 
To say that aggression is natural sometimes is to say that it is part of human nature. 
Human nature has been judged by many in recent years to be almost exclusively a 
biological matter and, significantly, the relevant biology has been perceived as 
deterministic. Consequently, when aggression is believed to be part of human 
nature, very often it is also believed to be unavoidable and inevitable. 
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Plainly it would be foolish and quite inappropriate for me to engage in any dispute 
over the empirical claims which are the supposed basis for biological determinism. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the nature of these claims in order to 
appreciate the dubious foundation on which they are based and their implications. 
To talk of aggression being part of human nature is to be rather vague. Terms 
such as 'instinctive' and 'innate' are little more use when employed in everyday 
speech. What is meant usually seems to comprise one or more of the following 
overlapping, but none the less separable, ideas: i) aggression is rooted in our 
animal ancestry, ii) aggression has evolved and is an adaptation, 	 aggression is 
present at birth and unlearned. Some reflection on these may be illuminating. 
II i) 	 Aggression is rooted in our animal ancestry 
The belief that human aggression is rooted in our animal ancestry is strongly 
influenced by Konrad Lorenz (1966) who argued that animals are instinctively 
violent and that we carry these same destructive impulses in our genes. Goldstein 
(L989: 12), claims that the evidence which purports to show that the higher 
primates are instinctively aggressive is not convincing. Whatever the truth of this, 
even if our ancestors were instinctively aggressive, it would not follow that we too 
are necessarily genetically programmed, as it were, to be equally violent. Even if 
apes have aggressive instincts, human beings may not have inherited them. 
Sometimes we inherit the red hair of one parent and sometimes not. Genetic 
ancestry is a complicated matter. 
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The argument for genetic determination here rests on a similarity perceived between 
humans and some other animals, such that they appear to have common ancestry. 
Both apes and humans behave aggressively at times, but comparable behaviour 
alone is insufficient to prove common inheritance. This is not merely because 
behaviour is a poor guide to genes, but because biological similarities may be 
analogous rather than homologous. (The wings of bats and birds are terined 
analogous, since, although they have the same function, they are formed quite 
differently and thus offer no proof of common ancestry.) Only homologous 
features demonstrate genetic heritage. Traits which seem homologous between the 
higher primates and humans may not be so. 
Easily forgotten in this context is that the most recent common ancestor from whom 
apes and human beings could have inherited any shared characteristics is thought to 
have existed at least two million years ago, since when the human brain is said to 
have increased in volume about fourfold (Rose et al., 1984: 255). Arguments 
about aggressive behaviour based on animal ancestors must seem dubious in the 
face of this extraordinary change. We may have changed equally dramatically in 
many other respects too. 
Given that conclusions about human aggression are sometimes drawn from 
contemporary studies of animal behaviour rather than from evidence relating to 
common ancestry, their force is further weakened. The attempt to show that 
aggression is in our genes by examining animal behaviour may well be a 
misconceived enterprise, but it is something which permeates biological 
determinism. 
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II ii) 	 Aggression has evolved and is an adaptation 
The idea that aggression has evolved presupposes that aggressive action 
contributes to the survival and/or reproduction of the individual or species, perhaps 
in winning food, territory or a mate. Immediately it is obvious that the benefit of 
aggression is dependent on external conditions, such as food shortages resulting in 
competition for resources. Bateson points out that, 
expression of cooperative or aggressive behavior is 
likely to be conditional in all those animals that have 
the equipment to detect changes in conditions. 
(Bateson, 1989: 37) 
The nature of the evolved trait is presumed to relate to states of affairs in the world 
and therefore it is profitably exercised only in some circumstances, especially since 
aggression carries with it the risk of injury. Different circumstances might favour 
cooperative rather than aggressive behaviour. Many species appear to resolve 
conflicts without recourse to aggression at all, let alone in the foam of inter-group 
war: 
In many highly successful species, groups (whether 
they be schools of minnows, flocks of starlings or 
herds of wildebeeste) form, merge and break up to 
the mutual benefit of all concerned and without any 
aggression at all. (Huntingford, 1989: 30). 
So, if aggression is a characteristic which has evolved, it is not one in operation all 
the time, but will only be exercised in certain situations by some animals and not all 
of those which have the capacity to respond to the prevailing conditions. 
Aggression then may indeed be an adaptation to states of affairs in which animals 
evolved. However, acceptance of this hardly bridges the gulf between any likely 
sets of circumstances which confronted our ancestors, animal or early human, and 
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some of the cicumstances we might meet aggressively today. What conceivable 
situations producing the claimed adaptation could be comparable to religious and 
political conflicts which can fuel modern war? 
The fear in humans, provoked by a threat to territory perhaps, may be the same as 
or similar to that experienced by other animals, but the behaviour which constitutes 
the response to that fear can be so markedly different that it is difficult to see it as an 
adaptation. Hitting out with a blunt instrument might be an adaptation traceable to 
biting or clawing, but telephoning the order to launch an attack seems different in 
kind. The explanation for impersonal and technological warfare surely cannot be 
simply biological adaptation. Adaptation hardly explains the prospect of first strike 
in a nuclear war. 
Destructive fighting, between groups in the animal world, which appears to be 
organised with various individuals playing distinct roles, does exist and might be 
thought the precursor to human war, but, according to Huntingford this is far less 
common than might be supposed. The most salient examples of injurious, large-
scale, inter-group fighting is found in , 
the social Hymenoptera, a class of animals (including 
the ants, bees and wasps) that is very different from 
our own species in evolutionary terms. 
(Huntingford, 1989: 31, my italics) 
So military warfare might look like an adaptation of animal behaviour, but such 
large scale fighting within the species is apparently only found in animals from 
whom we do not claim direct ancestry. 
In any case, some forms of modern warfare do not sit easily alongside notions of 
survival of the individual or the species. Nuclear exchanges seem irreconcilable 
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with the promotion of the survival of the species or even the continuation of a 
particular family grouping. 
If you fling a nuclear weapon at your enemy, you are 
unlikely to increase the chances that either you or 
your family will survive. (Bateson, 1989: 38) 
At best, the likely outcome is too uncertain and indiscriminate: at worst, the 
obliteration of both group and species is a serious possibility. It might be thought 
that the need for territory to ensure the survival of the group, which comprises 
conditions in which aggression comes into play, can still arise and it is the 
expression of that aggression which has altered (or evolved), but, in so far as a 
particular form of aggression plainly endangers the survival of all, it cannot be 
simply the result of evolution and adaptation. 
II iii) 	 Aggression is innate 
'Human nature' often refers to that which is assumed to be innate. Although 
'innate' is often used to encompass more than its precise biological meaning, 
nevertheless, the implication of heredity is presumably intended, and this in its turn 
suggests genetic transmission. If aggression were innate in this sense, then people 
would be more or less aggressive according to their genetic inheritance. While the 
truth of this is hotly debated, such enquiry may be a red herring. Even if 
aggression were an inherited characteristic, 
a genetic difference that produces a behavioural 
difference does not mean that the behaviour pattern in 
question is unaffected by other factors. (Bateson, 
1989: p. 39) 
So genetic inheritance need not be deterministic with respect to aggressive 
behaviour and environmental influences are not ruled out. 
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'Innate' can also imply 'present at birth' and thus unlearned. Again, it is assumed 
that much hangs on this. Acceptance of the idea that aggression is innate seems to 
carry with it acceptance that aggression is an unalterable fact of human life, 
something which, if present, we must just learn to live with. But irrespective of 
whether or not it can be shown scientifically that aggression is initially learned or 
unlearned, it is evidently not the case that patterns of behaviour are immutable. 
Aggressive behaviour certainly seems to be affected by learning. Punishment and 
rewards have their effect, even if it is not always the desired one. Both human 
beings and other animals apparently learn to discriminate between situations where 
aggression succeeds and fails in achieving the end in view. People learn to change 
the way in which they give expression to their aggression. That a behavioural 
characteristic is initially unlearned does not show that learning cannot alter it. 
In the light of the above, it is obviously not necessary to deny that biology 
contributes to the existence of human aggression in order to show that beliefs about 
aggression based on a crude version of biological determinism are ill-founded. 
Aggression and its expression in human war is not simply natural in the sense of 
genetically determined. 
Aggression is an attribute of persons. Persons have to be understood as more than 
biologically natural entities in order to make any sense of moral agency. Aristotle 
made this clear: 
... none of the ethical virtues arises in us by nature, 
for no natural thing can be unnaturally trained. For 
instance a stone which naturally moves downwards 
cannot be trained to move upwards. Neither by 
nature, nor contrary to nature, then, do the virtues 
arise in us. (Aristotle, 1975: 28, 1103a) 
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It is difficult to imagine that even the most rigid adherent of sociobiological beliefs 
actually does live and function as if there is nothing more to human beings than a 
collection of predetermined and predetermining biological characteristics. 
Nevertheless some people do talk and write as if there is no more to personhood 
than can be explained in scientific terms. 
Arguments from biological determinism are pernicious in that they are often used to 
suggest that aggression and war are beyond our control and thus not subject to 
ethical judgement. Recognition of their insecure base is therefore vital. 
When aggression or war is termed 'natural', it would be foolish to imagine that 
what is intended is always a reference to biological determinism. 'Natural' is rarely 
used with any precision and can have various connotations, many of which relate to 
beliefs about the moral status of what is described. 
Bertrand Russell believed that there will always be those who claim, 'wars will 
never stop; it would be contrary to human nature', (Russell, 1936: 179). The claim 
may be that our biology leads inexorably to war, but reference to 'human nature' 
and to what is 'natural' often carries other associations too. Insofar as these also 
can affect moral attitudes, it is important that they are recognised. In the following 
section various implications of 'natural' will be explored in order to emphasise that 
aggression and war should not be viewed as beyond human agency, above 
interference or desirable in being a 'natural' good. 
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III Some worrying implications of claiming that 
aggression is natural. 
Even when it is plain that aggression is not natural in any sociobiological sense, it 
can surely be accepted that it is part of human nature. People laugh, cry and they 
are aggressive among other things. There is nothing particularly worrying about 
the idea that aggression is a human characteristic. What is disturbing is when 
'natural' is taken to imply unavoidable and inevitable in this context. This is 
disturbing not only because it is a very obvious misconception, but also because 
reasoning based on it seems to lead in dangerous directions - reasoning that seems 
to go as follows: If aggression is natural and inevitable, then we must put up with 
it, like the weather. We must accept it as a given: it is acceptable in the sense of 
being beyond the moral sphere.' When this slides into legitimising the status quo, 
it puts aggression and even war beyond reproach. There is no point in wanting to 
alter the situation and it is odd even to question it. Aggression and war are just 
features of our existence. 
III i) 	 The implication of conceptualising aggression as a law 
of nature 
Sometimes it appears that this view of aggression is based on an assumption that its 
existence is an example of a law of nature. Much as we perceive the movements of 
planets as constituting a law of nature, so aggression is merely an instance of 
natural law. 
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Whether or not this description is apt, this idea becomes a matter for concern when 
the corollary is that laws of nature are only to be interfered with at our peril. 
Physical phenomena, such as planets, are not governed by laws in the sense that 
they transgress when they do not conform to our theories or laws. The 'laws' 
describe events, and it is these descriptions which conform (or fail to conform) to 
reality. To see conduct, including aggressive behaviour, in these terms is to see it 
as something beyond any human agent's control. 
Thus to invoke the 'laws of nature' as a reason for allowing or encouraging 
aggression is odd in the extreme. It is to maintain on the one hand that aggression 
is not subject to human agency, and thus beyond questions of justifiability, and on 
the other to imply that people ought to allow its natural course. The old adage that 
'ought implies can' should not be ignored. Logically, if people cannot choose 
autonomously with respect to aggression, we cannot be morally blamed or praised 
for allowing it. 
It might be argued that moral choices are pertinent to natural phenomena, for rain is 
natural, but we can prevent it falling in a certain place by seeding the clouds so that 
it will fall earlier elsewhere, and we can bring about good or ill by such action. But 
this does not show that there is no inconsistency in speaking of a moral duty to give 
natural aggression its head. Whether or not we are morally justified in causing the 
rain to fall in one place rather than another depends on the consequences, not on the 
simple assumption that it is morally wrong to interfere with a natural phenomenon. 
Only if aggression is perceived to be not merely an expression of the laws of 
nature, but something within our control, can we make sense of the idea that we 
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have a moral obligation to allow or stop it. It is self-contradictory to assert 
otherwise. 
III ii) 	 The implication that we should not interfere with what is 
natural 
Recommending non-interference may also be implicit when 'natural' is used, as in 
'natural childbirth', as if meddling with nature is somehow always deplorable and 
the repression of what comes naturally is damaging. The implication that we 
should not intervene in processes we call 'natural' is frequently identifiable when 
green issues are under discussion. Some respect for the natural world and a healthy 
fear of causing unpredictable catastrophes must be eminently reasonable, but I 
should not wish to extend non-intervention to everything which could be termed 
'natural'. On occasion, the use of antibiotics seems highly desirable, while to let an 
illness follow its natural course is not always a good thing. When it carries this 
connotation, it is evident that 'natural' is selectively employed, commonly applied 
to trees and hedge rows, and rarely to some other phenomena of the natural world 
such as germs. Just because something is natural in this sense it does not always 
mean that it is wrong to interfere. 
III iii) 	 The implication that what is natural is desirable 
The connotations of 'natural' can go beyond the idea that what is natural is just a 
feature of our existence and something we must accept. 'Natural' can imply 
'acceptable' in a positive sense. For some what is 'natural' , in contrast with what 
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is 'unnatural' seems to approach a good per se. Shampoos, perfumes and hair 
brushes are sold by one retailer as part of 'The Natural Collection', presumably to 
distinguish them from the undesirable synthetics and artifice of competitors. 
'Natural' is often used evaluatively, suggesting preferable, in sharp contrast to the 
distaste evinced when people talk of 'unnatural perversions'. To see aggression 
and war as natural can be to see it as something desirable or to be preferred. 
III iv) 	 The implication that what is natural is laudable 
What is natural can be acceptable in a slightly different sense - morally acceptable, 
even a good. In part, this idea derives from a sociobiological set of beliefs which 
raise the 'survival of the fittest' theme. Those who survive are not just lucky, but 
the fittest. If aggression has led to survival, then it is a valuable characteristic. 
Those who exhibit aggression are the best specimens. What has survived is not 
just acceptable, it is the height of the evolutionary tree to date - the best yet. It can 
become more than acceptable; it can be laudable. The corollary of this must be that 
those who are victims of aggression are weak: they are doomed, deserving all they 
get. The aggressive salesperson deserves the sale, and the foolish, weak buyer 
deserves to be taken for a ride. The aggressive fighter deserves to win the war and 
the pacifist lacks merit in being without red-blooded aggression. Most scientists 
would certainly blench at this interpretation of evolutionary theory, but the 
metaphors used by some do contribute to such interpretations. The imagery of the 
selfish gene has much to answer for. To say that aggression is natural can mean 
that it is praiseworthy. 
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III v) 	 The implication that what is natural requires outlet 
Of course aggression is not always spoken of with approval and it would be 
ludicrous to imagine otherwise. Noting that aggression is natural is sometimes 
accompanied by the suggestion that people need to 'get it out of their systems'. 
Among the the beliefs about human aggression he lists as prevalent in Western 
Society, Goldstein includes, 
Failure to express anger results in heart disease, 
stress, and high blood pressure. 
and 
Children should be allowed to play aggressively. 
This will get it out of their system and they will be 
better behaved as a result. (Goldstein, 1989: 11) 
The implications here are confusing. On the one hand, a certain complacency 
towards the moral status of aggression is evident - a sort of mental shrug along with 
the thought that, 'It's only natural,' - and on the other, there is evidence of some 
uneasiness that unless it is channelled into appropriate spheres it might have nasty 
consequences. 
The confusion is particularly evident when what is put forward as a harmless outlet 
is itself violent . Boxing often seems to be recommended as a sport in which 
people can use their aggression in -a disciplined and controlled fashion. As 
Goldstein warns, there is a belief that,-  
The aggressive instinct can be controlled through 
substitute activities, such as football games. 
(Goldstein, 1989: 11) 
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It does not require too great a leap of the imagination to see that the underlying 
assumption is often that natural aggression will otherwise find a more dangerous 
outlet. 
It is clear then that, although it is not always so, loosely to describe aggression as 
'natural' can lead to perceptions that it is unavoidable, acceptable or even desirable. 
Our beliefs with regard to aggression are important because they appear to affect 
our attitudes towards it and what we do about it. In what sense aggression is 
believed to be natural matters. 
Aggression must be understood as an emotion and a mode of behaviour - natural, in 
that it is a human attribute, but neither unavoidable nor necessarily good. 
Since it is thought to be causally or otherwise closely related to warfare, one further 
line of enquiry into aggression should be pursued. Having established that it is not 
outside the arena of moral questions, it is important to ask if aggression itself is 
morally objectionable for if it is, then it is unlikely that war could be morally 
neutral. 
IV Is aggression a prima facie moral evil? 
IV i) 	 Is aggression morally neutral? 
Midgley (1984: 91) is certain that aggression is not necessarily wicked. She is 
surely right that not all wickedness is aggressive: the two are not synonymous. At 
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the individual level, presumably one can lie or break a promise without feeling or 
acting aggressively. On a larger scale, injustices are perpetrated by neglect as well 
as with the intention to harm. Whether or not all aggression is wicked does 
however seem to be a more complex issue. 
Once again it may be useful to draw a distinction between the emotion (feeling 
aggressive) and the behaviour. Midgley writes of the 'positive function' of 
aggression, suggesting that children need to feel it before they can control it and 
learn 'the difference between justified and unjustified anger,' ( Midgley 1984: 89). 
It must be true that people have to experience an emotion before they can control it, 
if only in the sense that there would be nothing to control otherwise. It is not 
equally obvious that people are all similarly a prey to their emotions. Perhaps 
somewhat implausibly but not inconceivably, it might be that some never have this 
propensity and thus never learn, or need to learn, control over their aggressive 
feelings. Be this as it may, Midgley implies that aggressive feelings per se are 
neither evil nor good, but they can be put to good or bad use. I cannot agree. 
Anger may be neither evil nor good, yet have good or bad consequences, but 
aggression seems different. 
Prima facie, aggression is morally questionable in that it involves the intention to 
harm or to override the rights of others (whereas anger need not). Rage appears to 
be an entirely appropriate emotion to feel when confronted by a terrible act of 
cruelty. Further, it might be deplorable, and show a sad lack of moral sensitivity, if 
one were not enraged. But if aggression is not exactly the same as anger, in that it 
includes the will to wound, then it is less clear that there are occasions on which 
one ought to feel aggression. 
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IV ii) 	 Is feeling aggressive morally wrong? 
It could be argued that feelings, wishes and intentions do not enter the sphere of 
morality unless they are enacted or affect others in a fairly direct way, but if our 
beliefs affect our attitudes and our attitudes influence our deeds, the potential for 
private feelings of an aggressive nature not having some effect in the long term, on 
other people, is small. Feeling aggressive may be a moral matter. 
It does not seem to me that thinking a thing, as it were, is as bad as doing it, 
although some thoughts may be worse than some deeds. (Dwelling on refinements 
of torture one would apply if one dared must be more wicked than the sharp word 
spoken in mild irritation, but toying with thoughts of murder cannot be as bad as 
perpetrating the crime.) So the actual physical attack on another is likely to be less 
easily justified than the aggressive emotion. Conversely, if actual violence can be 
justified, it is likely that aggressive feelings can be too. 
Suppose I were to come upon a woman mistreating a dog. My emotional response, 
anger, is morally appropriate. (I am a moral agent. There is no suggestion that my 
feelings are automatic or totally unavoidable.) Although my response is affected by 
my appraisal of the situation as well as my abhorrence of cruelty, I have not been 
intentionally provoked by the person against whom my anger is directed: indeed, 
she is unaware of my presence. All seems relatively unproblematic while what I 
feel is anger and until I contemplate action. Is it not only justifiable, but probably 
my moral duty, to take some action - but what action? Instantly to kill the woman 
seems to be to go too far. I do wish to arrest the mistreatment and also to 
discourage her from such cruelty in the future. This aim seems worthy enough 
and, provided both that I pursue it with the minimum force necessary to achieve it 
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and ensure that this minimum force is not in itself disproportionate to the end in 
view, my action seems justified. Suppose now that my emotional response is 
rather more than anger; it is aggressive. I feel like killing her. While not as morally 
reprehensible as actually commiting murder, it surely seems that this also is too 
'violent' a response to this situation. Should not my feelings, as well as my 
actions, be more matched to my appraisal of the circumstances? 
It is true that we do often talk of 'feeling like killing' people, but usually this is a 
graphic attempt to convey the intensity of our rage, irritation or whatever. (This is 
not to say that it is never literally meant, only that frequently we use the phrase 
without having the full-blown intention to commit murder. We may even 
momentarily want to kill, but have no intention of satisfying this desire.) If actual 
killing is ever justifiable, presumably in the same circumstances 'thinking it' is also 
morally tolerable. The factors which give good grounds for actions are surely 
likely to constitute acceptable reasons for experiencing certain emotions. And yet 
this does not seem to ring quite true for aggression. If I kill without sufficient 
justification, I have committed a morally unacceptable act. The action is judged 
according to appraisals of the circumstances. Simply wanting to take another's life, 
without any further grounds will not suffice as moral justification. Experiencing _ 
the urge to hurt someone is significantly different from feeling the fury of moral 
outrage. While moral outrage implies my conviction that my feelings are justified, 
the emotion, aggression, may be dependent on a cognitive appraisal of 
circumstances, but need not involve reasoning in terms of self-justification. That is 
to say, in feeling aggressive I need not be asking whether or not I have good 
grounds for hurting a person. I may just want to. Such a desire is no inescapable 
wash of feeling: in the light of appraisal, there may be reasons which lead to the 
aggression, but they may be of the type, 'Because I don't like her face'. In other 
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words, they are not the sort of reason which could comprise moral grounds. If this 
constitutes aggression, it appears improbable that it can be morally acceptable. 
It seems plain that, if killing the woman is too violent a response to her cruelty, then 
aggressive feelings of this extreme character will also be open to moral objection. 
A less violent response is called for. If, on the other hand, violent action can be 
justified, then the urge to perform that act must also be justifiable. Yet 
unexpectedly there remains an intuitive difficulty when we contemplate this 
apparent corollary. Sometimes only wanting to act seems wrong while performing 
the deed appears laudable. An actual attack must in certain situations be desirable -
as the only conceivable means of arresting evil - but merely experiencing the feeling 
of wanting to inflict halm cannot be. Pope is not alone in finding repugnant 
someone, 'willing to wound, yet afraid to strike', (Pope, 1963: 604, Epistle to Dr. 
Arbuthnot, 1. 203). Feeling aggressive without any intention of acting aggressively 
is not always a lesser evil than an aggressive deed. 
IV iii) 	 Can aggression be justified? 
n•n 
The physical act of attacking is not of course always aggressive in the sense of 
intended to hurt. That it does hurt is incidental at times to some other purpose. I 
might launch myself in a rugby tackle at someone who appears to be about to 
assault a small child. My attack is in order to prevent the assault. It is very likely 
that my victim will be hurt in falling, but this is not the point of my tackle. My 
attack is only aggressive in that it is proactive, a first strike as it were, and is 
justifiable as an act to protect the child. 
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A similar rationale might also be invoked to account for people's tolerance of the 
fooballer who plays aggressively (in the literal not metaphorical sense) with the 
paramount aim of scoring rather than wishing harm to opposing players, yet whose 
style of play inevitably is physically intimidating. It might be argued further that, 
provided the player's actions fall within the rules of the game, it is morally 
acceptable. However, although the rules may not preclude it, football is surely not 
essentially about intimidating the opposition. Goals can be scored without 
aggression. When aggressive play is intended to threaten, psychologically or 
physically, I suggest that it is morally questionable and difficult to justify. 
The one sport where aggression is evidently not inappropriate must be boxing. The 
whole aim is to attack and inflict physical violence on one's opponent. But it is 
noteworthy that the morality of boxing is questioned for exactly the reason that the 
infliction of physical harm is an intrinsic part of the sport - within the rules of the 
game. 
When aggression in games implies only 'Get in first' and positive action, then it 
must be unobjectionable. A chess player might well agree. But whereas in chess 
physical intimidation is presumably ruled out, it is not obvious that this is the case 
in football. In physical games, the advice, 'Be aggressive!' can imply far more 
than, 'Take the initiative.' It does often carry overtones of potential violence. 
Personal intimidation in chess is plainly inappropriate. Why should it be tolerated 
as 'gamesmanship' in other activities? The abusive whisper or threatening 
behaviour may be impossible to outlaw from football and thus not against the rules 
of the game, but this does not make it morally acceptable. 
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That aggression which primarily involves the willingness or intention to wound 
must be hard to justify. When a dentist, for example, is drilling aggressively, 
heedless of her patient's pain, this is surely undesirable, and is plainly 
distinguishable from the dentist's action in causing a patient momentary pain in 
order to achieve a relatively pain free future. 
Aggression does seem to be a prima facie evil and morally dubious in many areas of 
life. This is not to say that it is necessarily always unjustifiable. In war, as in 
boxing, to act aggressively is presumably entirely appropriate - war involves 
wounding others. If (but only if) we accept the morality of warfare, then, in 
military action, aggression must be acceptable, even desirable. Similarly, in war, 
the aggressive feelings we might be encouraged to harbour towards the enemy may 
be useful in so far as they enable us to condone or actually engage in killing. 
Nevertheless, aggression is not per se morally neutral or a moral good. It may be 
justifiable in some circumstances, a necessary evil perhaps, but justification is 
needed. Although aggressive deeds and feelings may be valuable in waging war, 
their moral acceptability will be dependent, in the first instance, upon the morality 
of war. 
Plainly war is a moral issue. It has been argued that when war is perceived as an 
expression of human aggression, there is no reason to suppose it is the result of an 
irresistible natural impulse and completely unavoidable. Moral judgements are 
entirely appropriate and should not be pre-empted by any assumptions that 
aggression is natural and therefore acceptable or desirable. More than this, 
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aggression and war are not morally neutral, but prima facie evils requiring 
justification. 
If this is true, it makes sense of the way in which we do as a matter of fact question 
the rights and wrongs of aggression, killing and war. Whether or not killing and 
war can ever be justified is a further question which must now be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Is killing always wrong? 
- an examination of arguments against homicide. 
War involves killing. Given that we do not have to regard war as a terrible 
inevitability, beyond human agency, the moral problem posed must be faced. The 
deeply felt abhorrence towards taking life may reflect the belief that homicide is 
wrong, but many are at the same time convinced that deciding whether to fight or 
not presents a real dilemma: the taking of human life is an evil, but to kill in war 
may be justifiable if it averts greater evil. 
Absolute pacifism, on the other hand, denies that killing another person is ever 
morally acceptable. 
While virtually everyone believes that there is a 
strong moral presumption against the violence and 
killing involved in war, pacifists differ from most of 
us in their belief that this presumption can never be 
overridden, that the challenge to provide moral 
justification for war can never be met. (McMahan, 
1993: 386) 
The absolutist usually adheres to a prohibition on killing as a matter of principle, 
which applies irrespective of the consequences that failure to kill might bring. The 
potentially evil consequences may include death and large scale destruction, but, for 
the absolute pacifist, there can be no moral justification for going to war. 
It will be argued here that, although it is not self-contradictory, the absolutist 
position is inadequate, and that it cannot be wrong, in all circumstances and without 
exception, intentionally to kill. 
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It will be shown that the presuppositions on which the inviolability of human life 
might be based are unsatisfactory and unconvincing. Examination of various 
claims about the special value of life reveals many problems and suggests that there 
are cases where killing is the morally preferable option. Such analysis is well-
trodden ground (see Dworkin, 1993; Glover, 1977; Nonnan, 1995; Singer, 1994 ), 
but it is not always familiar to those contemplating teaching on war and thus cannot 
be ignored here. Part of the moral complexity of war which needs to be appreciated 
comprises the difficulty of establishing the inviolability of human life. 
It might be thought that arguments about individual lives have little relevance to war 
but, 
It is doubtful, however, that an absolute rejection of 
war can be coherently grounded on anything other 
than an absolute prohibition of certain types of acts 
necessarily involved in war - e.g. intentional violence 
and killing. (McMahan, 1993: 386) 
My concern is to demonstrate that no sufficient reason can be found to uphold an 
absolute prohibition on one type of act, killing, which is intrinsic to the whole 
concept of war. What is at issue can often be illuminated by reference to acts such 
as suicide, euthenasia, and capital punishment, which primarily involve individuals 
rather than large groups. Futhermore, it should be remembered that, however 
many thousands are destroyed by an act of war, the numbers represent the loss of 
individual lives. 
The intention in this chapter is to establish that an absolutist position on the taking 
of human life is dubious and that it cannot be demonstrated that all killing, and 
therefore killing in war, is inevitably immoral. Whether or not pacifist beliefs are 
well-founded is of central importance. 
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I Is pacifism self-contradictory? 
In his essay, 'Pacifism: a Philosophical analysis', Narveson argues that pacifism is 
self-contradictory. He declares that to claim violence is morally wrong is: 
to say that those to whom it is done have a right not 
to have it done to them. (Narveson, 1979: 447) 
This does not look promising for two reasons. As Teichman makes clear, firstly, 
pacifism need not be based on the premise that moral claims are to be identified with 
rights claims, and, secondly, the premise itself is extraordinary. It is not a logically 
necessary truth that every moral wrong has a correlative moral right which it 
violates. Teichman gives as an example cowardly behaviour, often regarded as 
morally contemptible, but which does not necessarily violate any rights, since, 'it is 
possible to act in a cowardly way even when alone on a desert island.' (Teichman, 
1986: 32) 
Even if a weaker claim is being made to the effect that violence is a special case of 
moral wrong doing and violates a particular right not to be injured or killed, the next 
stage in Narveson's argument is similarly hard to swallow. As Glover is quick to 
point out, 
he argues that for people to have such a right 
includes having the 'right to anything else that might 
be necessary (other things being equal) to prevent the 
deprivation occurring.' (Glover, 1977: 257) 
Glover is surely correct in noting that, 'To think that something is wrong does not 
entail that potential victims of that act have a no-holds-barred right of self-defence,' 
(Glover, 1977: 257). Having a right not to have one's pocket picked does not 
automatically carry with it the right to shoot the pick-pocket. Entitlement to act in 
protection of one right cannot be a carte blanche to override the rights of another. 
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Narveson himself earlier concedes this when he writes, 
we do not have a right to kill someone for rapping us 
on the ribs for example. (Narveson, 1970: 64) 
Nevertheless he does go on to argue that if rational persuasion fails then 'we have a 
right to the use of force,' (Narveson, 1979: 73). Glover explicitly assumes, 
although Narveson is writing about violence more generally, that the flawed logic 
of the argument is unaffected if it is applied to killing. This is, I think, correct 
given that Narveson does not specify that only force short of homicide is 
permissible. 
Glover draws attention to the logical conclusion of Narveson's argument: 
absolute pacifism is inconsistent because, in saying 
that violence or killing is wrong, we are committed to 
the view that we have a right to use violence or 
killing if necessary to protect our own right not to be 
the victim. (Glover, 1977: 257) 
Narveson could be right in assuming that we have the right to kill in self-defence, 
but such a right cannot be derived solely from the right not to be killed. Having the 
right not to be tortured does not give me the right to torture my would be torturers 
in order to protect myself. The two rights are not so intimately connected. Further 
grounds would be required to provide justification. 
Narveson's position then, itself lacks coherence and does not show that absolute 
pacifism is self-contradictory. - 
My only doubt regarding the apparent absurdity of Narveson's claim concerns the 
interpretation of his actual words. The words, 'anything else that might be 
necessary' (my italics), could suggest the minimum necessary to prevent one's 
right being infringed and that minimum could be to kill, but if this is so a further 
factor has been brought into play. No longer is the right to kill being derived solely 
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from the right not to be killed. We are justified in killing if nothing less will protect 
us. Expressed in this form, Narveson's own inconsistency is not as blatant as 
Glover would have us believe. 
What is important here is that if Narveson is maintaining that absolute pacifism is 
self-contradictory then he is mistaken. Absolute pacifism cannot and does not 
sanction the taking of life in order to protect one's own right not to be killed, even if 
such a right were allowed. 
While it cannot be shown to be self-contradictory, an absolute prohibition on the 
taking of human life may be untenable because it is based on weak or false 
premises. 
II The right to life 
Pacifism is sometimes based on the presupposition that we have a right to life. 
The right to life is often spoken of as 'a moral right', as if it has special status 
distinguishing it from those rights which have been socially agreed. 'Moral rights' 
is certainly not intended to refer to rights which people can confer and withdraw. 
Sometimes the implication is religious - moral rights are God-given - and 
sometimes the implication is that such rights are a priori - just given. Either way no 
reason can be adduced for their existence and they are evidently categorised as 
uncontestable and not open to question. 
Norman bluntly states, 
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There are no self-evident moral rights. The concept 
of a moral right may have a use, but it is not morally 
basic, and whether or not we have particular moral 
rights such as a right to life can be determined only 
by appealing to prior moral considerations. 
(Norman, 1995: 40) 
I agree, but would emphasise that, when the moral right to life is invoked, the 
implication intended is that a principle which has ultimate priority is being called 
upon. If this is so, the right to life is being invested with the weight of a moral first 
principle - a matter for belief rather than argument. The right to life would be an 
absolute. 
An absolute right to life would always be overriding and commitment to it would 
deny the possibility of any justification for killing. As we have seen, Narveson 
appears to adhere to some doctrine of rights, but he cannot hold that the right not to 
be killed and our right to kill to preserve one's own life are both absolutes because 
self-evidently they are likely to come in direct conflict. His must be a belief in 
prima facie rights, such that some rights can take priority over others. 
As an absolute, the right to life is difficult to embrace since it permits no 
consideration of other factors, including those which so exercise us in debates over 
life and death, and there may be occasions when one's right to life can only be 
upheld if someone else's is violated. Acceptance that there is an absolute right to 
life must rest on an intuition that I cannot share. 
The right to life is surely a prima facie right, such that other factors could in 
principle take precedence, and a right like others that, one can choose to exercise or 
not to exercise,' (Singer, 1994: 218). Perceived in this way, it has no special 
significance to distinguish it from the idea that killing is a great, but not necessarily 
the greatest, evil. In this sense, the right to life cannot underpin absolute pacifism. 
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None of this is to suggest that there can be no right to life or that all reference to 
rights, and specifically to the right not to be killed, has no place in law: the 
objection is to a defence of absolute pacifism being based on rights, moral or 
otherwise. 
Agreement that people should have the right to life is undeniably desirable: 
Universal acceptance and secure protection of the 
right to life of every person is the most important 
good that society can bestow upon its members. 
(Singer, 1994: 218) 
Talk of rights, in relation to moral questions of life and death, can be useful in 
underlining the idea, not only that people must face the moral responsibility for 
conferring or withdrawing them (since the attribution of rights, I would maintain, is 
a human activity and not God-given), but also that we can waive our rights or 
choose to exercise them. My rights cannot morally take precedence over yours, 
merely in virtue of being mine, but some notion that my life is peculiarly my 
business, and that I am entitled to make certain decisions about my life, 'though not 
about yours, does seem germane. I may wish my life to be brought to an end and 
thus wish to waive any right to life that I may have for, 
We value the protection of the right to life only when 
we want to go on living. (Singer, 1994: 218 - 219) 
Support for suicide and voluntary euthenasia rests heavily on this assumption, and 
the acceptability of free choice, as a volunteer soldier, to risk being killed in war 
may depend on the same concept of being able to waive rights. (It is after all 
difficult to talk of waiving without appealing to rights - a case of sailors at war 
being drowned and waiving as it were!) Rights talk seems itself to preclude 
absolutism in this context. The notion that we can relinquish rights, irrespective of 
whether or not we ought to, makes no sense unless it is prima facie rights that are 
under discussion. 
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An absolute right to life would be consistent with absolute pacifism, but it does not 
appear to be a tenable proposition. A prima facie right to life, on the other hand, 
provides no foundation for an absolute prohibition on killing. More than claims 
about a right to life would be needed to show that killing in war or elsewhere is 
never justifiable. 
III The intrinsic value of life 
Arguments to the effect that killing is always wrong because life is intrinsically 
_valuable are as weakly based as those dependent on 'moral rights'. Dworkin is 
keen to show that, properly understood, the intrinsic value of life has special status 
which can give rise to the belief that killing is always wrong. 
We believe, that it is intrinsically regrettable when 
human life, once begun, ends prematurely. We 
believe, in other words, that premature death is bad 
in itself, even when it is not bad for any particular 
person. (Dworkin, 1993: 69) 
Pointing out that, 'the abstract idea of life's intrinsic value is open to different 
interpretations', he goes on to explain this: 
Something is intrinsically valuable...if its value is 
independent of what people happen to enjoy or want 
or need or what is good for them. Most of us treat at 
least some objects or events as intrinsically valuable 
in that way: we think we should admire and protect 
them because they are important in themselves, and 
not just if or because we or others want or enjoy 
them. (Dworkin, 1993: 71 - 72) 
Life, Dworkin argues, can be valued instrumentally and subjectively, but it is the 
feeling that life is also valuable per se that he claims gives rise to the belief that it is 
wrong to kill. He distinguishes intrinsic value from instrumental and subjective 
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value by claiming that intrinsic value is independent of what people enjoy, want or 
need in order to gain other ends. 
But the whole notion of intrinsic worth is more problematic than Dworkin allows. 
He too readily dismisses philosophers who reject the notion of intrinsic value, as 
those who insist, 
objects or events can be valuable only when and 
because they serve someone's or something's 
interests. (Dworkin, 1993: 69) 
The mistake lies in his restricted interpretation of 'interests', 'desires' and 
'enjoyment'. Having reduced subjective value to 'enjoying', he then diminishes the 
concept further by making it synonymous with a personal preference for things 
such as whisky (or in his case 'whiskey'). In the light of this, his claim that the 
value ascribed to life is fundamentally different from and additional to instrumental 
or subjective/personal worth is convincing, but what he says is true only in a 
superficial sense. Assuredly life may be valued over and above any instrumental 
factors and in a way different from a mere personal preference, but this hardly 
demonstrates that intrinsic value is disconnected from people's desires or needs. 
To value anything can be to desire in a wider sense something related to its 
existence, to gain pleasure rather than pain from it. I may value something, not 
personally, in the sense that I want it or like it, but because others do so and, all 
other things being equal, I would rather they were satisfied rather than unsatisfied. 
I desire it in that I should choose for rather than against it. So, while I agree that 
things can be valuable in ways other than instrumentally and purely subjectively 
(which for Dworkin amounts to personal tastes), I have trouble recognising 
intrinsic value, completely disassociated from people's desires. Surely any value is 
attributed by people. Value cannot be a property of objects independent of any 
valuers. If literally no-one ever valued a particular work of art, then it would not be 
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valuable. Dworkin himself appears to arrive at this conclusion without realising it, 
when describing how we do not value everything in itself and thus do not consider 
everything inviolable. Instead, he maintains, we select what we take to be 'sacred', 
and, 
our selections are shaped by and reflect our needs 
and, in a reciprocal way, shape and are shaped by 
other opinions we have. (Dworkin, 1993: 80) 
The notion of intrinsic value is variously expressed. Two distinct locutions are 
commonly used: 'valuable in itself and 'valued for itself. I take it that 'valuable in 
itself most nearly encapsulates the Dworkin's idea that intrinsic value is a 
property. 'Valuable in itself is an additional feature of life, over and above any 
other quality; one which is decisive when judging inviolability. 'Valuable for itself 
is slightly different. It does not signify any added value, but is a description of 
how we value something and does not provide a further reason why something 
should be valued. 
Dworkin sees the two as synonomous when he contends that objects of intrinsic 
value are those which are honoured, 'not because they serve our desires or interests 
but for their own sakes' (Dworkin, 1993: 69), but he is in error. I agree that we are 
familiar with valuing things for themselves, but find the idea that something has 
value in itself less comprehensible. To value something for its own sake is to value 
it for no reason beyond its own qualities and attributes - not for instrumental 
reasons, not for some nebulous extra value, but for itself alone. I enjoy a particular 
whisky for its taste and smell, the care with which it has been aged and the whole 
experience of drinking it. I can enjoy it, not in order to drown my sorrows or to 
demonstrate my sophistication to the neighbours, not as a means to a further end, 
but for itself. There is nothing alien about this, but it is noticeable that valuing 
something for itself is a relatively diminished concept and might amount only to 
what Dworkin terms 'subjective' or 'personal' valuing. 
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'Value for its own sake' is something people decide and is not a given. It thus does 
not carry the weight intended by 'intrinsic value' and seems more aptly used with 
reference to preference, liking and subjective forms of valuing. 
Not only do I think Dworkin is mistaken in his characterisation of intrinsic value, 
but it must also be clear that it could not be the basis for an absolute prohibition on 
taking life. I concede that sense can be made of life valued for itself, but it is open 
to me not to value life for itself and so this interpretation of intrinsic value will not 
provide a secure base for the inviolability of life. 
When people appeal to intrinsic value they are usually using it as a 'reason 
terminator', (Gregory & Woods, 1974: 51 - 64). 'Because it is intrinsically 
valuable,' serves as a final reason to bring to a close discussion of why people 
should not take life. But if intrinsic value is attributed in the light of other criteria, it 
cannot properly function in this way and there is nothing odd about asking for 
further reasons. Dworkin himself has conceded this. We do not just believe life 
has intrinsic value and whisky has not: we come to this conclusion in the light of 
other values we hold. It must be unlikely then that the absolute wrongness of 
killing can be established simply by invoking intrinsic value, for it evidently lacks 
the logical status of a first principle. 
Dworkin would agree that appreciation of the 'intrinsic value' of life does not 
logically commit one to an absolute prohibition on killing - he is merely claiming 
that as a matter of fact many base their objections to taking human life on a notion 
of intrinsic value. 
The notion of intrinsic value is not necessary to an understanding that life is 
especially valued and that killing seems a moral enormity. Sometimes 'intrinsic' 
may just be employed to add emotive force to what is said, signifying no more than 
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'special'. It may be the case that life should be specially valued, but not because it 
has intrinsic value. 
There does seem to be something fundamental about valuing human life. As human 
beings, we can value many things and mourn their loss, but without some human 
life there is no valuing and no mourning. Of course without people, other forms of 
life might continue and this could be seen as valuable, but, as far as we know, there 
would be no 'valuing' in any meaningful sense of the word. We can only value 
life, even when that includes life in the future after we are all dead, while we are 
alive to do so. 
Valuing life, or anything else, is an attribute of persons and it is our attitude to life 
and the taking of it which is at stake. To value life especially does not necessarily 
demand that one values a particular life, including one's own, over and above 
everything else. One could wish one's own life over, yet value life generally. It 
would not be inconsistent to believe that killing is a desperate evil and, 
simultaneously, that it can on occasion be justified, in the same way that the 
breaking of promises can. Commitment to the value of life itself does seem 
desirable, but it need not be commitment to an overriding value. 
The idea that we should value life itself is further complicated by the difficulty 
experienced in attempting to define 'life'. If it is problematic to distinguish life 
from death, any absolute prescription with regard to life would seem to be built on 
shifting sand. 
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IV The difficulty of defining 'life' 
Life, it might be maintained, is simply a biological matter - human beings and other 
organisms are either alive or dead. But it is not always easy to distinguish between 
life and death. This is not primarily an empirical problem, although factual 
considerations are relevant. There are times, for example, when we cannot know 
whether patients on life-support systems will ever regain consciousness. If we 
knew they would one day recover, presumably they would be deemed alive still, 
but we cannot know with certainty. Advances in medical technology have brought 
about a situation in which there often is no easily identifiable moment of biological 
death. 
And yet the difficulty is not exclusively one of identifying that life is present or 
absent in accordance with criteria. It is that of deciding which criteria are in some 
significant sense valid. Life, of course, can be defined for legal purposes in a 
variety of ways: the criterion used might be lack of heartbeat, the cessation of 
breathing or brain death. But the criterion used should not be perceived as a simple 
medical fact. It is a condition decided upon. 
_ The moment when death is said to occur cannot be 
discovered by medical science, but rather must be 
chosen. (Truog, cited by Singer, 1994: 42) 
The choice cannot be a purely formal matter arrived at merely to solve a problem 
posed by technical difficulties in hospitals. Because the intentional extinguishing of 
life is a moral matter, we want to know whether or not a person has been killed in 
reality. The lines drawn have significance in the real world. The parameters of 
what counts as life are notoriously difficult to decide, but they are crucial precisely 
because moral decisions hang on them. 
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There are now situations where we have to decide if people on life-support systems 
count as living and will be 'killed' if we pull the plug. To fire shots into a dead 
body may or may not be wrong, but it cannot be the same moral wrongdoing as 
shooting someone who is alive in order to bring about their death. Moral 
judgement will depend on whether or not a person who counts as living has been 
shot. 
This problem is peculiarly inherent in all arguments founded on the value of life 
when life is conceived of in predominantly biological terms, for the point of 
reference, life itself, may be indetemiinate. 
If the alternative to life is death, it might be thought that an absolute ban on killing 
would be more firmly based on a moral abhorrence of death. 
V Is death evil? 
Death may be feared, but it would be nonsense to talk in terms of the very fact of 
death being a moral evil. Mortality is part of what it is to be human, a defining 
characteristic of the human condition. That we shall each die is certain and dying 
naturally is something that happens to us, not an action which over which we can 
exercise moral restraint. As Wittgenstein pointed out, 
Death is not an event in life: we do not live to 
experience death. (cited by Glover, 1977: 51) 
The moral questions arise in the contemplation of premature death by human 
agency. We can properly grieve over death as a consequence of illness, if all that is 
humanly possible cannot prevent it, but this is not the same as the moral 
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repugnance we can feel over the death of someone killed or allowed through 
inaction to die. 
A human death at any age is a loss, the removal of a 
unique individual life, but what is tragic is an early 
death. We mourn especially the death of a child, 
whose evident potentialities will never be realised. 
(Norman, 1995: 59) 
To kill and bring about the frustration of these potentialities is to do more than 
obliterate a biological entity, although even that obliteration may horrify. 
The taking of life is not like having an arm amputated - we cannot manage without 
life or in spite of its loss. The enormity of killing a human being is in part to do 
with the fact that death is irreversible and the victim cannot be recompensed, but it 
is surely more than this too. What morally appals is not death viewed as the endof 
a biological life. The concern is with the curtailing of a good rather than the evil of 
death itself: 
If death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its 
positive features, but only because of what it 
deprives us of. (Nagel, 1986: 9) 
It is what death implies that is important. Neither the value of life nor the evil of 
death, while life and death are seen in biological teillis, are sufficient to show that 
we should never take human life. 
The presumption that-killing is an evil must be inextricably tied to assumptions 
about the good that is being curtailed - the value of human life even if this is not 
seen as an absolute value. The value attributed to life may relate to the quality of 
life rather than the fact of life itself. 
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VI The quality of life 
It does not seem possible that any absolutist arguments against killing could be 
derived from the quality of life, since it is usually invoked in an attempt to legitimise 
the intentional ending of life. The quality of life is assumed to be an alternative 
ethic rather than an elucidation of the value of life. 
Every legislator, every doctor, and every citizen 
needs to recognise that the real issue is whether to 
affirm and protect the sanctity of all human life, or to 
embrace a social ethic where some human lives are 
valued and others are not. As a nation, we must 
choose between the sanctity of life ethic and the 
'quality of life' ethic. (Ronald Reagan, 1983, cited 
in Singer, 1994: 106) 
Scrutiny of the quality of life is important, not to emphasise that it would be 
impossible to infer from it the absolutist position, but to introduce arguments to 
show that killing is not always morally deplorable. This is by no means 
straightforward, since the quality of life is a problematic concept. 
The quality of life is not an isolatable property of a thing called 'life'. It must surely 
be experiential. It may be subjectively experienced - something personally felt 
such as happiness or misery. If a person is in extreme pain, wishing to die, then 
many may concede that helping to bring about her death might be justified. But the 
concession would be related to the person's own estimate of the quality of her own 
life and her own fate freely chosen. My claim to my own happiness or suffering, 
and thus to the quality of my life, is incorrigible. You cannot argue me into 
accepting that my life is happy by pointing to my fortunate circumstances and the 
fact that I have everything people normally desire. You can only give me reasons 
why you feel I ought to be happy. You cannot make me so. I might change my 
mind about the quality of my life, gaining insight from your homily, but only if my 
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happiness were exclusively dependent on my previous misapprehension of my 
circumstances and this is unlikely in the extreme. 
Degrees of pain and pleasure involve a relationship between a person and the 
external world, and how a person feels about her situation in the light of values 
held. What makes one happy can be misery to another. Only I can ultimately be 
certain whether or not I am happy. So when I claim that the quality of my life is 
such that I wish to die, the fact that it is my appraisal of my life is centrally relevant 
in deciding if to kill me is morally acceptable. Respect for autonomy has joined, 
and I would argue overruled, reference to quality in deciding whether euthenasia is 
justified. The quality of life could be used to justify suicide or voluntary 
euthenasia, but not as grounds for killing in other circumstances. 
If we forget this crucial subjective element in talking about the quality of life and 
think of it as something we can easily judge for others, the potential problems 
multiply. 
In underestimating the personal, we must be in danger of ignoring the subjective 
nature of what in fact brings pleasure or misery. To judge another's quality of life 
solely by reference to what we might find tolerable or intolerable could permit 
unsolicited killing in cases where we normally, unhesitatingly rule it out. Extreme 
facial disfigurement has probably led to some suicides, but it does not always result 
in the wish to die, and the idea of killing everyone in this position on the grounds 
that quality of their lives is intolerably impaired, must appal. The moral choice with 
respect to someone else's life requires a greater degree of certainty than one's own 
unverifiable beliefs. 
When we refer to the quality of life, very often we mean it evaluatively and not in a 
purely descriptive sense. We mean it is desirable, as in 'quality time'. The quality 
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of life is greater at times, and at a low ebb at others. Despite the experiential aspect, 
some objective assessment is possible. We can often tell when some people are 
experiencing more quality of life than others. Just because I cannot be certain with 
regard to another's happiness is no reason to suppose I can have no intimation at 
all. We do not need to engage in telepathy in order to justfy our assumption that 
living wracked with relentless pain is to experience less quality of life than living 
without pain. 
Because people can have more or less of the quality of life, it might be thought it 
can be quantified. In a sense, of course, experience tells us this is so. However, 
although the quality of life might be desirable, it does not follow that more 
inevitably equals better. That food is a good does not entail the more the better. 
Eating too much makes us ill. We can have too much of a good thing in this sense. 
It is possible that the longer we live, the more 'quality' we could be said to 
experience, and, if our lives are reasonably contented, that the quality of life will be 
added to in time. I think to some degree this must be so, and it is why we regret so 
bitterly the death of a young person. But this is not to claim that longevity always 
brings better quality of life. A longer life increases the potential for a worse as well 
as a better quality of life. The quality of life cannot be quantified merely in terms of 
longevity. 
We can have too long a life. Insufficient quality of life, or lack of it, causes some 
to wish their lives terminated. They feel their lives are no longer worth living and 
seek death. 
Even when a poor quality of life is viewed as a justification for suicide or voluntary 
euthenasia, it must be stressed that choosing with regard to someone else's life is 
different. It is inconceivable that it could be right to justify decisions on people's 
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life and death by reference solely to their greater or lesser quality of life. Surely the 
greater the quality of life people have is not identifiable with their being more 
deserving of not being killed. 
It is not clear if 'the quality of life' is intended to refer only to the individual's life or 
if it is more generally applicable, referring also to some total quality of life we might 
all share in. If a serial killer is terrorising the neighbourhood, then it might be 
suggested that the quality of others' lives will be very much improved by the 
murderer's death (and that, since the killer is deeply unhappy, his poor quality of 
life will be simultaneously and mercifully ended.) Once again it is difficult to 
imagine this being the morally conclusive factor. It surely does not legitimise 
killing the murderer, since it is possible the desired improvement in the quality of 
life could be achieved by other means, such as imprisonment and psychiatric 
treatment for the killer. Further, if calculations of this type were pennissible, what 
would there be to stop us killing the aged and infirm relative, whom we feel sure 
has a poor quality of life, in order to inherit and thus improve our own situation? 
The sum total of quality of life could be important, but it should not be decisive. 
Thus far nothing has been said about the quality of life to show that the absolutists 
are wrong. However, the danger, of equating more or less quality of life with more 
or less moral justification for taking that life, can be avoided. If, instead of 
focussing on a sliding scale of amounts of quality, we attend to whether or not any 
quality at all resides in a life, the situation is likely to be very different. 
The quality of life could be conceptualised as something a person either has or has 
not. The idea that people can be biologically alive (in a deep and long-term coma 
perhaps) but so injured that they have no quality of life whatsoever is familiar, (see 
the cases of Tony Bland, Nancy-Cruzon and Joey Fiori cited in Singer, 1994: 57 
ff.). Dworkin (1995), Glover (1977) and Singer (1994) all conclude that life in a 
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persistent vegetative state amounts to no life at all and that it is morally peiinissible 
to terminate it. Absolutists would deny this, so it is necessary to look more closely 
at what it is to be alive and have quality of life in order to show the weakness of 
their position. 
VII Consciousness 
Any concept of the quality of life must imply consciousness, for without 
consciousness there would be no experiencing of anything, valuable or otherwise. 
It cannot be convincingly argued that it is always wrong to kill people because they 
are conscious beings. 
To be conscious is to be aware, a state which excludes both sleepers and those who 
have fainted or are under anaesthetic. Plainly, pacifists or not, we must all be loath 
to accept that it could be right to kill people when they are asleep, but not when they 
are awake. 
On the other hand, while the distinction between waking and sleeping is not 
attractive as a relevant criterion, we may be less reluctant to invoke the difference 
between one in an irreversible coma and one who is not. The irreversibility is what 
makes the difference. By definition, a person in an irreversible coma will never 
again be conscious. 
It must be a capacity which is under scrutiny rather than a temporal state. While 
sleeping, a person is unconscious, but has not lost the capacity to be aware. In 
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being deprived of the possibility of ever regaining consciousness, one has already 
lost all possibility of experiencing life. I do not mean that the quality of life is 
minimal, poor or desperately bad - I mean that it does not make sense to speak of it 
at all. This may be in Singer's mind when he writes, 
Life without consciousness is of no worth at all. 
(Singer, 1994: 190) 
But the capacity for consciousness alone could not supply sufficient reason to 
refrain from killing. As Glover (1977: 46 ff.) so cogently argues, a major problem 
with consciousness on this minimal level is that we appropriately ascribe it to 
animals too, but most of us blench at the prospect of there being no moral 
difference between taking the life of a cow and the life of a human being: 
If the whole basis of the ban on killing were the 
intrinsic value of mere consciousness, killing higher 
animals would be as bad as killing humans. (Glover, 
1977: 50). 
I am not saying it is not wrong to kill cows, only that it seems worse to kill human 
beings, and that a moral distinction between the two acts is surely assumed by 
many pacifists.-  Alhough there must be some pacifists who are also vegetarians, 
there is nothing written into pacifism which forbids killing animals. The 
prohibition concerns human life. 
So the capacity for mere consciousness is insufficient to identify the value of 
specifically human lives and to establish that they should never be intentionally 
ended. More would be needed to differentiate between human and other life. 
We cannot allocate a different moral value to the killing of cows and the killing of 
people, simply in virtue of human beings belonging to a different species, since this 
fails to identify a morally relevant distinction. A richer concept of consciousness, 
however, might provide relevant features to justify the differentiation. It is 
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sometimes claimed that people have a 'higher consciousness', either in 
distinguishing some animals from others - human beings from lobsters for instance 
- or in pointing to a heightened consciousness achieved for some, because they are 
especially intelligent, sensitive or even perhaps have mystical powers. 
When the suggestion is that humans, unlike other animals, are more conscious in 
being self-conscious, able to think about long term past and future, able to imagine 
more and engage in abstract thought, then we must be wary of merely redefining 
persons rather than recognising an attribute in virtue of which a person is deserving 
of special treatment. If all human beings by definition have a higher consciousness, 
then in appealing to that attribute we are simply restating that human beings should 
never be killed. 
Only when we mean that all those with the attribute can be distinguished from those 
who have it not, are we recognising a possible criterion. It would be a criterion 
which could give some 'higher' animals entitlements which some humans would 
not share. This might be acceptable, but it is impossible that absolutists 
consistently could find it so. 
If it were intended to signify a degree of awareness, such that 'higher' meant better, 
greater and more valuable, a dangerous dimension of sophistication would have 
been added. 'The better the consciousness the greater the entitlement not to be 
killed', is no more attractive as a rule than 'the greater the intelligence, the more 
deserving of life'. Any notion of life which is dependent upon, 'the possession of 
relatively sophisticated mental capacities, and if, moreover, the possession of these 
is a matter of degree,' will be unsatisfactory since, 
the way is then open to saying of anyone who has 
limited intelligence ... that really he or she has no life 
and there is no objection to killing him/her. 
(Norman, 1995: 57) 
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So the capacity for consciousness, rather than any sophistication of consciousness, 
may be important, but is insufficient on its own to provide a basis for an absolute 
ruling against the killing of people. Human life is not given special value by 
consciousness, although consciousness may be presupposed by the notion of life 
having special value. 
One of the weaknesses of using consciousness is that it fails to distinguish between 
human and other lives. In that it is often regarded as a defining attribute of persons, 
appeal to autonomy in order to show the wrongness of killing might seem more 
promising. 
VIII Autonomy 
To have autonomy is taken to mean to be, within the limitations of the human 
condition, self-directing and self-regulating, having control over one's own life, 
free to decide upon and pursue one's own fate. It is to have the capacity to choose 
and to act on one's own choices. 
To believe that taking life is wrong because to kill someone who does not wish to 
die is to override that person's autonomy is far from absurd, but it could not rule 
out all killing. Many writers, including Norman (1995) and Glover (1977), find 
arguments based on autonomy unsatisfactory. I agree. Although it will be shown 
that Glover's arguments examined below are not conclusive, it will be clear that 
respect for autonomy would permit suicide and voluntary euthenasia. Moreover, 
although dying in war is not the same as suicide and euthenasia, to kill in war is not 
always to override a person's autonomy. 
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In establishing that the autonomy principle does not preclude killing in all cases, 
Glover raises the dilemma of a hypothetical set of people who have no reluctance to 
die and contends, 
If our only objection to killing were based on the 
autonomy principle, there would be no objection to 
killing the whole community. (Glover, 1977: 79) 
I am not sure this is so. If, as Glover implies, there is no reason to suppose that the 
people in the community lack autonomy despite their complacency with regard to 
death, then presumably they have made an autonomous decision to continue living. 
Commitment to the autonomy principle would not permit their lives to be taken. 
After all, both suicide and murder would be open to them. In so far as they are not 
bringing about their own deaths, perhaps in the belief that both suicide and murder 
are wrong, it has to be as a result of an autonomous decision, however lightly 
taken. Would it be possible not to be reluctant to die and yet to continue living 
without choosing to do so? I suppose one might not care either way and accept life 
or death according to, for example, the throw of the dice, relinquishing one's 
autonomy in this respect. But still there would remain an implicit choice to leave it 
to chance rather than, for example, to be killed as a result of another person's 
decision. Killing them in either case still looks likely to be an act infringing on their 
autonomy. 
Glover has not demonstrated that arguments for pacifism, based on the principle 
that it is wrong to override a person's autonomy, will permit killing in this instance. 
Commitment to the autonomy principle may not allow the taking of life in this 
example, but it is difficult to see how it could lead directly to an absolute prohibition 
on killing. Part of the attraction of autonomy as a foundation for arguments over 
life and death is that at least here there is a factor relevant to our wishes with respect 
to our own lives. However, these same wishes may include the desire to die and it 
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must make permissible some cases of suicide since taking one's own life can be an 
autonomous act. 
It might be said that to rely on autonomy alone is to fail to take account of the belief 
that, even if a person chooses to commit suicide, we could be justified in 
intervening and overriding her autonomy. In other words, some implications of the 
autonomy principle do not sit easily with a common moral belief. 
This is not self-evidently true. Intervention in those cases which characteristically 
cause anxiety would not necessarily involve the infringement of autonomy. The 
occasions on which we are likely to feel justified in preventing suicide are surely 
exactly those when we feel that the intended act is not the result of a fully 
autonomous decision. The conditions of autonomy include, not only freedom from 
external influence, but also freedom from some influences internal to a person -
irresistible impulses, addiction, states of mind and emotions so strong that they 
preclude or radically impair the exercise of reason. An autonomous decision does 
not demand the absence of all illness or emotion, but it does require that it is made 
in the light of reasons, rather than exclusively emotion. (One might be angry or 
jealous but still not to the degree to which this would interfere with one's reasoning 
powers. It is only when overwhelmed by passion, blinded by rage perhaps, that a 
person's autonomy is endangered.) An inability to make decisions, to think straight 
and a loss of self-identity are frequently cited as symptoms of serious depression. 
This too must amount to loss of autonomy. We feel people are not responsible for 
their own actions if they commit suicide when the 'balance of the mind is disturbed' 
and believe that intervention is justified. What are we pointing to but their lack of 
autonomy? Glover's contention that, 'if the only principle applying in matters of 
life and death were the autonomy principle, we would often find ourselves debarred 
from intervening' (Glover, 1977: 79 - 80), seems to overstate the case. 
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It is true that we could not consistently respect autonomy and prevent suicides 
which we judged to be the result of autonomous decisions, but the intervention 
would not be ruled out in all those cases when it is very often believed justifiable. 
I am not entirely clear whether or not commitment to pacifism necessarily precludes 
the moral acceptability of suicide and voluntary euthenasia, but, if the absolutist 
stance maintains that all taking of human life is wrong, it cannot be based on respect 
for autonomy. If the concern is only with unsolicited killing, adherence to the 
principle of autonomy has yet to be shown inadequate. 
To take the life of someone who does not wish to die would be to infringe on that 
person's autonomy. Will it follow that all killing, in war for instance, is wrong? If 
soldiers have freely chosen to pursue a career which clearly puts their lives at risk, 
although they would choose not to be killed given the option, the autonomous 
decision to become soldiers might take precedence. The implication must be that 
they are contracting to do all that is involved in being members of the armed forces, 
up to and including being killed, and moreover, despite not wishing to die, they are 
committed to foregoing some actions (such as desertion) by which they could avoid 
being killed. Priorities can be identified among one person's autonomous choices 
when they conflict. Some killing in war may be on par with allowing suicide and 
permitted by the autonomy principle. 
Noting this does not resolve the situation when two people's autonomy is in 
conflict - the question of who is in the right during fighting, when one soldier's 
autonomy seems inevitably threatened by another's. However it could be argued 
that this is not, in theory, a situation where two people's autonomous choices are in 
conflict. In making the decision to become soldiers, people have implicitly 
relinquished some autonomy - autonomy over certain aspects of their lives - as if 
waiving a right. They have agreed to obey orders unquestioningly in certain 
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situations and those orders may be to override a reluctance to face death and to kill. 
To think of soldiers as infringing their enemies' autonomy when shooting them is 
mistaken. Like monks who surrender some of their autonomy in promising 
obedience, the question of their autonomy in that respect need not repeatedly arise. 
There is no presumption that this never arises. A change of mind is very possible. 
With new insight in the face of imminent death, one might well arrive at the 
autonomous decision that one does not wish to be killed for queen and country, and 
rescind the decision made on joining up - but equally, one might not. One might 
fear death and yet prefer it to dishonour. As a result of an autonomous decision, 
one could still choose to be killed. Respecting autonomy does not seem to prohibit 
all killing of others. 
And yet choosing to meet death in this fashion is not the same as deciding on 
suicide or opting for euthenasia. The situation on the battle field is significantly 
different. There is a clear distinction between sincerely soliciting death and being 
willing to die if necessary. The soldier may have surrendered the entitlement to take 
each and every means of avoiding being killed, but this is not the same as wanting 
to die. The soldier courts death only in the sense of intentionally risking life. A 
soldier could be suicidal and yearn for death, but, given that on the field of battle a 
person is carrying weapons which can be turned to self-destruction, the case is not 
altered. If the soldier does not kill himself with the means so readily to hand, we 
should be wary of the conviction that he has taken a fully autonomous decision to 
do so, and recognise the belief, that in killing we merely shall be allowing suicide 
or euthenasia, might be mistaken. 
Death in war is cannot be equated with suicide or euthenasia. If killing on the 
battlefield is compatible with respect for autonomy it is for different reaons. 
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The argument would have to be that to kill in war would not necessarily override a 
soldier's autonomy per se. In killing a soldier there need be no conflict between 
respect for that autonomy, embodied in the freely taken decision which commits 
him or her to accepting death in battle, and the permissibility of killing him or her. 
It is respect for this autonomous choice alone that would not be overruled by the 
enemy forces meting out death, but it is enough to show that the pacifist stance 
against killing cannot be dependent on autonomy. 
While adherence to the principle of autonomy permits some killing that non-
absolutists believe is morally tolerable, it is far from satisfactory. As a guiding 
principle, it does not allow for those who cannot make decisions about their own 
lives. It seems unlikely that the new born baby is in a position to conceptualise life 
and death, let alone to make a preference known. If this is true, then to kill the 
baby would not be to override anyone's autonomy. Pacifists and non-pacifists 
alike are likely to find this morally abhorrent. Examination of autonomy as a 
criterion is illuminating, but reveals its inadequacy as a means to distinguish 
morally acceptable from morally unacceptable killing. 
To show that pacifist ideals are untenable, it is necessary to address this issue 
further and seek a richer conception of living which goes beyond consciousness 
and autonomy. 
IX Having a life 
James Rachels (1986) draws a distinction between 'being alive' and 'having a life'. 
This must resonate with all those who urge us now to, 'Get a life!' They imply that 
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being alive is not good enough; we need in addition to 'get hold of life', to 'start to 
live' rather than passively going along with the routines of living. 
It might seem that nothing more is being recommended here than the need for 
quality of life, but, in Rachels' terms, having a life is a precondition of any 
qualitative life and might be quite distinct from anything normally intended by 
'quality living'. (One could have a life of abject misery, lacking all apparently 
desirable features.) Having a life has more to do with the capacity for self-
consciousness and the capacity for experiencing quality - good or bad - in our lives, 
than with our experiences of life themselves. At the same time, the idea 
encompasses that value we attach to people's lives as being, peculiarly and 
significantly, individually theirs. Having a life is not the same as having a quality 
life and it goes beyond any purely biological concept of living. 
Rachels explains that there can be more to living than merely being alive: 
Insects, while they are doubtlessly alive, do not have 
lives. They are too simple. They do not have the 
mental wherewithal to have plans, hopes or 
aspirations. They cannot regret their pasts, or look 
forward to their futures. (Rachels, 1986: 26) 
Insects do not have the capacity for autonomy and for that self-consciousness 
which makes it sensible to talk of a quality of life. Rachels' distinction allows a 
conception of life as a good which should not be lightly curtailed. Simply to be 
alive biologically will not serve as sufficient distinction to prohibit killing, but to 
possess the wherewithal to have a life might. 
Consequently the rule against killing does not apply 
to living things which are not capable of having 
lives, including many animals and some humans. 
(Norman, 1995: 55) 
This, at last, begins to coincide for many of us with our felt experience that it may 
not be always be wrong to end life and our simultaneous belief that killing is a 
moral enormity. Biological existence is necessary to any possibility of having a 
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life, but perhaps there are states which count as living yet in which one might as 
well be dead. 
The idea of having a life in Rachels' sense, accommodates the individuality of each 
person's life, with its unique biography, and allows for my sense of ownership 
over my life. Repecting having a life takes account of autonomy. It is not simply 
that I have a biography: it is that my biography is one that only I live. What makes 
my life mine is that I experience it uniquely and, in the light of my own emotions, 
feelings, understandings, desires and personality, formulate my hopes and 
purposes. We may all experience fear, but my fear is not your fear even if we are 
both afraid of spiders. 
What is tragic about an early death is, therefore, not 
just that it deprives the person of a certain quantity of 
worthwhile experiences, but that it interrupts and 
frustrates their living—of their own life. (Norman, 
1995: 59) 
The special value of life is in the living of it. The distinguishing feature should be 
that a person has the capacity to have a life. Both new-born babies and people who 
are temporarily unconscious can have this potential, but not all those who are living 
have it. The way is open to give those who will never in the future be aware, or 
able to plan and hope, a different moral status that may allow taking their lives, 
while protecting the lives of others who cannot make their wishes known. 
The new-born child, though as yet it lacks a sense of 
its own past and future, has embarked on the process 
of learning, of interacting with its environment and 
forming relationships with others, and has thus taken 
its first steps in making a life. (Norman, 1988: 199) 
Talk of a capacity may seem to raise speculations about the future, such that we 
dare not claim irreversible incapacity. 'Will tomorrow bring technological advances 
so that those deemed incapable today will be recognised as capable in 24 hours 
time?' is a daunting question, but it need not postpone all judgement eternally. 
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Valuably, it does encourage us to take note of uncertainty and to err on the safe 
side. We can only decide if we think somone has the capacity to have a life with 
reference to evidence already available. While we cannot predict the future with 
certainty, nevertheless past experience tells us that healthy babies do become 
autonomous people, even if we are reluctant to claim they have autonomy at birth. 
The first person who recovers from cortical death will supply good reason for not 
including death of the cortex in the factors used to establish whether someone is 
living or not. After all, we do not need to foreclose on the possibility of medical 
advances: we can include in our decision making probability and the state of current 
research. Lack of logical certainty does not doom us unacceptably to completely 
arbitrary choices. 
The notion of having a life that is significantly one's own, is not only compatible 
with the idea of autonomy, it is presupposed by it. To be autonomous, the 
decisions I make must be distinguishably my own, not merely those foisted on me 
by other people, culture or routine. In turn, responsibility is dependent upon 
autonomy. To the extent to which I lack the freedom to act from choice, to that 
degree I am not responsible for my actions and cannot be held blameworthy. Moral 
disapproval of killing depends on culpability and responsibility. Intentionally to kill 
is to be responsible for another's death. Having a life, in Rachels' terms, is not just 
to have something of quality, not just to have something peculiarly mine rather than 
yours, but also to have something over which I can be held especially responsible. 
The capacity for having a life then makes sense of the capacity for moral agency. It 
underlines the potentiality for doing good. This too is part of the quality, the value, 
we attribute to human life. Having a life also carries the potentiality for 
wrongdoing, but to deprive a person of life is to extinguish potential for good and 
ill. It is to take away an important aspect of personhood. 
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Having a life is different in kind from existing. The difference is not simply a 
matter of degree. A human being living a life is not just more alive than a Ming 
vase; a teenager is not just more alive than a baby; a person is not just more alive 
than a lobster. Having a life is to be a person. 
The awfulness of killing a person includes but does not depend upon the fact that it 
takes away something irreplaceable. A person's life is unique; even identical twins 
cannot have the same life (Norman, 1988: 200). To take a life is an irreparable act 
and the loss of life generally is the loss of something of value. It could be said that 
breaking a Ming vase destroys for ever something valuable and it is grievous in its 
own way, but not in the same way as the destruction of human beings. The Ming 
vase may be unique, irreplaceable (indeed its value is in part dependent on these 
characteristics) and, once broken, it is irreparable. It is valued for its qualities. So 
what is distinctive about destroying people? Surely it is that human beings have 
lives to lead. A person has qualities which it would be absurd to include in the 
properties of a vase. This is not merely a matter of degree. Human beings are not 
just more beautiful, better made, worth more than Ming vases; they are different, 
they are living. Animals too live and breathe. Their living too is different in kind 
from the vase's existence, but it is not necessarily the living of human beings. 
Autonomy, the ability to lead one's own life, to act wittingly, pursuing purposes 
and capable of moral action - this is what is so distinctive about persons. To the 
extent to which any animals share these characteristics, to that extent they too will 
count as persons in moral judgements. But while they lack the capacity for 
autonomy and morality, they, and any human being in this position, will not. (This 
is not to say that they are not proper objects of moral concern, for we can 
undoubtedly do wrong to them. It is to emphasise that, without the capacity for 
having a life of their own, they are not full persons.) 
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Respecting the distinctive quality of personhood, viewed as the capacity for having 
a life, provides a principle for moral judgements about the taking of human life 
which permits suicide and voluntary euthenasia, when they are the consequence of 
autonomous decisions. It also allows some differentiation between those in long 
term states of unconsciousness. It does not legitimise the killing of people who 
have lives and do not want to die. 
I would maintain that the notion of having a life is an appropriate concept of life 
which enables morally acceptable decisions about life and death to be made. Killing 
those who can have no life is not necessarily wrong. 
Absolute pacifism prohibits the intentional killing of others without exception, and 
is thus incompatible with 'having a life' as a guiding principle. 
The assumption so far has been that pacifism could be based on a principle relating 
to the value of life. The morality of taking life is however often debated in quite 
different terms. It could be argued that it is always wrong to kill, not because 
human life comprises an overriding value, but because the consequences of killing 
never outweigh the prima facie evil of taking life. Consequentialist arguments 
therefore require scrutiny. 
X Utilitarian arguments 
Utilitarianism judges killing to be wrong only to the extent to which it adds to the 
pain in the world or reduces the pleasure. Since it does not give any exceptional 
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significance to the taking of life, this belief is unlikely to yield an absolute 
prohibition on homicide, but the possibility should be explored. 
The wrongness of killing from a utilitarian perspective would be assessed according 
to the consequences: 
to kill someone noinially causes great suffering and 
deprives the victim of possible happiness. 
(Norman,1988: 198) 
Taking life has no special status except insofar as it is that which causes most harm. 
Killing would not be wrong in itself, carrying independent weight in the moral 
balance. 
Norman rejects this view, attacking what he sees as the inadequacy of a utilitarian 
stance, while allowing, 
that the principle of not taking human life cannot be 
an absolute principle. (Norman, 1988: 201) 
In his paper, 'The Case for Pacifism' (1988), he explores the difficult problem 
posed when two people's lives conflict and one's life can only be preserved by 
'sacrificing another's life.' The example he uses is the situation where A is 
threatening B, and B's life can be saved only by killing A. To choose between the 
two on utilitarian grounds, weighing which will add most to the sum of happiness 
in the world, would not be right he claims. 
Intuitively, I agree with his conviction that it would not be right to do so. It is-not 
self-evident that the generous philanthropist, shedding sweetness and light while 
contributing enormously to the happiness, both short and long term, of whole 
populations, is more deserving of life than the saintly hermit who has no effect on 
others. 
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Nevertheless, some problems do attend the example Noi 	 man uses. In order to 
demonstrate the implausibility of the utilitarian position, he needs to show that there 
are instances when a choice between lives is unavoidable, and one person can 
justifiably be killed in virtue of being responsible for bringing about this situation 
rather than for consequentialist reasons. The problems are threefold. 
Firstly, it is not plain to me that examples which present the stark choice of kill or 
be killed, are so obviously plausible. 
As soon as the attempt is made to flesh out some details, it seems that an alternative 
course of action, trying to disable the aggressor, must exist and that this would be 
the morally preferable option. At close quarters, stabbing or shooting the intending 
murderer, A, in the heart is not the only possible course of action. 
The invention of examples where the option is either both must die or one's life 
must be sacrificed is easy, but I find it difficult to include in these the actual threat 
which would be relevant to B's decision in the way Norman requires. If A and B 
are climbing roped together and A falls, it is quite conceivable that B will be in a 
situation so precarious that she cannot haul up A without losing her footing and 
causing them both to plunge to their deaths. If she does nothing or waits too long 
to act, since there is no possibility of rescue, both will die from exposure or from 
the fall when B loses her own grip on the rock face. B might then be justified in 
cutting the rope, thus killing A, but acting in the only way which will save her own 
life. However, if both protagonists are aware of the dangers of their position, A 
cannot be reasonably supposed to be about to attempt the murder of B. He might 
have murderous intent, even be waving a loaded gun in her direction, but it is not a 
real threat to B, unless A is also intent on suicide. A might be responsible for the 
life-threatening situation, through inexcusable neglect of safety precautions 
perhaps, but A cannot kill B right now without killing himself. The choice would 
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not be the same as that in Norman's outline. (To introduce suicidal impulses into 
the scenario would be to intoduce a confusing complication and a different reason 
why a person might be said to be deserving of death.) 
If considerable distance is imagined between the protagonists, A's threat could be 
real and without suicidal implications. A and B perhaps are soldiers. A, in the 
distance, is lining up his weapon. He is a noted marksman and is undoubtedly 
about to shoot B dead. B's only means of preventing this is to fire her own 
weapon at A. Unfortunately, B's weapon fires a hail of high velocity bullets any 
one of which will kill anyone it touches. This looks more like the situation Norman 
intends. But is not the option available to shoot at a point near enough to shock, 
thus destroying A's aim, but far enough away to avoid hitting him? (If it is 
suggested that the speed of response required is such that niceties of judgement are 
out of the question, then the answer must be that, in that event, B is not necessarily 
in a position to be able to make a fully autonomous decision and cannot be held 
entirely responsible for killing A.) 
I am not contesting Norman's claim that B would be justified in killing A, I am not 
trying to invoke Double Effect and I do accept that, B might misjudge and thereby 
kill A, but nevertheless I maintain that B's choice is still not restricted to kill or be 
killed. With Anscombe, I would maintain, 
If he kills the man who attacks him or someone else 
it ought to be accidental. (Anscombe, 1981: 68) 
The conditions Norman needs - i.e. the necessity for B to sacrifice the life of the 
intending murderer - are not as easily incorporated into hypothetical situations as we 
are encouraged to believe and thus the example employed is not convincing. 
Secondly, because Noinian wants to provide an instance where Utilitarianism is 
obviously wrong and respect for life (his solution) right, the culpability of the 
attacker, A, is crucial: 
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The relevant consideration is surely that A is 
threatening B's life and that therefore if the choice 
has to be made it is A's life that must be taken, since 
it is he who is responsible for the fact that one or the 
other life must be sacrificed. (Norman, 1988: 201) 
But what if B is a serial killer, although still not threatening the life of A? While B 
is still not responsible for this particular moment of choice, B has already been 
responsible for sacrificing other lives and is likely to kill again and, as an adherent 
of capital punishment perhaps, A's threat may not be unconnected with this. Is it 
so obvious that B is not responsible for the situation and can be justified in killing 
A? Indeed, Norman himself might accept that this would provide an instance of 
where B rather than A has, 'through the wickedness of his own action, brought it 
upon himself,' (ibid.: 201). 
I have no wish to argue that in these circumstances B has forfeited all claim to life 
and that it is B who must be sacrificed, but only to suggest instead that the death of 
A is not always as easily swallowed as it might appear, and that the attractive notion 
that 'he who is responsible for the fact that one or the other life must be sacrificed' 
is more nearly the description of a gut reaction than of a self-evident criterion when 
deciding matters of life and death. More importantly, if responsibility for the 
existence of the moment of choice between two lives carries with it a lesser claim to 
life, the slippery slope to endorsing the killing of those who are responsible for 
similar dilemmas is imminent. Those whose policies cause doctors to have to 
choose which of two patients should be sacrificed might fall into the same category. 
Or, if it is insisted that murderous intent must accompany the responsibility which 
entails forfeiture of some entitlement to life, this could be employed as an argument 
for capital punishment - something which Norman makes explicit elsewhere (1995: 
187) that he does not espouse. 
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Thirdly, the unsatisfactory nature of the Utilitarian's approach to killing is better 
exemplified in Utilitarianism - For and Against, where the choice is between killing 
one person or refusing to do so, thereby causing the deaths of many men 
(Williams, 1973: 98). (In the course of a botanical expedition, Jim stumbles on a 
small South American town square where the execution of a random group of 
inhabitants is about to take place. The officer in charge of the execution party offers 
the option to our hero and all the villagers plead with him to kill one man, and save 
the rest from certain death.) Here the utilitarian commitment to maximising 
happiness, does seem to entail that killing another person would be justified while 
yet, as Williams points out, most of us intuitively recoil from this conclusion. It is 
not that the reasoning seems to lack all moral force, nor that the bringing about of 
other deaths by inaction is insignificant; it is, as Williams makes clear, the doubt 
that this is the whole story - the incompleteness of the reasoning - that so disturbs 
US: 
A feature of Utilitarianism is that it cuts out a kind of 
consideration which for some others makes a 
difference to what they feel about some cases: a 
consideration involving the idea, as we might first 
and very simply put it, that each of us is specially 
responsible for what he (sic.) does rather than for 
what other people do. (Williams, 1973: 99) 
There is a deeply felt distinction between the responsibility for the act of killing and 
for deaths resulting from a failure to act which is excluded from a purely utilitarian 
calculation. This distinction is not reflected in Norman's example here, and yet this 
is a central inadequacy of the utilitarian approach. 
Irrespective of the validity of the distinction drawn between acts and omissions, I 
am conscious of Hare's comment that it is easy, 
to think up cases in which a utilitarian calculation 
would seem to justify actions contrary to principles 
which most of us, at least when we are not 
philosophising, hold sacred. On careful inspection it 
will turn out that these cases are either fictitious or at 
least highly unusual, or else that the utilitarian 
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calculations are very sketchily done, leaving out 
considerations which in practice would be most 
important. (Hare, 1974: 53) 
Objections to the consequentialist view are often in the nature of intuitions. (What 
other than intuition tells No 	 nan that some prospects may be worse than killing?) 
They may be none the worse for that. The intuition that it is wrong intentionally to 
kill may be a belief in a fundamental value other than the maximisation of utility, 
and a recognition that a plurality of values is possible. Since Norman does not 
completely dismiss utilitarian concerns, he is accepting that we may consistently 
hold a variety of values. Norman's objection to Utilitarianism is that Utilitarians do 
not value life per se, only in so far as it contributes to the maximisation of 
happiness. 
Norman maintains, 
the judgement cannot be a purely utilitarian one, nor 
can it be simply a matter of calculating alternative 
levels of freedom and oppression. The wrongness 
of killing carries an independent weight, and it 
weighs very heavily in the balance, but we cannot 
rule out the possibility that it might be outweighed by 
a sufficiently great prospect of the alleviation of 
oppression or suffering. (Noiman, 1988: 201 - 202) 
I share with Nonnan the intuition that killing just is wrong and also agree that this 
cannot be an absolutist position, for other values may take precedence. 
Nevertheless, I find it more difficult to set aside utilitarian considerations than 
Norman apppears to. 
The utilitarian case is not ultimately destroyed by such criticisms so, if it were 
demonstrable that causing death necessarily, always and inevitably, added to the 
sum of pain in the world and reduced happiness, utilitarian arguments could be 
employed in the cause of absolute pacifism and a total prohibition on killing. But 
this must be impossible. While at first sight taking life might appear to bring about 
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more misery than happiness, it is certainly not inconceivable that the reverse might 
be the case. Williams' hypothetical example has made this plain. Jim will cause 
more pain than happiness if he refuses to kill. 
An absolute veto on killing then cannot be derived from the principle of utility, 
since there will be cases where the value of a human life is outweighed by the pain 
averted in ending it. Utilitarianism provides a means of judging when taking life is 
justifiable. What it does not do is to reflect the widely held conviction that special 
importance should be attached to life, and that this should have independent weight 
rather than being merely something that may or may not contribute to the sum of 
happiness. 
We have seen that there seem to be no strong grounds for the belief that killing is 
always morally unjustifiable. The premises that we have a right to life or that life 
has intrinsic value are flawed. A predominantly biological concept of life, the 
notion that death itself is evil and a generalised abstract idea of the quality of life all 
similarly provide inadequate foundations on which to build a coherent position. 
n•n 
Consciousness and autonomy both failed as criteria to distinguish satisfactorily 
between those that we might find morally acceptable to kill and those that we should 
not. An enriched conception of being alive, having a life, took into account 
autonomy and would permit suicide, euthenasia and possibly the killing of fighting 
soldiers. While it might be that a pacifist stance tolerated suicide, absolutism must 
preclude the unsolicited killing of others and utilitarian arguments would not 
necessarily support this principle. 
The intentional taking of life has been recognised as a prima facie wrong, such that 
moral justification is needed to make it acceptable. I find no rational grounds for 
assuming that it is always unjustifiable and conclude that there may be worse deeds 
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than killing a person - killing many people perhaps, or causing catastrophic and 
appalling consequences by failure to kill. 
However, believing that it is not always wrong to take human life (even when this 
includes soldiers in battle) is not to accept that all killing in war is justifiable. Wars 
themselves may be catastrophic and more than soldiers are killed. Whether or not 
there can be a just war now requires investigation. 
81 
CHAPTER 3 
Can killing in war be justified? 
We have seen that people are not doomed as it were to respond aggressively, 
resolving all their differences by physical attacks, so war is not entirely beyond our 
control and is thus open to moral scrutiny. Despite the fact that the prospect of 
killing other people appals, it also seems that an absolutist stance against the 
intentional taking of life is not self-evidently the only morally acceptable one. It is 
not yet clear if killing in war falls into the same category as suicide and euthenasia, 
where at least doubt remains and deliberately taking life might be justifable. 
Whether or not homicide in war can ever be justified is a further question. 
I Just War Theory 
It appears relevant then to examine the notion of the just war. 'Just war theory' is 
perhaps rather a glib phrase. 'Theory' suggests a coherent set of principles and 
criteria, but while these are identifiable, they seem to owe as much to history as to 
philosophy. The shifts of emphasis between the different grounds cited as 
justification for war would seem attributable as much to historical circumstance as 
to any linear progression in philosophy. 
There appears to be no single identifiable concept of the just war. Different beliefs 
about what comprises a just rather than an unjust war have been evident through the 
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centuries. We thus share with our ancestors concern about the moral acceptability 
of warfare, but accounts of what constitutes that acceptability have varied with time. 
The notion of the just war comprises a major Western moral tradition which has 
developed through the ages, reflecting the changes in moral and religious attitudes, 
and taking account of what might be termed 'technical advancements' in the 
methods of warfare. When we refer to 'just war theory' we are invoking a 
description of criteria which provide justification for some wars and set limits on 
the destructive violence of war. 
It is possible to trace the derivation of various threads in twentieth century thinking 
on just wars from classical and mediaeval times, but the twists and turns in these 
threads have been influenced by changing circumstances - changes in 
'jurisprudence, statecraft and in concepts of the patria and the realm,' (Russell, 
1975: 297). The world of nuclear weapons is so far removed from the hand-to-
hand fighting of the past that traditional ideas of the just war could be thought 
irrelevant to the moral dilemmas posed by modern warfare. But it is exactly 
because they comprise a tradition and are part of our history, that present day just 
war thinking cannot profitably be examined in isolation. While there is no 
inexorable evolution of theory along a certain path, nevertheless it is because people 
had those ideas previously that the specific beliefs held now are possible. We 
cannot think about the morality of war without employing the concepts of the 
tradition. 
The very desire to distinguish wars that are 'just' from those that are not is surely 
recognition of the need to limit the potential ill effects of warfare. Although this 
must seem to many today a moral imperative, because the ill effects are morally 
abhorrent, the restraint called for may have sprung from more pragmatic reasoning. 
Indeed, what Welch (1993) terms 'Realist' accounts of war dismiss justice as a 
motivation, maintaining either that states are insincere in claiming to be motivated 
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by justice or that what is perceived as justice is always self-serving. So there are 
political theorists who would ignore moral perspectives on war or reduce them to 
something nearing expediency. Welch himself argues that justice can be a motive 
for war, but when he comments, Only those issues that touch their (the national 
leaders') perceived entitlements succeed in engaging their senses of justice.' 
(Welch, 1993: 2), his notion of justice does seem more legalistic than moral. 
It is relevant to note that this makes clear that there are at least three possible ways 
of looking at what counts as just': moral, non-moral and legalistic. Discussing 
what counts as a just war can be a little like discussing what is right in a game. 
Some might say that to play is morally acceptable since it will give pleasure, but in a 
specific instance it would be morally dubious to beat an opponent by too great a 
margin if you know this will cause the loser to commit suicide. The concerns in 
this example are clearly moral. (In this context, a war to regain territory might be 
morally acceptable, but, if the only means of winning is to lay waste the enemy 
country and kill the the whole population, the enterprise might be morally 
questionable.) In contrast, another might reason that to allow one's boss to win the 
game will be in your best self-interest and thus the 'right' course of action. (A war 
waged solely to enlarge an empire, without any intention to benefit the people, 
might parallel this.) Pure self-interest is surely not appropriately described as 
'moral'; indeed, many would see it as immoral. I prefer the term 'non-moral', 
since the pursuit of self-interest need not, I assume, always be wrong - it would 
depend on other factors such as the effect on others. A third possibility falls 
outside the moral sphere. The legalistic player might believe that, given the game is 
a game and not a moral issue, that one plays according to the rules - what is right is 
anything which falls within the rules. (An analogy here might be the use of 
defoliants in Vietnam which was not expressly forbidden by the Geneva Protocol, 
signed by the U.S.A. in 1970, since it comprised a chemical attack on crops rather 
than on people, but nevertheless had terrible side-effects including birth-defects 
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among the offspring of the affected and thus 'stretched the terms of the Geneva 
Protocol to its limits' (Gander, 1987: 19).) 
It seems quite possible that, within the tradition, wars could have been accounted 
just' in senses other than those in which moral considerations dominate, but the 
fact that on occasion the criteria for just wars have been interpreted in what I have 
called 'legalistic' ways should not obscure the fact that it is a moral tradition. 'Just 
war tradition represents above all a fund of practical moral wisdom,' (Johnson, 
1984: 15). The intention here is to explore the morality of warfare, not to discuss 
just war criteria reduced to the rules of a game. 
While the following exploration of the tradition comprises reflection on what has 
historically been accepted as just, the moral problems_ encountered in evaluating the 
conditions under which killing in war could now be accounted justifiable are 
illuminated. 
I i) 	 The just war tradition 
The distinction between just and unjust wars was drawn long before the Middle 
Ages, although perhaps we inevitably associate it with Augustine and Aquinas. 
Certainly there are examples in the Old Testament of wars believed to be justified in 
so far as they were fought against enemies of the faith and in classical times the 
Hellenes thought all wars waged against non-Hellenes were justified (Russell, 
1975: 292). Implicitly, civil war seems to be what is ruled out, insofar as it 
necessitates the killing of one's own people, but those who are not of the same faith 
or who spring from a different ethnic or cultural tradition are not accorded the same 
rights or protection. Whether this is the result of a moral judgement, the outcome 
of viewing outsiders as less than persons, or whether it is the rationalisation of self- 
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interest, others comprising a threat to the survival of the group defined in terms of 
religion or nationality, is not obvious. It could of course be both. What now 
seems to be a tension between ethics and pragmatic considerations is evident from 
the earliest mentions of just wars, but the need to exercise some restraint on 
fighting, for whatever reason, is evident. 
By the Middle Ages the concept of justice in the context of war had become 
assimilated into a legalistic concept, that of legality (Russell, 1975: 197) reflecting 
the role of temporal law, yet distinctively theological considerations weighed heavy. 
Attempts to reconcile the Christian teaching against violence with the need to wage 
war in order to preserve the faith were inevitable. As many have pointed out, just 
war theories perhaps provide the best compromise the church could devise between 
aggression and Christian pacifism. 
II Jus ad bellum & jus in bello in the tradition 
Walzer (1977) maintains that just war thinking always encapsulates the dualism 
which involves judgement with reference to two logically independent criteria: the 
reasons for going to war and the means adopted in waging war. Aristotle appears 
first to have used the term 'just war', but only later came the distinction between 
'jus ad bellum' and 'jus in bello'. In order to sanction killing in war, both the 
rightness of going to war and the morality of the way in which it is fought became 
necessary conditions. 
. Over time 'jus ad bellum' and 'jus bello' came to include: 
a) War should only be fought for just causes; 
b) It should only be fought with the right intention; 
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c) It should only be waged by a legitimate authority; 
d) It should be undertaken as a last resort, only when other peaceful 
resolutions have failed; 
e) The war should be conducted in a morally legitimate manner. 
II a) 	 Just causes 
The idea that the justness of a war can be dependent on its causes was developed by 
the Romans and 'causa Belli' was cited as a necessary precondition for 'justum 
bellum'. This concept of just causes is still influential. Various conditions have 
been and still are judged just causes. 
The belief that war should be a means to a higher goal has long been accepted as a 
just cause, but to accept this is to accept little of substance. It is only to agree that 
war should not be an end in itself - an assumption already implicit in the whole 
enterprise of distinguishing the just from the unjust wars. 
However, the higher goals have been variously detailed. 
II a) i) 	 To benefit those governed 
Aristotle believed that to wage war in order to obtain an empire for the benefit of the 
governed was acceptable. It is not clear to me if the governed' picks out the 
population already within the empire who will gain from its expansion by perhaps 
the addition of richer lands, or if the term refers to those who are to become part of 
the enlarged empire and thus gain, perhaps by being ruled more justly. A further 
possibility is that one state might fight to acquire an empire not for its own people, 
but for another populace, to give them an empire of their own. Whichever was 
intended, Grotius (De Jure Belli ac Pacis: 131) later expressed the vital condition 
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that the acquisition of an empire should indeed be beneficial to the governed and no 
mere pretext for warfare. Given this caveat, and trusting that 'beneficial' implies 
that the benefit intended is greater than would otherwise be the lot of the governed, 
this does seem reasonable although still more open to interpretation than is 
comfortable. It might, for example, allow the waging of war to bring communism 
or democracy to a people, living under a benevolent despot perhaps, who were 
content with their lot or who did not wish for the more 'beneficial' circumstances 
the war was intended to bring about. Judging what is beneficial is likely to be 
coloured by the values of the aggressor. 
Nevertheless, it is plain that to go to war only to subjugate another populace would 
not be just: 
To crush and bring_into subjection peoples who have 
done you no harm, for no other reason but simply 
for the love of dominance, what is that but to behave 
like a big band of robbers. (Augustine, 1963: 73) 
II a) ii) 	 To prevent enslavement 
Another higher goal which provides adequate reason for war has been seen as to 
prevent one's own enslavement. Given that the actual state of slavery is no longer 
internationally tolerated although slavery undoubtedly still exists in some parts of 
the world, the prevention of one's people's enslavement would presumably still 
count as a just cause for those convinced there can be jus ad bellum. To prevent 
one's own enslavement would be to avoid a state of affairs necessarily evil and 
unbeneficial. 
Attempts to justify waging war in order to resist domination by an external power 
may be a modern variant of this, but they could also be seen in terms of self-
defence. Recognition of self-defence as a just cause is enshrined now in the 
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Charter of the U.N. (Article 2 (e)), but it is far from unproblematic, deserving 
separate consideration below, outside this predominantly historical account, in the 
discussion of modern just war thinking. For the moment it is only necessary to add 
that the Roman Catholic Church now admits only self-defence as grounds for 
fighting a war (Ruston, 1981: 15 - 16). 
II a) iii) 	 To punish 
The idea that punishment constitutes a just cause, if not an easily recognised higher 
goal, is likely to be the least attractive one today - or so I thought until the 
Americans launched Cruise missiles at installations in Iraq to show Saddam 
Hussein that his actions against some of the Kurdish factions in his country could 
not be allowed to pass without military consequences. When justifying the strike in 
the media great emphasis was placed on the wickedness of Saddam Hussein and the 
language employed was of punishment and desert rather than of means and ends. 
Augustine's belief in punishment as a just cause sprang from the tradition that war 
must be a consequence of sin and a remedy for it. This permitted violence against 
an entire people, soldier and civilian alike, since the guilt was assumed to be that of 
the nation as a whole. The whole notion of punishment in the context of the 
activities of states is problematic. Cannot only people be guilty of sin in the way 
that only people commit crimes? If the crime is perpetrated in the name of the state, 
must we assume consent such that all the populace are culpable? Although the state 
undoubtedly has an identity and a momentum, as it were, distinct from the sum of 
the population, there does not seem to be an entity, 'the state' which is punishable 
without punishing individual citizens. Most often, where the state does not act on 
universal consensus, it is the leaders who cause the 'sinful' acts to occur. If they 
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are not solely responsible, they are at least more culpable than many others, yet 
how could waging war on a country punish only the guilty? 
Maintaining that war is a consequence of sin, seems to imply that punishment is 
seen as retributive, a direct response to sin. The very fact of the sin is sufficient 
justification in itself for waging war on the sinners. The godly have an intuition of 
desert and judge war to be the appropriate punishment. This prospect has little 
appeal, not least because justification which rests on intuition seems inadequate. 
The military attack on Saddam Hussein in 1996 may have been in retribution, but 
also appeared to spring from a consequentialist perspective on punishment. It was 
felt necessary to teach him a lesson, to show him and others that he could not get 
away with his misdeeds - in other words to refouu the offender, and to deter him 
and others from commiting similar offences. Without wishing to judge the morality 
of this particular offensive strike here, it is relevant to note that the punitive aspect 
of the attack seemed to be emphasised in order to justify military action for which 
no other just cause could be cited. Punishment was invoked as if it would function 
as an overriding just cause, exactly as it might have been in the past. 
A state could punish with war when it had been lawfully wronged according to 
Grotius, or to avenge injury in the view of Augustine and Aquinas. Dugard (1983) 
claims that Grotius went further in maintaining that the recovery of property would 
provide a just cause, presumably because the original theft would be an example of 
unlawful injury. Waging war to recover lost goods does not seem completely 
identifiable with punishment, but is related to it. The Falklands War was presented 
as a war to recover property and there was evidence in Britain of the feeling that 
Argentina must be punished for invading and claiming British territory. The 
Falklands War exemplifies some of the problems attached to this just cause. It was 
not clear beyond doubt which country was rightfully reclaiming the territory and it 
was evident that many people were dubious whether doing so merited the cost in 
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lives. It was not universally agreed that, even if Britain had just cause, other 
factors were not more important. War seemed disproportionately evil to the good 
sought by it. 
For various reasons then punishment, even when it includes the recovery of 
property, is hard to view as a cause sufficient to justify going to war. 
II a) iv) 	 To convert 
Also related to punishment (although distinguishable from it) is war to convert the 
infidel. As non-believers, infidels must be sinners and deserving of punishment. 
The brutal simplicity of this reasoning has little appeal today and it has been said 
that Christian dogma was used in this way only to rationalise and give legitimacy to 
killing. Dugard may well be right in saying, 
From the earliest days, therefore the doctrine of the 
just war served the cause of one faith or ideology at 
the expense of another. (Dugard, 1983) 
Waging war and killing many certainly does not seem to be the most efficient way 
of converting people, if conversion is a matter of conscience and conviction. Those 
killed will not have been converted and, although the survivors might well claim to 
have been converted out of fear, a sincere change of faith seems an unlikely direct 
consequence of being conquered. I suppose it must be conceded that, if a longer 
term view is taken, inter-marriages and social interaction once peace is re-
established could bring about the desired effect, but the persistence of religious faith 
in the face of oppression and religious martyrdom is not unknown. While war to 
convert the infidel may not be totally senseless, its justifiability must be dubious. 
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If to convert is to save others from eternal damnation or from a state of evil worse 
than death, or even if it is conceived of as a humane way of eradicating a competing 
religion (humane in comparison with genocide), then what must count as a 'higher 
end' is in view. This alone will not make many Holy Wars any more palatable. 
The crusade in 1209 against the heretical Cathars, provides an example of the 
wholesale destruction which could result from doctrinal differerences. Noted for 
their pacifism, the Cathars surrendered town after town, but the inhabitants were 
put to the sword or burnt at the stake. Pope Innocent III was apparently motivated 
by a wish for the extermination of 'an organised Church that offered a real 
alternative to the Catholic Church' (Regan, 1994: 138). It could be argued that the 
annihilation of the sect prevented more Catholics falling into sin by joining the 
Cathars, but it is unlikely that the conversion of the heretics themselves was 
intended. Perhaps it was believed that a Cathar was better dead than living in 
heresy, an early version of the 'better dead than red' which we have heard this 
century and which suggests that political ideology as well as religious faith might be 
used to justify war. 
Despite the alien flavour of conversion by violence, it is not inconceivable that this 
idea contributes to some conflicts in the twentieth century. What appear to be wars 
of faith at the moment are often predominantly driven by political ends, but it would 
be foolhardy to ignore the force of religious belief and the possibility that some 
profoundly believe that ensuring the predominance of one's own religion is just 
cause for war. 
Not only could faith apparently legitimise the employment of military force, but to 
fight could be seen as a religious duty, embraced more ardently perhaps than any 
temporal obligation to state or country. Nevertheless, to be willing to die for one's 
faith or beliefs is comprehensible, but that it is justifiable to kill in order to convert 
others is difficult to accept. 
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II a) v) 	 To achieve peace 
The most familiar just cause, and perhaps the most attractive, is to achieve peace. 
Our doubts about war suggest that peace is necessarily better so it must constitute a 
higher goal. Augustine held that peace comprised a higher goal and thus provided 
just cause. 
It is agreed then that peace is the desirable end of 
war. Everyone by making war seeks peace. 
(Augustine, 1963: 342) 
Johnson seems to find this self-explanatory, merely adding, 'or at least a more 
secure peace than that which obtained beforehand' (Johnson, 1984: 3). 
However, prima facie, some contradiction lurks here. While the assumption might 
be that people are entitled to fight back, as it were, in order to re-establish peace, the 
idea that one might instigate war in order to bring about peace does seem 
problematic, but both these views are quite widely held today. 
When war is justified on the grounds that it will bring about peace, it is as if some 
subtle paradox is being appealed to. I use the phrase 'paradox of peace' to 
encapsulate the notion that peace can involve war. The expression of this belief is 
often confused, but at least two stances can be distinguished. One is the 
assumption that too much peace results in war and the other, that war may be 
necessary to achieve peace. 
The paradox of peace would seem to have all the charm of the paradox of freedom -
that is to say, not a great deal when it is subject to closer scrutiny. (The paradox of 
freedom appears to reveal that paradoxically, 'freedom ... must lead to very great 
restraint, since it makes the bully free to enslave the meek' (Popper, 1945: 265). 
Whether a logical or an empirical point is being attempted here is unclear. But 
surely it is nonsensical. Logically freedom precludes constraint: lack of restraint is 
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a necessary condition of freedom. To suggest this is a paradox is merely to 
disguise the somewhat unpalatable belief that not all freedom is desirable and that 
some restraint is good. R.S. Peters' formulation of the paradox of freedom implies 
this when he says, 'Too much freedom leads to too little' (Peters, 1970: 186). 'Too 
much' suggests an undesirable excess. Peters, of course, clearly maintains this is 
an empirical truth and does not derive it, as Popper seems to, from a logical 
absurdity.) 
Just as there is no paradox of freedom, so there can be no paradox of peace. To 
say that an inordinate quantity of peace leads to war is simply to claim that, as a 
matter of fact, peace is impermanent. It cannot be held that peace causes war any 
more than health causes illness. The suggestion must be that, the world being what 
it is, peace is likely to be broken by war. There is no necessary causal relationship 
between the two. 
The idea that war may be necessary to achieve peace is equally unparadoxical. It 
merely expresses the belief that 'peace' is not always desirable and that war is 
sometimes preferable. 
It should be remembered in this context that 'war' and 'peace' are wide terms, 
properly applicable to more than military conflict and its absence. Like freedom, 
peace can be a matter of degree. One may be at peace with a neighbouring nation, 
yet engaged in violent conflict within one's country. This need not obscure the 
logical truth that, to the extent to which a person is in violent conflict with others, 
that person is not at peace. 
Nevertheless, there is no necessary inconsistency in claiming to value peace while 
being willing to fight in order to protect, for example, democracy, nor is the 
problem apparently raised a paradox. In valuing peace one may be valuing a 
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peaceful society where lack of injustice makes for the absence of violent conflict. 
Quite consistently one may also believe it is better to relinquish some degree of 
peace temporarily and so go to war with the intention of preserving and 
strengthening that peaceful state of society. Roger Scruton argues on these lines 
when he writes that the peace movement ought to work, 
at whatever the risk for the overthrow of the only 
system which has so far succeeded in suppressing 
movements like itself. (Scruton in The Guardian 
newspaper, 29 March, 1983) 
There are no grounds here for the accusation that Scruton deprecates peace per se; 
only for the claim that he evidently values one sort of peace more than another. For 
Scruton, war to bring about a peaceful society is preferable to the absence of war 
allowing the perpetuation of a society which does not value peace. 
Those who are willing that an existing peace should 
be disturbed, do not hate peace, but desire to change 
to something they judge better. (Augustine, 1963: 
342) 
Committed pacifists apart, many who declare in favour of peace accept the notion of 
the just war without any necessary inconsistency or indeed the existence of a 
paradox. Only those who believe with Benjamin Franklin, 'there never was a good 
war nor a bad peace', can properly be charged with self-contradiction if they cite 
peace as their justification for engaging in military conflict. 
Despite the fact that belief in fighting for peace is not incoherent, it is still a 
troubling thought, and the simplicity of Franklin's statement is alluring. The advent 
of nuclear weapons has added a further dimension to the potential evils of warfare 
which will weigh heavy in the balance of the probable consequences of going to 
war. It cannot be denied that peace must count as a higher goal, but the cost of 
achieving it via war today may be too great. 
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H b) 	 Right Intention 
Only in certain, highly specific circumstances would reasons for going to war count 
as just causes. Jus ad bellum requires that wars be fought: for a higher goal such as 
peace; to prevent enslavement of one's people; to gain an empire to benefit the 
governed; in self-defence; in order to punish; to achieve the restoration of goods or 
to convert the infidel. In Aquinas' terms the attacker must have 'recta intentio' -
one of these 'proper' intentions - if his cause is to be a just one. Broadly the 
intention must be to avoid evil and advance good. 
It is interesting to note that avoiding evil does not appear to encompass the 
prevention of war. None of the causes which provide right intention permits or 
takes account of the concept of preventive war. The injury, the sin, the state of 
affairs giving rise to these just causes logically precedes them, eliciting attack as a 
response. In the case of punishment or religious conversion, the notion of 
attacking to prevent the occurrence of a worse war is irrelevant. Generally just 
causes give grounds for going to war, for attacking first, yet they do not include the 
prevention of being attacked. In the past, self-defence has been viewed as fighting 
to defend oneself when attacked, in response to actual violence. What then are we 
to make of contemporary politicians' claims that pre-emptive strikes are justifiable? 
Does the threat or fear of attack at some point constitute a reality, an event, 
comparable to the first spear being cast? Augustine believed that the duty of love 
for the innocent victim obliged a Christian to intervene to protect the innocent. The 
same duty of love was due to the aggressor and limited the means used in 
protecting, but those limits might, it is true, include the death of the aggressor. The 
U. S. Bishops in The Challenge of Peace, explicitly cite Augustine's justification 
for 'lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims' (1983: 25), but 
proceed to confuse the issue as they expand on it. They write that, when faced 
with, 
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the fact of attack on the innocent, the presumption 
that we do no harm even to our enemy, yielded to the 
command of love, understood as the need to restrain 
an enemy who would injure the innocent. (The U. 
S. Bishops, 1983: 25) 
'The fact of attack' could refer to a strong conviction or the likelihood that attack is 
imminent, but a more straightforward reading is surely that an actual event is 
intended: when the innocent have been attacked it is justifiable to restrain the 
attackers by force. On the other hand, 'would', in 'who would injure the 
innocent', could well be a future conditional, as in 'if they were to attack, they 
would inflict injury' which implies that self-defence could be prophylactic. 
I incline to the view that it is not obvious that Augustine supported preventive 
aggression nor that the U.S. Bishops are convinced of its justice. Appeals to self-
defence may only sanction retaliatory action rather than pre-emptive strikes as is 
widely believed. Preventive aggression seems to be a modern concept and not 
legitimised as a right intention. 
II c) 	 Legitimate authority 
'Jus ad bellum' is not simply a matter of just causes and right intention. The 
declaration of just war has long been considered the prerogative of a legitimate 
authority. The 'legitimate prince' of Aquinas, who could justly engage in killing 
for the welfare of those entrusted to his care, has given way to the concept of the 
legitimately elected leader. In current Roman Catholic doctrine at least, such a 
leader is defined as one elected by a majority of the people (according to Dr. J. 
Winter of Pembroke College, Cambridge, at a CUDS seminar in 1986), but 
increasingly who is to count as a legitimate authority becomes uncertain. 
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In early medieval times, war was seen as a function of divine providence, so that in 
a sense legitimate authority was derived from God. Although war was designed to 
punish crime and sin, and providence governed the outcome, victory it seemed was 
not necessarily granted to the just party. This attempt to marry beliefs about just 
wars with the apparent realities of warfare reveals an unease echoed elsewhere in 
theorising. Russell notes 'Augustine's tentative recognition' (Russell, 1975: 21) 
that both sides in a war could have just cause and concluded that the problem would 
then be who had the greater justice. In retrospect, across the centuries, it is also 
obvious that if a ruler were a just one (in other words one who has the right to go to 
war) then in fact he would be likely to consider his own cause just. The enemy, 
almost by definition, is unjust, and so the legitimate prince is judge, jury and 
executioner in his own cause. 
Because the prince does not engage in the killing alone, but is the author of war, his 
legitimate authority extends to soldiers acting on his behalf. What should a soldier 
do if unconvinced of the ruler's legitimacy or of the justice of his cause? Augustine 
was uncompromising. In refusing to kill, a soldier would be guilty of treason. It is 
apparently irrelevant whether or not soldiers believe in the justice of the cause for 
which they are to fight. They have relinquished their autonomy in this respect and 
their prime duty is to the prince, not to their own consciences. Substantially, one 
suspects for predominantly pragmatic reasons, this view is held today by those in 
the armed forces. 
The Nuremburg trials made clear that not all actions could be justified by reference 
to orders from superiors in the armed forces. Obedience to a higher authority could 
not legitimise wrong acts, such as torture. However, this ruling only applies to 
conduct outside that deemed appropriate in war. It does not release soldiers from 
the obligation to kill in war if ordered to do so, whatever their private convictions. 
Killing and fighting in war is not illegitimate. Soldiers are not automatically war 
98 
criminals because they have fought for an unjust cause. The responsibility for the 
causa belli belongs to the legitimate authority. 
II d) 	 War as a last resort 
It might appear that once established as a legitimate authority, a ruler is allowed 
considerable freedom to initiate war within just war theory. However, at least as 
far back as Aquinas, it was believed that war should be only a last resort. While 
there were just magistrates who could resolve disputes, there could be no excuse 
for waging war. This assumption was reiterated in the Vatican II document 
Gaudium et Spes, 79: 
As long as the danger of war persists and there is no 
international authority with the necessary competence 
and power, governments cannot be denied the right 
of lawful self-defence, once all peace efforts have 
failed. (Ruston, 1981: 15) 
In other words, while there remains the possibility that war can rationally be 
avoided and differences resolved peacefully, fighting between nations is 
inexcusable. 
The question of jus ad bellum, then can be seen as an exploration of how to limit 
wars, as a restraining set of conditions to reduce the frequency of war. 
War is justifiable only if war can be limited. 
(Kenny, 1984: 16) 
Behind this lies the presupposition that peace is a prima facie good and war is not. 
In traditional moral philosophy, violence itself is 
never considered a moral good; only an unjust 
situation may require violence as a necessity to 
remedy the situation in the name of justice. 
(Pottenger, 1983) 
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It does not follow then that war itself is always evil, only that it is believed to be a 
sad necessity at times to prevent evil or to bring about good. 
The nature of warfare has not yet been addressed. Notions of jus ad bellum only 
inadequately satisfy the felt need to reconcile the evil of killing with the apparent 
necessity of war. It is the idea of jus in bello which focuses attention on criteria for 
limiting the conduct of war. 
II e) 	 The right conduct of war - a matter of morality, not mere 
expediency 
Much talk of warfare too easily disguises the fact that war itself necessarily involves 
violence and killing. The weapons employed are intended to mete out injury and 
death: that is what they are for. As Paskins and Dockrill (1979: 106) point out, 
fighting whose rules were aimed at precluding fatality would not be war. In the 
light of this, the whole idea that there ought to be jus in bello does seem to comprise 
a significant moral leap. While one might cynically argue that there were and are 
considerable pragmatic reasons for jus ad bellum, relating to the prevention of 
constant slaughter and the destruction of crops and livestock, the desire to restrain 
the way in which wars are waged is not so easily reduced to expediency. Jus in 
bello concerns the avoidance of unnecessary killing, the treatment of prisoners, the 
protection of non-combatants and, more recently, discriminate and proportionate 
means. 
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II e) i) 	 Unnecessary killing 
A precursor to just war thinking, Cicero noted that war should be waged with 
virtue, courage, faith and honour. Consequently he advised mercy to the enemy 
when the end of the war was in sight. Unnecessary death was to be avoided once it 
was plain which way victory would go. (It must be admitted that this stricture 
could be waived if the enemy had themselves acted with particular barbarity. Some 
notion of revenge for cruelties suffered was allowed.) 
How could this aspect of jus in bello have arisen if not from moral sensibility? 
Expediency might well play a part. In hand to hand combat the protagonists cannot 
help but be aware of their opponents as people, so the desire to do as you would be 
done by makes sense - moral perhaps, but also arguably very expedient. If you are 
known to torture your antagonists to death, you are surely inviting the same fate. 
Is it the case that, in long distance warfare, we are similarly willing to restrict our 
practices to the least painful primarily in order to receive similar treatment, and that 
this is the source of the rules of war? 
The bombing of Dresden and LeMay's saturation bombing of Tokyo, permitted by 
British and American governments respectively, might seem to show otherwise. 
'On March 9, 1945, for example, 334 American B-29 bombers hit Tokyo in a 
single attack that destroyed 267,171 buildings and killed 84,000 civilians 
(wounding 40,000 more), while flattening 16 square miles of the city,' (Toffler & 
Toffler, 1993: 42). 
Some people evidently were not willing to confine their attacks to legitimate targets 
and those deliberate attacks on civilians seem to have been perpetrated reckless of 
possible retaliation. However, there are other possible explanations. There may 
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have been an assumption that the enemy would not or could not retaliate in kind and 
thus pragmatically there was no reason to engage in mutual restraint - in other 
words we were willing to restrict our attacks only as long as retribution was 
possible - but the reason given, and the most likely explanation, was that the 
destruction of cities would break the morale of the enemy and shorten the war, thus 
saving many lives in the long term. (The lives taken into account were presumably 
those of the allies and, specifically, in the bombing of Tokyo, of American soldiers. 
We cannot be looking here at an intention to minimize the total number of deaths 
expected in the action and it must be unlikely that overall loss of life on both sides 
in the war, including that of Japenese civilians, was part of the equation.) This is 
not so much a complete rejection of expediency as a weighing of practical 
considerations to decide how best to bring about a morally desirable end. The 
quick end to the war was deemed more important than the immunity of innocents. 
The morality of this is still debated, but whether the decision was right or wrong, it 
was plainly not one born simply of fear of reprisal. 
II e) ii) 	 The treatment of prisoners 
The virtue of showing mercy to the enemy has not passed down to us in an 
unbroken line. 
The idea that kindly treatment of P. 0. W's might be 
a moral imperative, having universal validity, would 
appear in the context of a holy war nothing short of 
blasphemous. For it would imply that there might be 
something to be said for being kind to devils. 
(Paskins & Dockrill, 1979: 203) 
Nevertheless killing prisoners has long been forbidden by just war theory and 
international law. 
It seems clear that distinctively moral considerations are raised by the traditional 
rules for right conduct in war. This appears to be borne out by the prohibition on 
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killing prisoners. It has been argued that the effect, on the opposing army, of 
killing prisoners is such that it enrages them, hardening their deteimination to win. 
But surely the reason it excites especial fury (beyond that experienced when one's 
friend is killed in a 'fair' fight), is the presumption that it is cruelly unjust. In other 
words, the injustice of murdering prisoners is presupposed in this reasoning. 
The idea that fear of horrible consequences if one is taken prisoner might spur 
soldiers to greater efforts has more force. Propaganda in time of war frequently 
concentrates on the cruelty of the enemy, and Argentinian soldiers going to the 
Falklands, presumably to encourage them to fight to the death, were apparently told 
that the British would kill all prisoners. Nevertheless, I am still not convinced that 
a reluctance to engender fear in one's antagonist could fully explain the prohibition 
on killing prisoners. After all, extreme fear in the enemy soldiers might be very 
useful, leading them to desert. 
Alvin and Heidi Toffler argue that in pre-industrial times prisoners were spared for 
practical reasons. 
Once agriculture made it possible to create food 
surpluses, however, and prisoners could generate 
more food than required to keep themselves fed, it 
became more profitable to enslave rather than to eat 
or kill them,' (Toffler & Toffler, 1993: 224). 
Today, even when prisoners are set to work in the fields, as they were in England 
during World War II, it is not obvious that profit was the sole reason, nor that it 
should have been. Moral judgements are made about the building of the Burma 
railway, and they depend on the inhumanity with which the prisoners were treated. 
No longer is it widely accepted that the treatment of prisoners should be simply a 
matter of expediency. 
When prisoners are merely held, imprisoned, far from accounting for the 
convention of not slaughtering those taken prisoner, practicalities suggest that 
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killing them would be profitable: guards would be released to get back to the 
battlefield, there would be a saving of resources in temis of food at least, and there 
would be no question of people escaping to rejoin the enemy. 
In mediaeval times, valuable prisoners, hostages, were carefully looked after while 
the possibility of ransom remained, but again there appears to be no equal 
advantage now in protecting prisoners from death. Accepting the immunity of 
prisoners is surely accepting a moral precept. 
The parameters of what was considered acceptable in war are found in the customs 
and practices of mediaeval knights. However they arose, by this time the rules of 
war amounted to a code of honour. Whether this is separable from a moral code is 
not obvious. Conventions pertaining to knights include strictures more appropriate 
to manners and etiquette, but some certainly would seem to have moral origins. 
What is important is that breaches of a code of honour result in disgrace. The fear 
of this fall from grace is nearer a religious motivation than obedience to secular law, 
and may well have had greater effect. Allegiance to something beyond self-interest 
and practical factors has been given - and this may well encompass moral 
sensitivity. 
Just war theory seems to be an odd mixture of pragmatic and moral constraints, but 
jus in Bello cannot be reduced to mere expediency. 
II e) iii) 	 The protection of innocents 
Killing the innocent has long been held to be wrong, yet poses several dilemmas. 
These revolve about the identification of the innocent. As noted above, non-
combatants were not necessarily innocent in Augustine's view. When a nation was 
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guilty of sin, perhaps by being non-believers, then all deserved death, irrespective 
of their participation in the fighting. 
It could be argued that we need to guarantee the immunity of civilians for the same 
reasons that we do not want to be always fighting - because we are dependent on 
the crops and livestock that they tend. Soldiers need food and there is nothing left 
to fight for if everyone dies of starvation. This might be the case when small 
agricultural communities are imagined, but long ago a civilian population might 
include non-combatants who contributed little either to the war effort or to the 
running of the state. Many aristocratic women over child-bearing age could hardly 
have been thought essential to the survival of the community and yet they would 
have been counted among the 'innocents'. Their protection therefore is surely a 
purely moral matter and, as such, is a principle which makes a strong contribution 
to the restriction of conduct in war. Indeed it constitutes one of the most important 
principles by which we still judge the morality of war, despite the difficuty of 
adhering to it in practice. 
Aquinas first seems to have raised the question of immunity for non-combatants, 
perceiving them innocent of wrong-doing. Children, women and peasants did not 
seem to deserve the same fate as soldiers. However, although a soldier might fear 
killing an innocent person in the heat of battle, his error might not have the 
disastrous consequence one might suppose, for, in the middle ages it was believed 
that if a just man were unjustly killed he would be led to glory and to God. 
When Beziers was surrendered, the crusading soldiers were troubled by the 
difficulty of how they could distinguish the heretic Cathars from other townsfolk. 
The Abbot of Citeaux, leading them, is famous for replying: 'Kill them all; God 
n.n 
will know his own,' (Regan, 1994: 140). Is it too cynical to suggest that, while 
not intending to kill innocents, the actual effect of such a tenet would be minimal in 
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practice on the safety of non-combatants straying onto the battlefield and innocent 
victims of sieges? 
In mediaeval times it was perhaps not too difficult to distinguish soldiers from 
women and peasants, but there must always have been problems. When does a 
child holding a weapon become a soldier? The situation is now even more 
confused. Who counts as a combatant? Women are certainly no longer exempt on 
the grounds of gender - they too can now join the armed forces. No more can we 
equate 'combatant' merely with a person in the thick of battle. The one launching 
the missile from the bunker and the general directing the attack are 'fighting' as 
surely as the soldier with fixed bayonet. 
But so much is obvious - their trade is still soldiering. Something in the role of 
being a member of the armed forces (even one on cook-house duties) seems 
logically to carry with it the duty of killing and dying in war if fate demands it. In a 
sense they are fair game. 
Yet it is questionable whether or not this is the case for even all those in the forces. 
Were all soldiers to have assumed this role both wittingly and voluntarily there 
could be little confusion. However, the co-opted or pressed soldier who is allowed 
no freedom of choice about joining up hardly seems to be in the same category. 
Even mercenaries may have elected to engage in war only in the limited sense of 
preferring to fight for money rather than to suffer inevitable starvation. They too 
may have been coerced, if by circumstance rather than the recruiting officer. The 
practicalities of the situation require that there shall be no distinction within the 
military. If reluctant soldiers were pelinitted to opt out on the grounds of 
conscience it would be absurd to contemplate enforced conscription. Coerced or 
willing, all soldiers are supposed to fulfil their duties and these may include killing 
or being killed. Not to fight amounts to treason. It could not be otherwise on a 
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practical level. In battle it would not be possible accurately to distinguish between 
conscripted and voluntary recruits and so no moral blame could be attributed even if 
it were presumed wrong to kill the unwilling soldier. Nevertheless, the moral 
uncertainty persists. When conscientious objection is not a real option, 
distinguishing between willing and unwilling combatants might be thought formally 
desirable, yet in practice remain an impossibility. The moral problem may be that 
of conscription itself, in that it must lead to 'innocents' in the forces. 
The distinction between a combatant (consenting or otherwise) and an innocent is 
further blurred in modern warfare. Whereas killing the smith who forged the 
weapons may once have seemed a relatively inconsequential attempt to shorten a 
war, the destruction of a munition's factory and all its workers could well be 
significant in determining the outcome. The factory may contribute enoiniously to 
the war. Munitions workers, clearly not technically members of the military, 
nevertheless do seem to be contributing to the war in a way that other civilians, 
engaged in the manufacture of cosmetics for instance, do not. 
Of course, this does not mean that that it is always impossible to distinguish non-
combatants. 
People whose mere existence and activity supporting 
existence by growing crops, making clothes, etc., -
such people are innocent. (Anscombe, 1981: 53) 
There need be no doubt about small children and babies. Immunity for the 
innocents is not an entirely futile aim, but the uncertainties do present problems. 
The treatment of prisoners and the protection of civilians demanded by jus in bello 
can be readily accepted as having moral force. That these restrictions on the means 
of waging war have at times been ignored or obeyed for predominantly pragmatic 
reasons does not take away their moral significance. While considerable doubt 
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must remain about the ethical value of some of the 'just' causes in traditional jus ad 
bellum, the restraints on the conduct of war embodied in the just war tradition 
amount to moral imperatives. 
Not all the elements in the just war tradition have survived into twentieth century 
just war thinking. Some have been lost as religious and moral views have changed, 
some have been modified as the world has become international, and others seem to 
have been ignored as the means of fighting wars have been transformed by 
technology. But still, despite smart bombs, the most recent wars have involved 
hand to hand fighting. War still involves soldiers killing soldiers. It has not 
changed essentially and the desire for a just war theory remains. 
III Modern Just War Thinking 
In this century, our capacity for destruction in war has increased to a degree 
unimaginable for those who contributed to the early just war tradition. In addition 
to the moral problems inherent in any war, new problems have arisen for just war 
thinkers. Aerial bombing has meant that the killing of civilians in war is almost 
commonplace and technological advances have brought us weapons of 
unprecedented and awesome power. Those moral dilemmas which are distinctively 
'modern' are primarily those arising from the conduct of war, how we kill and 
whom we kill in war. Modern just war thinking focuses particularly, but not 
exclusively, on jus in bello. 
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Newly invented means of waging war have not brought with them essentially new 
difficulties in identifying just causes. This is not to say that jus ad bellum is now 
straightforward, but to emphasise that the problems are not different in kind from 
those experienced in earlier times. The drawing of political borders which do not 
conform to universally recognised national, ethnic or religious divisions may 
complicate people's perceptions of just causes and make the distinction between, 
for example, civil war and international war difficult to draw at times, but the 
fundamental questions are the same. 
Technological advances do not change the question posed in asking when it is 
morally acceptable to go to war. Modern just war thinking continues to address the 
same issues raised by jus ad bellum and appears to reaffirm that war in self-
defence, for instance, is justifiable. However, closer attention to linguistic 
meaning, characteristic of much twentieth century philosophy, reveals some 
difficulties which now need to be taken into account. Queries about what 'self-
defence' might properly comprise affect whether or not wars can be legitimised on 
this basis. 
III i) 	 War in self-defence 
There is broad agreement that self-defence constitutes just cause, and for many now 
this is the only morally acceptable reason for going to war. It was noted earlier that 
Vatican II recognised self-defence as the only adequate reason for modern warfare 
(Ruston, 1981: 15). However, closer scrutiny of what might be meant by 'war in 
self-defence' shows that the notion is far from unproblematic. Although it is 
relatively easy to understand, if not agree with, a notion of some entitlement to 
attempt to save one's own skin as in self-defence, for a nation to claim the right to 
self-defence is to invoke a more elusive concept. 
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A country going to war presumably does so in the certainty that not all skins will be 
saved. Soldiers go to war in the belief that it is their duty to die in action if the 
circumstances demand it. Acceptance of war and soldiering is acceptance of dying 
in action in a way that acceptance of the notion of self-defence cannot be acceptance 
of dying in the cause of self-preservation. One might fail to defend oneself and 
therefore die, but it would be a contradiction in terms to claim that success in self-
defence might necessitate dying. 
'Warfare' implies that soldiers are not fighting merely in personal self-defence. 
Although, in certain situations, fighting may comprise an act of self-preservation, 
military engagements are part of a broader canvas. In theory at least, such conflicts 
consist of something more than many individuals, all engaged in fighting for their 
own lives. The army goes to battle on behalf of other citizens, in defence of the 
country or state. It is difficult to get a grip on the idea of a nation's 'self-defence' 
when it involves one group of people defending another. Soldiers may as a matter 
of fact be defending themselves in battle, but their raison d'etre is the defence of the 
nation. Undoubtedly, unless perhaps they are mercenaries, they will count as 
members of the nation, but, even when the nation is seen as a collection of 
individual people, the armed forces will be fighting for other people who are not in 
the services too. Personal self-defence alone does not encompass my risking my 
life to save another, but a country's going to war in self-defence necessarily 
involves the ultimate risk for some in order to preserve others' lives. Killing to 
protect others is not the same as killing in self-defence. Self-defence is an 
inappropriate justification for both risking death and killing in war. 
Invoked as a justification for war, self-defence often seems to amount to a 
protection of liberty, political freedom or religious choice rather than life itself. 
'Self-defence' on a national scale seems to imply the protection of a way of life 
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rather than the prevention of the destruction of the population. As Norman 
suggests, 
if ideas of territorial integrity and political sovereignty 
are to play a significant role in the moral argument we 
would have to move beyond the self-defence analogy. 
(Norman, 1995: 136). 
He is surely correct when he goes on to say that the 'life of a political community' 
would have to be shown to have 'a value comparable to that of human life itself 
(Norman, 1995: 137) before war in its defence could be morally justifiable. 
The Holocaust and any attempts at 'ethnic cleansing' are, of course, terrible and 
notable exceptions in which the obliteration of a people has been at stake and, 
presumably, in the face of which, defensive fighting would be analogous to 
personal self-defence. Indeed, it is more than analogous; it amounts to the same 
thing. If any killing in self-defence is morally acceptable, war as a collective 
defence of a people against genocide must be. 
However, when 'self-defence' is offered as a justification for wars that are not 
waged in literal self-defence, clearly it is inadequate. 
III ii) 	 War to defend a third party 
Modern versions of just war theory tend towards the 
position that the only just war is a war of defence 
against aggression. From that point of view, wars of 
intervention cannot be morally justified. (Norman 
reported in Philosophy Today, 1997: No. 24) 
Nevertheless, it is often supposed that there may be exceptions, and recent events in 
the Persian Gulf, Bosnia and elsewhere, have vividly brought this dilemma to 
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public attention. Going to war to protect others from genocide must seem 
legitimate. 
The claim that this is wrong, and that wars of intervention are unjust, rests on what 
Norman regards as 'an untenable notion of national sovereignty'. 
It rests on an analogy between the rights of 
individuals and the rights of states, and on the claim 
that states are morally entitled to defend their rights to 
territorial integrity and political sovereignity in the 
same way that individuals are entitled to defend their 
rights to life and liberty. (Norman, 1997, ibid.) 
In other words, because states do not have the same rights to life and liberty as 
individuals, it cannot be maintained that, 
wars of intervention are in principle unjustifiable by 
comparison with wars of defence. (Norman, 1997, 
ibid.) 
It is not clear therefore that modern just war thinking could convincingly rule out all 
wars fought to protect others. 
However, if going to war requires justification on par with that assumed for self-
defence, further problems are apparent. 
Waging war to defend another country is not a relatively simple case of personal 
self-defence, nor even that of fighting to prevent the obliteration of one's own 
people. There is no sense in which the army is responsible for the situation which 
might make the cause just. The soldiers are not defending their own country and 
they will not benefit in any direct way from the good effect they may bring about. 
While they could be described as fighting for a better world, this must seem a very 
distant goal, especially as their own world is not immediately (nor even perhaps 
foreseeably) threatened. Why should these soldiers risk death? 
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When war is waged to prevent deaths, it is apparent that we are facing a choice 
between lives, but whereas the notion of killing in self-defence can present the 
choice of kill or be killed, the situation is rather different in the context of war in 
order to save others' lives. Those who may be among the casualties are also those 
attacking to save the third party (the potential victims of genocide perhaps). The 
army fighting to save the victims has the choice between, 'fight and kill, risking 
death' or 'do nothing: save no lives and do not risk death'. This is not the forced 
choice of the person contemplating killing another in self-defence, where not to act 
is to surrender one's own life. 
Ought we to send people to certain death, effectively to kill them, in order to ensure 
that other people live? It is the job of soldiers to lay down their lives in a just war, 
one might say, and they may have voluntarily agreed to fight for their own people, 
but, when the war is to save a foreign population from genocide, it does seem to 
give preferential treatment to all but them. The lives of the potential victims of 
genocide are implicitly valued more than the lives of those who will fight. 
It may be the duty of soldiers to fight in a good cause to which their government is 
committed, even when this is to protect those who are not their own people, but it is 
not equally evident that civilians, ignorant perhaps of the situation, could have a 
similar obligation. In modern times, waging war on foreign soil does not exclude 
all risk to civilians at home. Bombs and missiles can be used at long range. It is 
difficult to see how the lives of one set of non-combatants could ever morally be 
given preference over the lives of another group of civilians. 
These, of course, are not new problems, but they complicate the identification of 
just causes and begin to suggest that just war theory, modern or traditional, cannot 
easily legitimise going to war for even those reasons widely accepted today. 
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III iii) 	 Weapons 
Modern just war thinking is more often thought of as characteristically concerned 
with jus in bello and the moral problems arising from the effects of the weapons we 
now have at our disposal. 
Jus in bello was to limit the conduct of war. Morally, it was not accepted that 
'anything goes' and today people feel the same. Over the ages there may always 
have existed an odd tension between producing more and more effective killing 
machines and the desire to kill only in some ways and not in others. In this century 
this has become a matter of immense public concern. War has reached unparalleled 
levels of mass destruction. Furthermore, some of the weapons available to bring 
about this destruction are significantly different in kind: 
some of our legislators still seem to think that a 
nuclear explosion is just a very much bigger bang, 
but not really different in kind from that of TNT. 
Hence the irrelevant arguments that more people died 
in Dresden than in Hiroshima, or that the 'innocent' 
have always suffered in war. The issue is not simply 
that horrific numbers are killed, but the nature of the 
forces by which they are killed, and the effects of 
releasing these forces into the environment. (The 
Bishop of Salisbury, 1984: 15) 
Moral problems are posed by both the scale and nature of the destruction modern 
weaponry has the capacity for. 
International law now includes prohibitions on certain types of weapon, because 
they are believed to be beyond justification. Presumably, until relatively recently, 
no one type of weapon appeared so much worse than another that its use was seen 
as unjust in the just war tradition. Be that as it may, on 17 June 1925, thirty eight 
nations signed the Geneva Protocol, under the auspices of the League of Nations, 
and in the late 1950s many Western Nations renounced chemical warfare altogether. 
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The United States finally stated that it was 
terminating all its chemical (and biological) warfare 
research, testing and production in November 1969. 
(Gander, 1987: 123). 
This must be reassuring and morally praiseworthy, but there is something 
extraordinary about the fact that we can be willing, even eager to kill people, yet 
mind how we do it. Some deaths undoubtedly involve more suffering than others. 
I do feel strongly that to die from napalm is worse than from an arrow or being 
shot. (How far this is due to a romanticised notion peddled by the cinema I'm not 
sure. Being shot in the stomach presumably is to experience dying in excruciating 
pain and yet this is an accepted risk of war.) Efficiency might demand that soldiers 
do not pause to torture their enemies to death, but I suspect that napalm is no less 
'efficient' than throwing a spear - indeed in terms of the certainty with which it kills 
and terrifies, the number of people incapacitated and the relatively small effort 
needed to launch it, it must be far more efficient. I cannot think of a sheerly 
practical reason why napalm should be internationally forbidden, and this does 
seem to epitomise an appropriate moral abhorrence of a particular form of warfare. 
The banning of other foinis of war, such as chemical and biological warfare, is not 
so evidently the reflection of exclusively ethical sensitivity. While they are seen to 
be unjust in that they threaten civilian populations, they can also be dangerous to 
more than the enemy. A less that pure note of self-preservation sounds. However, 
concern for the health of future generations is not reducible to mere expediency or 
self interest, even if the anxiety is predominantly for one's own country. There is 
also moral concern. Together with chemical and biological weapons, nuclear arms 
are capable of causing long term damage to the environment, and have the potential 
to affect far more than could be described as a limited military target. The 
deployment of nuclear weapons is still debated and the arguments do revolve about 
moral issues. 
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This all seems to suggest a widespread belief that the fact of death is not the worst 
thing a soldier faces. Some ways of dying are more abhorrent. Killing may not be 
the greatest evil of war. Moral sensitivity extends to the ways in which we mete out 
death and takes account of who will suffer. Modern just war thinking highlights 
these concerns. 
III iv) 	 The immunity of non-combatants 
Modern warfare is highly dependent on the production of arms. Apparently the 
United States during the Second World War not only sent 15 million men to war, 
but mass-manufactured nearly 6 million rifles and machine guns, over 300,000 
planes, 100,000 tanks and armoured vehicles, 71,000 naval vessels and 41 billion 
rounds of ammunition (Toffler & Toffler, 1993: 40). Presumably this is why 
attacks often seem to centre on the destruction of factories and sites rather than on 
the opposing soldiers. Destroying either the source of the arms or the silos in 
which they are deployed inevitably seems to involve killing civilians. Given the 
secrecy surrounding the locations of such places and the apparent inaccuracy with 
which bombs are delivered, a larger bomb than is needed to destroy the plant is 
likely to be used to ensure success. Thus not only those working to manufacture or 
to maintain the weapons are at risk, but also other citizens in the vicinity. And yet, 
The principal wickedness which is a temptation to 
those engaged in warfare is the killing of the 
innocent. (Anscombe, 1981: 53) 
This then raises an issue central to twentieth century just war thinking. If, in some 
cases, it is impossible for practical purposes (and war is nothing if not an 
essentially practical matter) to distinguish usefully between those actively engaged 
in war and others, how then to limit the destruction and keep the violence judged 
necessary to a morally acceptable level? That there is a desperate need for some 
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limitation is undeniable in the face of some statistics: since 1945 an estimated 
7,200,000 soldiers have been killed in wars, but when civilian casualties are 
included the total deaths rises to between 33 and 44 million (Toffler & Toffler, 
1993: 13). 
Two principles have emerged in recent theory in response to the new problems 
raised by the nature of modern warfare, since the advent of aerial bombing: 
discrimination and proportionality. Both these principles have their origins in the 
just war tradition. The 'discrimination' intended is that between innocents and 
others, and the idea that the war should not result in disproportionate evils was 
embodied in Fransisco de Vitoria's canons of warfare, when he adds that people 
must not be sacrificed unnecessarily, (Ruston, 1981: 15). 
III v) 	 Discrimination 
An act of war is described as 'indiscriminate' in so far as its intention is to kill non-
combatants. On this account, a weapon cannot be intrinsically indiscriminate. 
Whether or not the principle of discrimination is adhered to rests on the intention 
behind a weapon's use and not, as one might have assumed, on its effects. 
Perhaps indiscriminateness is most easily perceived as being at one end of a 
continuum stretching from accidental to intentional: at the one extreme is the arrow 
aimed at a military target but which, caught by the wind, lays low the farmer, and, 
at the other is the missile purposefully directed at the farming community. 
It is not the scale of the weapon's destructive capacity which distinguishes it as 
indiscriminate, but the intention underlying its use. Were there weapons whose 
only conceivable purpose was to kill civilians, then these would be intrinsically 
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indiscriminate, but it is impossible to imagine what these could ever comprise. 
When weapons are designed to kill people, they can be used to destroy armies since 
armies are composed of people. Large scale weapons may, as a matter of fact, 
prove fatal for non-combatants, but this contingency is irrelevant to the principle of 
discrimination. A weapon itself cannot be indiscriminate, only its use can be 
properly so described. 
The most obvious examples of the indiscriminate use of weapons are those cases 
where missiles capable of destroying whole cities are deployed as a threat. The 
force of the threat is precisely that the warheads, if used, will kill non-combatants 
even if aimed at military installations or personnel. Thus, on the grounds of 
indiscrimination, the particular use of such deterrent weapons is deemed morally 
abhorrent, but it is not the case that all arms whose use is likely to involve non-
military casualties are indiscriminate in themselves. Prudence may demand that we 
refrain from using biological and chemical weapons because of their probable 
consequences, but such action need not always be 'indiscriminate'. Far-fetched as 
it might seem, biological weapons could be launched against a population, all of 
whom would count as combatants (perhaps all the children are dead and only a 
desperate band of soldiers survives in the middle of a windless desert safely far 
away from any other human life), and thus would not be indiscriminate. 
Such weapons would however be ruled out if proportionality were invoked. 
III vi) 	 Proportionality 
Proportionality is seen in terms of the balance of means against ends (always given 
that the ends in view are justifiable). Paskins and Dockrill (1979) imply that 
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proportionate force is that force which is the minimum necessary to achieve the 
goal. 
Some weapons or systems of weapons must be disproportionate to any end 
whatsoever, and thus are intrinsically disproportionate. Any which have the 
capacity to destroy the entire population of the world would fall into this category. 
Weapons which have radically unpredictable consequences must also necessarily be 
disproportionate, for notions of proportionality must prohibit knowingly invoking 
the unpredictable. 
VII vii) 	 Nuclear weapons 
Acts of war involving the use of arms can be both indiscriminate and 
disproportionate as when a nuclear warhead is used with the intention of killing all 
and sundry within a huge area. However, while nuclear arms will always be 
disproportionate due to their long-term, unpredictable effects, their use will not 
invariably be indiscriminate - the intention behind their use may be the destruction 
of an exclusively military target. Similarly a weapon could be used as a threat 
against a whole population and thus indiscriminately, yet be the minimum force 
judged necessary to achieve a particular goal, so not disproportionate. 
Nuclear warfare, it would seem, can never be justified in just war thinking. The 
use of nuclear weapons would inevitably be disproportionate. Equally, to threaten 
reprisal in the form of a nuclear attack is unjustifiable, since the deterrent effect is 
dependent upon the intention of indiscriminate destruction. 
It is only because these weapons are so horrible that 
the threat of using them has any plausibility as a 
means of preventing war. (The Bishop of Salisbury, 
1984: 17) 
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If the two principles, discrimination and proportionality, are accepted as necessary 
to jus in bello, then one is inexorably drawn to the conclusion that at least, 
Nuclear deterrence is the (conditional) intention to 
wage disproportionate and indiscriminate war; 
nuclear deterrence is therefore straightforwardly and 
unequivocally wrong. (Paskins & Dockrill, 1979: 2) 
The advent of nuclear weapons has brought the need to confront new problems, not 
just larger in scale but different in kind. Total war used to mean war waged with 
virtually no restraint, war aimed at civilians as well as military targets and it was 
consequently deplored, but we now face situations where it may be impossible to 
employ modem weaponry without in effect pursuing total war. Nuclear weapons, 
held in the quantity we are now used to, could annihilate all human life, irrespective 
not only of people's civilian status within a country at war, but irrespective of 
whether their country is at war at all. Further, as they are understood at pres-ent, 
even if these weapons were not employed to destroy everyone, the effect of their 
use on future generations is likely to be injurious. So we have now a situation in 
which innocents are inevitably at risk from certain acts of war. 
It is difficult to imagine how much modem warfare can be justified at all. Ruston 
notes that the teaching of the Catholic Church now recognises: 
that many causes which may have justified war in the 
past can now no longer do so because of the far 
greater destructive power of modern war to 
combatants and civilians alike. The fact that war has 
now become an affair engulfing whole peoples - not 
merely rulers and their professional armies and those 
unfortunate citizens who happened to be in the way, 
as in the past - has led not to the abandonment of the 
principles of discrimination and proportionality, but 
to their renewed emphasis. The rethinking required 
is not with a view to explaining how the innocent 
may nowadays be legitimately killed. It is, on the 
contrary with a view to explaining how most modem 
warfare - especially that which uses weapons of 
mass destruction - would violate the most 
fundamental values of humanity which have always 
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underlain the Christian teaching on the Just War. 
(Ruston, 1981: 17) 
That reconciliation, of Christian precepts and war, sought in the just war tradition 
seems increasingly elusive. I agree with Walzer that 'nuclear war is and will remain 
morally unacceptable' (Walzer, 1977: 283). However, we need not leap to the 
conclusion that all war is wrong in every conceivable circumstance. Although we 
evidently have the capacity now to engage in warfare which seems to lack all moral 
justification, the actual practice of war still includes combat which is closer in 
concept to hand-to-hand fighting than to nuclear war. Soldiers still perish from 
bullets fired by other soldiers and civilians are still killed in circumstances that do 
not amount to total war. Modern just war thinking rightly introduces concerns with 
wholesale destruction, but this does not make redundant those considerations which 
are central to just war theory. Contemplation of the horrors of nuclear weapons 
should not obscure anxiety over the immunity of innocents in theatres of war which 
are less sophisticated, but where their destruction seems none the less unavoidable. 
The protection of civilians continues to be basic to just war theory although the 
practice of war rarely seems to reflect this moral sensitivity. 
The policy of attacking the civilian population in 
order to induce the enemy to surrender, or to damage 
his morale, seems to have been widely accepted in 
the civilized world, and seems to be accepted still, at 
least if the stakes are high enough. It gives evidence 
of the moral conviction that the deliberate killing of 
non-combatants - women, children, old people - is 
permissible if enough can be gained from it. (Nagel, 
1979: 59) 
It might appear that a distinction can be drawn between the direct attack on a civilian 
population and attacks on military targets which nevertheless inevitably bring about 
the deaths of innocents. The possibility of such a distinction, which could be 
morally significant, suggests that the Principle of Double Effect could be applied in 
the attempt to legitimise some warfare which kills civilians. 
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IV The Principle of Double Effect 
Faced with a prima facie evil, sometimes justification seems possible if it can be 
shown to be a necessary evil, necessary that is to some higher end. One way of 
addressing this is via the Principle of Double Effect. 
Central to the Principle is that actions can have, not only the intended effect, but 
two sets of consequences, and that a distinction can be drawn between that which is 
intended and that which is foreseen but unintended - a side-effect. The example 
most commonly cited in explanation is that of the doctor who gives a pain-killing 
drug to alleviate a patient's agony, in the knowledge that this same drug will 
contribute to and hasten death. As Mackie (1977: 161) points out, this can be 
distinguished from administering a drug to kill the patient and thereby bring an end 
to suffering. If the pain-killing injection is given because it will hasten death, then 
the intention has been to terminate a life (Norman, 1995: 87). Whereas 
intentionally to bring about death in this context may be wrong, application of the 
Principle of Double Effect opens the possibility that while the intention is to do 
good and reduce pain, the side-effect, even though inevitable, would not constitute 
the same evil. 
A second familiar example is that in which the chemotherapy prescribed to save life 
is known to cause hair-loss. The act of giving the chemotherapy has the intended 
consequence of saving life and the foreseen, but unintended, side-effect of causing 
hair loss. 
The purpose of the principle is to provide a criterion against which to judge the 
permissibility of an act which, if intentionally performed, would be counted a wrong 
doing. 
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There is no suggestion that we are not responsible for such unintentional 
consequences or that they do not matter, only that they do not comprise a breach of 
an absolute prohibition, in this instance against homicide. In war, when 'innocent' 
civilians are killed in a bombing raid on a railway line perhaps, there is no 
suggestion that those who ordered the raid are not responsible nor that the death of 
the civilians is necessarily permissible purely in virtue of being 'incidental'. It 
might or might not be judged acceptable against various criteria - in this case 
perhaps the criterion of proportionality. If the consequence of the action were loss 
of life, disproportionate to the potential good achievable by the obliteration of the 
military target, then the bombing could not be permissible even to those espousing 
Double Effect. So, an action is not removed from the sphere of moral justification 
because its bad consequences are unintended, but some effects, which would 
otherwise be deemed reprehensible, may be morally tolerable in virtue of being 
unintended. 
Acts of war frequently seem to encompass effects beyond the primary aim. To 
investigate whether or not these comprise morally permissible acts, consideration of 
the conditions of Double Effect and their application to war seems useful. 
(The conditions below are a paraphrase of those given in the New Catholic 
Encyclopedia, 1967: 1020 - 2, cited by Uniacke, 1994: 99) 
IV a) 
	 The moral status of the act 
The act itself must be morally good or at least 
indifferent. 
The act under scrutiny is not of course the killing of civilians; this is the side effect. 
The act in question could be described as the military action which carries with it the 
deaths of innocents - warfare itself. If non-combatant fatalities are to be justified by 
123 
Double Effect, the warfare of which these are consequences must have the required 
moral status. 
IV a) i) 	 War is a prima facie evil 
Neither going to war nor waging war, per se, appears a likely candidate for a morally good 
act or a morally indifferent one demanded by the first condition of Double Effect. Just War 
theory arose, in part at least, precisely because acts of war are seen as, prima facie, moral 
ills and thus requiring justification in the form of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The 
central problem of war is that it involves killing and injuring human beings. Although a 
person might be a fighting soldier and survive without ever killing or hurting another, war 
cannot be imagined without any reference to death and injury. This is not merely a 
contingent matter - killing is part of what is meant by 'war'. No amount of sanitised 
language about forces being depleted, units destroyed, attacks made or targets bombed can 
disguise the fact that fundamentally people's lives are at stake. The killing in war is more 
than extraordinarily probable - it is exactly what war is about. Is it possible to have war (in 
a non-metaphorical sense) without killing? Perhaps the odd battle, but if none were ever 
killed on any battlefield then, whatever the enterprise, it would not be war. 
Insofar as it involves, or rather actually is killing, war is hardly 'indifferent' and 
indeed must be an evil. War is a very different proposition from self-defence. 
Self-preservation in itself, is generally held to be a legitimate aim, morally 
indifferent or even a moral good. For some it amounts to an obligation: we do not 
merely have the right to preserve our own lives; we ought to do so whenever 
possible. But no such moral duty to engage in military conflict for its own sake 
seems remotely credible. Waging war requires justification. Already we are once 
removed, as it were, from a moral obligation. War itself cannot be morally neutral 
or a moral good, it is a prima facie evil. 
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IV a) ii) 	 War in a just cause 
However, suppose that the reason for engaging in military conflict is to achieve 
peace or to prevent the enslavement of the people, and that other relevant factors 
have been taken into account. In other words, it is a justified war that is under 
scrutiny. By definition now the moral status of the act is good. But this looks very 
like a tautology - which of course it is. A 'just war' means a morally acceptable 
war and if it is morally acceptable, why is it necessary to seek further justification? 
It is needed because such a tautology amounts to no more than an assertion that 
certain causes are just. 
It might be argued that, if war (in virtue of being a just war) were to be given the 
same ethical status as self-preservation, Double Effect could be invoked to justify 
killing in war in the same way that it could make permissible killing in personal 
self-defence. We can conceptually separate a war from the waging of that war. A 
just war might be one having just cause, and the killing occurs in pursuit of that just 
cause. But we are not comparing like with like. War still is not directly comparable 
with self-defence. The 'act' in question with regard to its moral status now is not 
war itself; it is the end, the result intended, which provides the reason for going to 
war. Thus the end in view, preventing enslavement for example, is comparable 
with self-defence and not war, the step taken to achieve this end. Killing in both 
cases could comprise the necessary means by which the end is to be achieved. The 
problem set out in this way is not how to justify killing in war, as if war and killing 
were separable. It is whether or not wars (particular instances of killing) can be 
justified in order to achieve morally good ends. It is the moral status of these ends 
that is in question when this condition is under consideration. 
In laying down criteria for jus ad bellum, just war theory already takes account of 
this. The first condition adds little to our understanding of these just causes, but it 
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could be said to underline the just war theory's demand that war should only be 
undertaken in pursuit of a higher end. 
IV a) iii) 	 The moral status of acts of war 
So far the discussion of this first condition has focussed on war itself rather than on 
the different acts of killing that might be perpetrated in waging war. Double Effect 
is more appropriately invoked with regard to these acts of war. Acts of war which 
might count as morally indifferent or good could be the bombing of military 
installations and depleting the enemy forces, for, if war is ever justifable, these 
would be a necessary and permissible part of warfare. 
So the first condition may be applicable to some acts of war and, if the other 
conditions can be satisfied, Double Effect could be important in establishing the 
moral legitimacy of actions which, because they cause the deaths of civilians, seem 
to be ruled out by just war theory. 
IV b) 	 Intention and the bad effect 
The agent may not positively will the bad effect but 
may permit it. If he could attain the good effect 
without the bad effect he should do so. The bad 
effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary. 
The second condition concerns the prohibition on willing the bad effect. The bad 
effect of an action might be a side-effect or an unavoidable concomitant. It 
presupposes that one can be sure that something will happen as a result of an 
action, yet not intend it. The killing of innocents could never be properly described 
as 'unintentional' if it is essential as part of the aim of an act or to the means of its 
achievement. 
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IV b) i) 	 Intentions and side-effects 
The death of civilians might well be foreseeable, yet plainly not the intended the 
goal. In no sense are the deaths of civilians a means of bringing about the 
destruction of an airfield for example. Double Effect might penult the bombing of 
the airbase even although non-military personnel are known to be there. 
Yet this does seem difficult to accept. Knowing something should surely be one of 
the factors taken into account when founing an intention, and one among those 
reflected upon in deciding the rightness of the intention. 
If the presence of innocents could not have been predicted, then their deaths would 
be accidental. If, on the other hand, pilots, did not know civilians would die, but 
the knowledge were available, then whether or not they were deemed morally 
culpable for the accident would depend in part on whether their ignorance were due 
to some negligence. In other words, if the pilots could not possibly have known, 
then they would be less guilty than if, with a modicum of effort, they could have 
found out, and this seems reasonable. 
n.n 
In contrast, Double Effect would apparently permit us wittingly to allow the deaths 
of civilians. The knowledge that innocents will die does not necessarily make the 
pilot more guilty. Provided the intention is to demolish a legitimate military target, 
realising that civilians will die does not make the bombing inevitably unacceptable. 
Double Effect thus runs counter to much ordinary moral reasoning and seems of 
dubious value. 
The use of aerial bombing as a weapon of war has brought us face to face with a 
new problem. Often we cannot deny the knowledge that civilians will die, and yet 
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to many bombing raids seem an appropriate way to wage war and morally distinct 
from the deliberate attacks on civilian targets. Double Effect may provide the 
criteria by which we can distinguish one from the other, but there must be doubt 
over the plausibility of this being morally significant in relation to such bombing. 
Presumably cases where the side-effects are probable, but uncertain, can be 
justified in a variety of ways. However, the Principle of Double Effect is 
particularly intended to apply to those where they are certain or concomitant, and 
less easily shown to be morally acceptable. It requires a distinction to be drawn 
between intended and unintended, albeit certain, effects. 
This distinction can be difficult to uphold in some instances. The intention to save 
life by chemotherapy is clearly not the same as the intention to cause hair loss. This 
predictable result of chemotherapy is not identifiable with the means by which life is 
saved nor is it essential to saving life. It is a side-effect and unintended. 
It is, however, less obvious that the deaths of civilians, when the airfield is 
bombed, fall into the same category. If they are known to be there, it is difficult to 
intend bombing the buildings without intending to bomb the people. In acts of war, 
when the amount of force employed makes the death of innocents certain, to speak 
of the killing as 'unintentional' and 'a side-effect' is surely inexcusable hair-
splitting. 
IV b) ii) 	 Permission and consent 
It might be thought that one salient difference between paradigm cases of side-
effects in Double Effect and the side-effect which comprises the killing of non-
combatants revolves about the notion of consent. (I am indebted to Graham 
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Haydon for raising this possibility.) It may be pointed out that the patient who will 
suffer hair loss can consent to or refuse the treatment. Even when the sufferer is in 
no state to consent, as could be the case for a dying woman needing the relief of 
morphine which will also hasten death, consent may be given by relatives acting in 
her interests and on her behalf. In permitting the bad effect, the doctor 
administering the drug may depend on the patient's consent. 
No similar concern for consent seems to be taken into account for the civilians who 
will die in the bombing raid. While they conceivably might agree to lay down their 
lives in this way, any right they may have to consent or refuse is ignored or 
overridden. This then would appear to provide a reason why Double Effect should 
not be invoked to justify the foreseeable killing of innocents. 
However, closer scrutiny makes it obvious that the cases are not parallel. The 
patient whose consent ought to be sought is not comparable to the civilians. The 
civilian deaths actually constitute the side-effect, equating to the hair loss. The pilot 
who drops the bomb, like the doctor, requires consent, but it is the author of the 
bombing who is in the position of the patient in this respect, and it is precisely 
whether or not that authority would be right to give consent to the bombing which 
is at stake in asking if the consequent loss of life is permissible. 
This said, the issue of whether or not permission might involve consent with regard 
to side-effects, does draw attention to what exactly would be permitted. In the 
paradigm cases, patients' consent may be sought about matters which primarily 
affect those people - their hair loss or the time of their own death. Those who 
sanction bombing raids are not so intimately involved in the side-effect. They are 
consenting to the deaths of others, not to their own. The intuition that this is an 
important distinction may not be pertinent to this condition, but it is not irrelevant 
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to the application of the Principle of Double Effect. The moral weight of innocent 
lives will be further considered in reflection on the fourth condition below. 
IV b) iii) 	 Incidental effects 
A major difficulty in addressing 'unintended' but foreseen bad effects is that a side-
effect may be very closely related to the action and yet incompatible with (so not 
related to) the good effect. Saving a nation by acts which necessarily involve 
killing some citizens may be better compared with examples other than the paradigm 
cases. The deaths of civilians in bomb attacks should perhaps be described as 
'incidental' rather than as 'side-effects'. 
Uniacke (1994: 102 ff.) claims that the terms 'side-effects' and 'unavoidable 
concomitants' are too restrictive in their compass and wants to extend the range to 
include effects more directly related to the action taken. She cites two difficult cases 
which would seem at first glance permissible, but which Double Effect would 
appear to exclude. The first is that of the surgeon who, in a desperate attempt to 
save a life, performs an operation in the knowledge that it will probably kill the 
patient. The patient dies. The death of the patient is entirely incompatible with the 
aim of the surgery, completely unintended, and yet cannot be properly described as 
an unavoidable concomitant or a side-effect. The patient's death may have been 
probable, but it is not certain and yet it is a direct consequence of the operation. 
The other example cited is that of the mother who throws her child out of a burning 
building to save its life, while realising that the fall may kill it. Again the outcome 
of this action is not indirectly connected to the intention or to the means by which it 
is to be achieved, but is a direct consequence of the purposive action taken. In both 
cases, the action taken could either kill or save (whereas hair loss would be a certain 
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consequence of chemotherapy, but would not endanger the aim of saving life). 
Uniacke therefore feels that the terms 'side-effects' and 'concomitants' are too 
limiting and cannot properly be thought to cover these two difficult cases. She 
therefore proposes 'incidental' as a more useful notion. Throwing the child from 
the window is the means employed to save life, and the consequent death of the 
child cannot be adequately described as a side-effect of this although it is incidental 
to the desired end. 
Uniacke seems to be claiming that there is an obvious difference, but not 
necessarily a morally significant one, between the attempt to save life that carries 
with it, alongside, a non-life-threatening ill effect and those attempts which of 
themselves comprise either saving life or causing death. This may well be correct 
and in some cases the brute risking of 'either/or' (incidental) may be morally 
permissible, just as the 'along with' (side-effect or concomitant) is perceived to be. 
Perhaps it is morally admissible, when no other solution is available, to risk killing 
the innocent while there is the faintest chance that the action will not kill, but save 
the life in question. The destruction of a military headquarters where people are 
being tortured and executed might fall into this category. 
n•n 
When an action comprises an attempt to save life which itself carries a risk to life, it 
surely can be morally justifiable as Uniacke maintains. An attack on a military 
establishment, where non-combatant prisoners are being tortured and killed, may be 
comparable with dropping the child from the burning building, in the faint hope that 
it will survive. However, it is important to emphasise that this is not analogous to 
giving a drug which alleviates pain, but also hastens death, any more than it is 
analogous to chemotherapy which causes hair loss. The pain-relieving medicine 
does not constitute a risk. It will certainly kill and cannot save life: it is not the 
either/or solution of the mother's desperate act or the surgeon's life-threatening 
operation. 
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If deaths, in those cases where killing is risked in the hope of saving life, are best 
described as 'incidental', then so be it, but there seems to be no need to stretch the 
conditions of Double Effect to embrace such examples. Exactly that lack of 
certainty with regard to the outcome suggests that applying the Principle of Double 
Effect is unnecessary and irrelevant. Such cases can be judged according to other 
criteria: the moral conviction of the need to do something in order to achieve the 
desired end, the lack of alternatives and the probability of outcome weighed against 
the imminence of death if no action is taken. To risk 'incidental' killing must on 
occasion be justifiable as a last resort, but falls outside the compass of the doctrine. 
IV b) iv) 	 Unnecessary bad effects 
The further caveat included in this second condition concerns necessity. The idea 
of necessity comes into force with, 'If he could attain the good effect without the 
bad effect he should do so.' An agent must not inflict unnecessary harm. 
This would demand not only that war should be a last resort, but also that the 
killing of civilians could never be justified if the war could be pursued without it. 
Unnecessary war is already ruled out by just war theory, and it appears that the 
second condition of Double Effect does not add usefully to this in terms of 
justification. 
It does however raise the question of whether or not bombs which will inevitably 
kill innocents can ever be justified. After all, we have choice with regard to the 
weapons we use. Civilians will always be at risk in war, but it must be preferable 
that the risk is confined to accidents, rather than extended to include unintentional, 
but foreseen effects of military action. 
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IV c) 	 Means and Effects 
The good effect must flow from the action at least as 
immediately (in the order of causality, though not 
necessarily in order of time) as the bad effect. In 
other words the good effect must be produced 
directly by the action, not by the bad effect. 
Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a 
good end, which is never allowed. 
IV c) i) 	 Using a bad means to a good end 
The third condition demands that the intended end be a result of the act and not of 
the bad effect. A case such as the bombing of Dresden would be prohibited, since 
the claimed good effect, shortening the war, was to be achieved by the bad effect, 
the destruction of a city. The slaughter of civilians was to be the breaking of morale 
which would bring about a more rapid conclusion to the war. If this is an accurate 
account of the fire bombing of Dresden, then Britain was 'using a bad means to a 
good end, which is never allowed.' As Anscombe unequivocally maintains, it is 
murderous to attack the innocent, 
For murder is the deliberate killing of the innocent, 
whether for its own sake or as a means to a further 
end. (Anscombe, 1981: 53) 
The Principle of Double Effect firmly prohibits the killing of innocents in order to 
n.n 
achieve victory. This same condition could also preclude the use of a threat to 
civilians in order to ward off attack. As suggested earlier, the force of nuclear 
deterrence is that it is a threat to obliterate whole populations and not just armies and 
military objectives. The good effect of the threat, the prevention of war, is expected 
to be a direct consequence of threatening a people irrespective of their military 
status. If this is so, the belief that nuclear deterrence is inadmissible in modern just 
war thinking is upheld by Double Effect reasoning. 
133 
The death of innocents, a bad effect, is obviously not always the means employed 
to achieve the end in view. Wars, in theory at least, can be won or lost without 
civilian casualties. Conventionally, the killing of non-combatants has been seen as 
a tragic effect of war, not the justifiable means by which military goals were won. 
It might be thought that when a war is brought to a conclusion as a consequence of 
civilian losses, provided that the killing of those non-combatants was not used as 
the means to bring about that result, such losses would be permissible. Sometimes 
a result can be brought about through actions, although those same actions were not 
done in order to bring about that result. Uniacke (1994: 102) cites becoming 
physically fit by means of doing manual work, even though the work is done solely 
to earn extra money. A comparable example might be the situation in which 
military headquarters are bombed solely to stop the torture there, but, since this 
involves destroying a large part of the city, it proves to be an act decisive in ending 
the war. In other words, the deaths of innocents, prisoners and citizens, might 
achieve the good effect, without having been the intended means. However,the 
good effect would have been produced directly by the bad effect, and this would 
again amount to having used a bad means to a good end. 
IV c) ii) 	 Unified acts 
The third condition presupposes a distinction between the action (the means) and 
the bad effect, but, as we have seen, such a distinction can appear impossible when 
certain acts of war are contemplated. The use of lethal force is surely perilously 
close to, if not identical with, killing. 
Where the necessary degree of force is foreseen as 
lethal, the act on which the good effect supervenes is 
too close to a description of the bad effect (killing the 
person) not to be the so-called bad effect. (Uniacke, 
1994: 121) 
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If the size of bomb deemed necessary is such that civilians will certainly be killed, 
the dropping of that bomb must constitute what Grisez calls a 'unified act' (Grisez, 
1975: 92). In some instances we cannot choose to wage war without choosing to 
engage in killing non-combatants any more than, we can choose to light a match, in 
what we know to be a gas filled room, without choosing to blow ourselves up (c.f. 
Uniacke, 1994: 115). When acts of war and killing civilians are not divisible, the 
third condition of Double Effect cannot be satisfied. 
IV d) 	 Proportionality 
The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to 
compensate for the allowing of the bad effect. In 
forming this decision many factors must be weighed 
and compared, with care and prudence proportionate 
to the importance of the case. Thus, an effect that 
benefits or harms society generally has more weight 
than one which affects only the individual, and an 
effect sure to occur deserves greater consideration 
than one that is only probable; an effect of a moral 
nature has greater importance than one that deals only 
with material things. 
IV d) i) 	 'Sufficiently desirable' 
It is not clear, from The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate 
for the allowing of the bad effect', whether the good effect must outweigh the bad 
or merely not be outweighed by it. 
When it is plain that the result of an act of war brings a greater good, outweighing 
any bad side-effects, the military action seems morally justifiable. There can be 
little question that a relatively small number of injuries is preferable to genocide, 
just as bruising an intending-murderer must be the preferred option to the death of 
the potential victim. Similarly, a few civilian deaths might be considered morally 
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preferable to the killing of many. However, even if this is the case, it is not 
obvious that acts of war should be permissible where the consequent loss of life to 
civilians is judged to be merely comparable in order of magnitude. 
It is possible to imagine a scenario where war is waged to save a group of people 
from certain death, to prevent genocide perhaps, and that the war will involve the 
deaths of a similar number of civilians. (Let us for the moment also imagine that all 
the other factors, such as ensuring the future safety of a state, implicit in such a 
situation and which would need to be weighed, are non-existent. This is a matter 
where only the number of deaths is under consideration.) Such a war is not self-
evidently wrong, but it does seem a further step is needed before that war can be 
thought morally desirable. Allowing that an action is not necessarily wrong is not 
the same as believing that it is morally right and ought to be performed. 
While it might be conceded that the loss of a few to save many is better than the loss 
of many to save a few, killing one set of people in war to prevent the slaughter of 
another group seems to be a mere trading of lives and not automatically acceptable. 
Unless blatantly preferential treatment is to be given to one group of innocents over 
another, the problem remains intransigent if only comparability is allowed to be _ 
'sufficiently desirable'. Instead, the phrase must surely suggest 'outweigh' if it is 
to make the bad effect permissible. 
The Principle of Double Effect does emphasise the need to take into account other 
factors such as precedent, the particular evil of wiping out a whole people and 
culture perhaps, or even the need, some might say, for an expression of moral 
outrage. Proportionality in war involving loss of life seems to demand particular 
attention to other factors and it is plain that material benefits are never as important 
as 'effects of a moral nature'. Nevertheless, there is something odd in this context 
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about the notion that an action could be justified by an equal, balancing amount of 
good. 
When lives are in question, the bad effects surely cancel out most imaginable 
goods, such that there is likely to be no good effect to provide justification. This 
must amount to the need for the good to outweigh the bad. 
VI d) ii) 	 The moral weighting to be given to the lives of 
innocents 
Dying to save life can be morally acceptable or even laudable, but it does appear 
that choosing to die in a good cause is very different from being coerced into doing 
so. It is the job of soldiers to lay down their lives in a just war, one might say, and 
they may have voluntarily chosen this as their duty. Some civilians too, in a 
democracy, may be committed to the war and have effectively chosen to risk their 
lives in a good cause, but it is surely not uncommon for non-combatants at least to 
be unwitting and involuntary victims of war. Just war thinking assumes that there 
is a moral distinction between killing civilians and killing soldiers and there is no 
reason to suppose that Double Effect overrides this. The Principle of Double Effect 
requires that relevant factors should be taken into account, 'with care and 
prudence'. The lack of moral obligation and choice for many, if not all, civilians 
should be weighed too, since the deaths of innocents would constitute a greater evil 
than the deaths of people freely committed to war. When calculating whether or not 
the good effect is sufficiently desirable to allow the bad effect, it is important to 
recognise the particular moral weight attached to the lives of innocents. 
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Although the Principle of Double Effect can be seen as unsatisfactory in many 
respects, especially when applied to acts of war, scrutiny of the conditions has 
raised some issues which might otherwise have passed unquestioned, and has 
shown that the principle is no crude version of ends justifying means. It certainly 
does not offer a carte blanche for all destruction believed necessary to achieve good 
ends. 
The attraction of Double Effect is that it addresses the problem of when one should 
pursue a right action even when it is obvious that this will involve harm. The 
principle appears at first glance highly relevant to war, insofar as it might be 
assumed to give legitimacy to the unavoidable killing of civilians and thus 
supplement just war thinking. However, it is crucial to realise that the principle 
cannot appropriately be invoked to solve all the problems inherent in the demand for 
the protection of innocents and to avoid what Anscombe describes as, 'double think 
about double effect', (Anscombe, 1981: 58). 
Examination of Double Effect is illuminating and significant, not because it reveals 
that the principle legitimises what might otherwise seem to be unjustifiable acts, but 
because it underlines the difficulties of such attempts. 
If war is to be presented appropriately in the classroom, children will have to be 
alerted to the moral complexities and educated to address them for themselves. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Teaching on War: 
Peace Education - one approach to presenting war in schools 
Exploration of the morality of war has shown that war is a highly controversial 
issue. War is not an unavoidable part of our lives. As Glover maintains, 'It is not 
yet clear that men have an ineradicable predisposition to war,' (Glover, 1977: 253) 
and consequently we should not ignore the moral dimension. In Chapter 2, it was 
seen that no arguments satisfactorily demonstrated that intentional taking of life is 
always wrong, but it was concluded that the taking of a life worth living, in 
Rachels' sense (Rachels, 1986: 26), is a prima facie evil. On the assumption that 
those who die in wars are not generally suicidal or the proper subjects for 
euthenasia, the justification of that killing which is part of warfare continues to be 
problematic. While just war thinking seemed to allow that fighting in self-defence 
must be morally acceptable, even this, like other just causes, was seen to be 
difficult to establish. The conduct of war has been complicated by the weaponry 
now at our disposal, such that protection for non-combatants may be impossible in 
much modern warfare. This calls into question whether or not the use of, for 
example, nuclear weapons, even in deterrence, could ever be morally right. 
Examination of the Principle of Double Effect revealed that the killing of innocents 
was not easily justified. 
All this suggests that teaching on war is likely to be problematic. Teachers will 
wish to educate children so that they appreciate the moral complexities and are in a 
position where they can make moral judgements with regard to war. How then 
should war be presented in schools? 
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One way of presenting issues relating to war is in the context of Peace Education. 
In that it comprises the most recent, specific and systematic approach to addressing 
issues of war widely in the curriculum, Peace Education should not be ignored. 
There may always have been teaching on war in schools. Certainly war is not a 
topic which will be new to the classroom. As suggested in the introduction, 
children discuss it infolinally, and various aspects of war are studied in different 
subject areas. However, until relatively recently, it is perhaps unlikely that the 
moral problems of war have received detailed academic treatment as a planned 
element in the curriculum. The drive to introduce Peace Education has been one 
attempt to rectify this. In seeking principles which ought to inform teaching on 
war, it would be foolish to ignore the significant contribution of those advocating 
Peace Education. 
In this chapter, in the first section, the general aims of Peace Education will be 
examined to discover if they are those which should guide all teaching on war. In 
the second section objections to Peace Education will be addressed in order to 
provide a more detailed scrutiny of the problems which face educators presenting 
war in the classroom. 
(It should be noted that 'Peace Education' will be used in reference to that area of 
study which was defined in the nineteen eighties by Hicks and others. 'Peace 
Studies' is conventionally used to refer to courses in institutions of higher or 
secondary education, but such courses can also appropriately be called Peace 
Education. 'Peace Education' will be employed as an umbrella term, to include 
what is taught to younger children, only using 'Peace Studies' when it is the title 
used in other texts. Any distinction between 'Peace Studies', a timetabled course, 
and 'Peace Education', which might also refer to crosscurricular and informal 
teaching, will not be employed here.) 
140 
I Peace Education 
Various authors, including Halstead (1985), Hicks (1988) and the NUT (1984), 
have detailed the evolution of Peace Education in recent years. There seems to be 
general agreement that, in the nineteen seventies and eighties, Peace Education 
appeared to be the natural heir to what had been known as World Studies and 
indeed was advocated by many of those previously involved in that field, such as 
Hicks and Bridges. 
As it happened, any large scale introduction of Peace Education into our schools 
lost impetus with the advent of the National Curriculum, which from its inception 
took centre stage in controversies about the curriculum. The days of international 
conferences between scientists and educators debating the possibilities and 
implications of Peace Education drew to a close, at least for the time being. More 
immediate concerns about the practical implementation and consequences of the 
National Curriculum took over. Lister sadly notes that now, 
Peace Education, in terms of practice, is a rare and 
exotic plant, flowering on Welsh clifftops and 
conspicuous by its absence in the prosaic life of the 
ordinary schools. (Lister, 1984: 72). 
Nevertheless, the ideas of those keen to have Peace Education in both primary and 
secondary schools have touched many teachers and influenced their practice. 
Certainly these ideas are relevant to the problems surrounding the presentation of 
war in schools. 
I i) 	 What is Peace Education? 
Peace Education means different things to different people: 
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To some it means a re-appraisal of the content and 
context of all that we teach; for some it means 
specific slots in the timetable in which to concentrate 
on issues like disarmament, racism, sexism, and 
human rights; for some it seems like the introduction 
into lessons of political indoctrination or propaganda. 
To some it is a hope for the future - an opportunity 
bring about a world without war; for some it is a 
threat - a challenge to the established patterns of 
authority and pedagogy. (NUT, 1984: 11) 
Some evidently fear the inclusion of Peace Education into the curriculum, while 
others welcome it with enthusiasm. It may be that the differing views arise from a 
confusion about what is meant by the title. 
Definitions of Peace Education are invariably expressed in terms of aims or 
objectives. Thus Hicks writes that 'a definition is appropriate', then gives the 
following list (attributed to Duczek) of what it attempts to do: 
i) sharpen awareness about the existence of 
conflict between people and within and 
between nations; 
ii) investigate the causes of conflict and violence 
embedded within the perceptions, values and 
attitudes of individuals, as well as within the 
social, political and economic structures of 
society; 
iii) encourage the search for alternatives, 
including non-violent solutions, and the 
development of skills necessary for their 
implementation. 
(Hicks, 1986: 13) 
The Nottinghamshire report also employs Duczek's wording, commenting that this 
is 'the most concise definition of Peace Education which we have come across', 
(Nottinghamshire LEA Working Party, 1981: 4). I should have to agree, but more 
detail is needed before we can see how far teaching on war should follow the 
precepts of Peace Education. 
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The Nottinghamshire report elaborates, including in its proposals specific reference 
to warfare, weapons and disarmament (ibid., 1981: 4 ff). There can be no doubt 
that Peace Education is intended to encompass issues of war, but its scope extends 
beyond it. To understand the importance of Peace Education's contribution to 
teaching on war and recognise some of the problems, three key features need to be 
explored: the ideas of conflict resolution, education for peace and the notions of 
negative and positive peace. 
I ii) 	 Conflict resolution 
Whatever the beliefs of their opponents, peace educators certainly do not mean by 
'peace' solely the absence of military conflict, let alone that the content of Peace 
Education should be limited to the rights and wrongs of nuclear warfare. But 
Peace Education does concern conflict and the resolution of conflict. It is, 
an attempt to respond to problems of conflict and 
violence on scales ranging from the global and 
national to the local and personal. (Hicks, 1988: 5) 
There is no suggestion that, in this context, peace entails the absence of conflict per 
se. 
Its vision of a peaceful world is not one in which 
there is an absence of conflict. (Fell, 1988: 75) 
Situations of conflict are inevitable in our world, 'an inescapable part of our lives' 
(Burnley, 1988: 53). Conflict seems to be part of the human condition. This is not 
to say, that human beings are naturally aggressive and doomed to injure each other 
in pursuit of the satisfaction of their instinctive drives, for it was clearly 
demonstrated in Chapter 1 that there are no good grounds for such a claim. Rather 
it is to suggest that part of what it is to be a person is to experience individual 
desires which are likely to run counter to the wants of others. Where limited goods 
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are available, there may be conflicting needs. Even the hennit or the desert island 
castaway may suffer from inner conflict when it is difficult to decide between 
different needs or desires and their relative position in one's own hierarchy of 
values. 
To accept that conflict is unavoidable is not necessarily to accept that war and 
violence are equally irresistible. Not all conflicts take the form of wars and not all 
conflicts cause people to resort to violence. Neither does conceding that individual 
desires are likely at times to conflict directly relate in any way to a belief that human 
beings are naturally bellicose. As we have seen, many biologists as well as 
philosophers have made plain that violence towards one's own kind cannot be 
simplistically attributed merely to what is inherent in the human race or its genes 
(see Hinde, 1989; Rose et al., 1981; Midgley: 1979 & 1984). 
If we are not predestined, as it were, to pursue our ends with violence, then the 
experience of conflict need not always be a violent or warlike one. The discussion 
of aggression in Chapter 1 indicated that the exact degree to which our behaviour is 
a product of our biological inheritance or our social circumstances is difficult to 
determine. Disentangling precisely what is innate from what is learnt, where the 
possibility of both contributing to certain behaviour is admitted, may be beyond us. 
However, the importance of recognising that both our biology and social factors are 
relevant to the way in which we resolve conflicts is underlined in the curricular aims 
of the Nottinghamshire report. One of the ten proposed aims is, 
To appreciate some of the biological and social 
factors which influence human behaviour. 
(Nottinghamshire LEA Working Party, 1981: 5) 
Peace Education is concerned to bring about understanding that conflict need not 
always lead to violence. If violent behaviour is to any extent learnt then people can 
presumably learn to cope with conflict without recourse to violence, aggressive 
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behaviour or war. Children need to understand that even if it were the case that we 
have an inborn propensity towards aggressive behaviour, this may still be 
suppressible. Legal, moral and religious codes rest on the supposition that in 
general we do have some control over our behaviour. People obviously have the 
capacity for murder (since murders are committed) and some evidently experience 
the urge to murder, but the assumption is that being able to murder one's neighbour 
does not entail that one therefore does so, and that urges to act violently ought to be 
repressed. There seems to be no good reason to discard these assumptions when 
contemplating the behaviour of our species as a whole. So while conflict may be 
present in our lives, peaceful resolutions to international conflicts may be possible. 
Perhaps it is useful to recognise conflict as a state of affairs and violence as 
behaviour or action. Human action is conventionally distinguished from reflexes 
over which people have no control. The capacity for action which may be inbuilt is 
not the same as a genetic imprint such that specific behaviour is inescapable on the 
receipt of certain stimuli. Having the capacity for violent action then is very 
different from being programmed to react violently in given circumstances. 
Accepting a capacity for violence in a situation of conflict is not accepting violence 
as an automatic response to a state of affairs we term 'conflict'. 
It is interesting to note that the military at least recognise this distinction and, 
furthermore, clearly doubt the strength of any biologically based propensity to kill. 
Thus, according to Guardian newspaper reports in 1982, en route to the Falklands, 
indoctrinatory programmes were implemented without which it was believed 
members of the armed forces could not have brought themselves to kill their fellow 
human beings. Norman draws attention to this: 
The hardened combat veteran can perhaps kill with 
equanimity, but the hardening process is necessary. 
An important part of military training is breaking 
down the psychological inhibitions against killing. 
(Norman, 1995: 183) 
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Violent behaviour and war then are not an inescapable part of our existence, but 
conflict itself may be unavoidable. Peace educators would not suggest that conflict 
is undesirable, although this idea is sometimes attributed to them. If altruism is 
held to be a virtue, then perhaps conflict too has its value. Altruism can presumably 
only be exercised when there is competition for goods (in the widest sense). It is 
difficult to imagine how one could learn what altruism is or develop the disposition 
to act altruistically without at least recognising that the desires of others can conflict 
with one's own and learning what it is to put another's needs and wishes first. 
So teaching about conflict resolution is intended to incorporate consideration of the 
nature of conflict, with emphasis on the possibility of non-violent solutions. In 
addition, in line with the aims of Peace Education (Hicks, 1986: 13) cited above, it 
should include investigation of the causes of conflict. Teaching on war too, at least 
for older children, would be incomplete if there were no exploration of the causes 
of international conflicts, and some consideration of just war theory and the 
difficulties of identifying jus ad bellum noted in Chapter 3. 
It would seem that conflict is something children will meet in their lives, both 
present and future. Those who engage in Peace Education are surely right to teach 
about conflict and its resolution. 
Conflict is an important element in children's lives. 
They experience it in arguments at home, in quarrels 
or fights at school, in violence portrayed in the 
media. They also meet it in history, social studies 
and many other parts of the school curriculum. If 
they are to cope well with life they need to have the 
capacity to understand and to deal with conflicts. 
(Nicholas, 1983: 1) 
How they can and should deal with it is at the core of Peace Education, and I would 
maintain it is germane to teaching on war. I do not wish to imply that fights in the 
playground are directly analogous to international warfare - to suggest they are 
would be to distort the reality of war in all its complexity - but the understanding 
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that physical violence is not always necessary or desirable as a means of resolving 
conflicts is very relevant. 
The strong emphasis on conflict resolution within Peace Education may make 
'Conflict Studies' seem a better title. However, Peace Education aims not only to 
teach about conflict, not simply to give some neutral presentation on the subject, but 
to contribute to bringing into being a more peaceful world. 
I iii) 	 Education for peace 
The fact that this area of studies is called 'Peace Education' rather than 'Conflict 
Studies' is significant. The desire to educate children with regard to conflict does 
spring from a belief that there is too little peace in the world today and that non-
violent resolution of conflict is to be preferred. 
'Peace Education' highlights the concern for peace and the value in which it is held. 
It may reflect the concern felt by many teachers at how little peace is overtly dealt 
with in the curriculum, in comparison with the time devoted to the consideration of 
wars in history for example. (Dealing with the significance of wars must often 
involve reflection on the conditions for peace, but perhaps teachers feel that this is 
inadequate in being peace addressed in the context of war, rather than lessons 
explicitly focussed on peace.) 
However there can be little doubt that Peace Education, as explicated by Hicks 
(1983, 1986 & 1988) is intended to be education for peace, indeed he explicitly 
writes of 'Education for Peace' and lists among the attitudes which should be 
fostered in children: 
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Commitment to justice: 
Students should value genuinely democratic 
principles and processes and be ready to work for a 
more just and peaceful world at local, national, and 
international levels. (Hicks, 1988: 15, my italics.) 
This must be desirable, for peace is surely a good thing worth striving for and there 
seems to be a widely shared and profound desire for peace. 
We are all ready to make the declaration that we are 
opposed to war, 'the easiest of commonplaces' as 
Burke called it. We are all in favour of peace. The 
desire for a life free of fear, free of violence is one of 
the most human aspirations. All religious traditions 
give voice to it. All governments will fromally 
protest that this is their most fundamental aim. 
(Reid, 1984: 124) 
But there is another reason for conceding that we should encourage pupils to value 
it. It may be that the only alternative is to teach children to devalue it. It seems 
illegitimate to talk of teaching about x as if it is possible to engage in the safe 
transmission of information relating to x somehow untainted by any questions of 
value. While it is possible to draw a formal distinction between educating about 
and educating for, this can obscure the truth in practice. We cannot teach all the 
facts about anything (even if we know them - and somehow know we know). In 
school we are limited by time, resources and our own inadequacies. Consequently 
we select from all we know, what we hope to teach. Concerned to educate those in 
our care, we choose what we believe to be relevant and important, rather than 
irrelevant and trivial, in the light of our educational aims and objectives, our 
knowledge of children and how they learn. In the end, this selection reflects our 
judgement, values and bias. We are inevitably doing more than presenting facts or 
neutral information. Implicitly we are presenting values too. Any discussion of 
peace is hardly appropriately so termed if matters of value are neglected, but this 
apart, it seems impossible that we could educate exclusively about peace without 
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presenting values: instead we are always teaching to some extent for or against 
peace. 
Peace Education is intended to promote favourable, not unfavourable, attitudes 
towards peace and it therefore seems appropriate that this bias is reflected in the 
name. 
Nevertheless, as a title, 'Peace Education' may seem recklessly provocative, 
suggestive of the inculcation of pacifism. But encouraging children to value peace 
is not the same as promulgating pacifism. To value peace is not necessarily to hold 
it as either one's first principle or one's only value. In Chapter 3 it was noted that 
one can value peace without believing that war can never be justified. In drawing 
attention to the value of peace, a teacher is doing more than offering peace as an 
option and is partisan in this respect, but this is quite distinct from the intentional 
inculcation of pacifist ideals. Teaching on war could legitimately include teaching 
the value of peace. 
Peace Education is not confined to promoting that peace which is the opposite of 
war. Its concern is also with peaceful living in a more general sense. What 'peace' 
might mean needs a little clarification in this context. 
I iv) 	 'Negative' and 'positive' peace 
'Peace', in the literature of Peace Education, is commonly said to have a negative 
and a positive sense. 
To the generation of the First and Second World 
wars the value of so-called 'negative peace' was 
clear. A world without war seemed a valuable and 
central goal. By the late 60's and 70's however as a 
new generation matured there emerged a greater 
concern for the creation of what John Galtung and 
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others called 'positive peace', or peace with justice. 
(Reid, 1984: 125) 
In his characterisation of positive and negative peace, Curle suggests that peace is 
analogous with health: 
Both are defined negatively in terms of their 
opposites. Health is what we enjoy when we are not 
suffering from bubonic plague, schizophrenia, the 
common cold or some other identifiable disease. 
Peace is what we enjoy when we are not at war or in 
some other state of unpleasant and distinctive 
conflict. As everyone knows, however, being 
healthy is much more than not being ill; it is feeling 
alive, whole and full of energy. (Curle, 1984: 8) 
It is 'being healthy' which is thought of as positive and the absence of disease as 
negative. This is an attractive notion and one which appears to identify different 
aspects of health, but it is also confusing. Surely to be healthy is to be without 
illness and no more. Talk of being 'full of energy' is somewhat of a red herring. 
Physically exhausted after a hard game of squash, one could not be properly 
described as 'full of energy', yet one could still be in the pink of good health. Lack 
of energy may or may not be a sign of ill-health - it depends upon the case. 
Instead of conceiving of health as having negative and positive aspects, could it not 
be viewed as a continuum? The less we are affected by any disease or illness, the 
more healthy we are. The absence of bubonic plague does not necessarily coincide 
with 'feeling alive' and full of good health, but this may still be because one has a 
minor ailment or impaiii 	 lent to health such as a vitamin deficiency, in other words, 
because one is not completely healthy. The root of my quibble may be in the 
mention of 'identifiable disease' which does not seem to allow that mild 
discomforts and lethargy can be symptoms of some slight illness. In addition, it 
should be remembered that feelings are not necessarily indicative of one's state of 
health. If grief prevents me from feeling aglow with good health, it need not signal 
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that I am unhealthy. Surely I can be both healthy and grieving. To suggest 
otherwise is to stretch the meaning of 'health' too far. 
In the same way it would seem that the absence of unpleasant conflict is peace. 
There is no additional positive element. Complete peace obviously is not merely the 
absence of war, but the absence of all violence (not only physical violence) is 
exactly what peace is. Aspin would argue that I am wrong: 
just as there is a widespread feeling that 'health' 
amounts to more than the mere absence of disease, 
so there is cosiderable regard for the view that a state 
of 'not-war', 'not-conflict' or 'non-oppression' does 
not add up to the 'peace' that is represented widely as 
a desirable terminus ad quem for statesmanlike 
endeavour and practical politics. (Aspin, 1986: 128) 
However, in charactersing a more positive account of peace, Aspin recalls the 
comment, 
it begins with the fostering of self-esteem or personal 
well-being in the individual. 
(Report of the Peace Education Conference, New 
Zealand, cited by Aspin, 1986: 129) 
This suggests that he is concerned with aims of Peace Education and what might be 
needed for more peaceful living, rather than defining peace. 
O'Connell (1984: 24) writes of negative peace as being 'a necessary though not a 
sufficient condition of positive peace'. He maintains that negative peace, the 
absence of violence, is only one element of peace and that another basic element, 
'cooperation among persons', is also necessary to an adequate characterisation of 
peace. 
Again this seems a misrepresentation. Many, many things can contribute to 
unpeacefulness and lack of cooperation is one of them. Cooperation is surely only 
contingently necessary to peace and is not the logically necessary condition 
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O'Connell seems to claim. While being uncooperative may exacerbate or cause 
strife, one could surely be at peace and yet not in a situation where cooperation is 
relevant. 'Non-cooperation' perhaps can be distinguished from 'uncooperation'. I 
should prefer maintain that, as I argued in Chapter 3, the degree to which anything 
which creates unpeacefulness is absent, to that extent there is peace. 
However, when 'negative' and 'positive' are not applied to peace but refer to 
people's attitudes or the measures they may take with respect to peace, the terms 
alert us to a useful distinction. 
In teaching for peace, and in teaching on war, it must be important to realise that, as 
O'Connell says, 
The negative element of peace which is the avoidance 
of discord or inflicted disorder is often the most 
psychologically salient of the elements of peace, 
and, 
The danger of concentrating on negative peace is that 
practitioners and theorists alike may neglect to work 
on constructing the foundations of peace. 
(O'Connell, 1984: 24) 
Surely we do need to learn to become less disposed towards violence, to achieve 
more control over some expressions of emotion, to acquire communication and 
other 'peace making' skills. If wars are to be avoided, it must be important work 
actively to bring about those conditions which give no cause for international 
conflict. 
On the one hand I see these as prerequisites for avoiding violence, but on the other I 
recognise them as positive rather than negative measures. Perhaps too the idea of 
'positive' underlines the option of focusing on what people and nations share in 
common rather than on their differences, on those things which make peace 
possible rather than its opposite, on having positive feelings, as we say, rather than 
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negative ones towards one another. When 'positive peace' identifies actively 
seeking more peaceful ways of life in contrast with merely avoiding violent conflict, 
I have no quarrel with the phrase. 
Hicks distinguishes between negative and positive peace rather more precisely. He 
defines negative peace as the absence of personal violence and positive peace as the 
absence of structural violence. 
Structural violence is described as indirect and, 
the ways in which people may also suffer as a result 
of social, political and economic systems. (Hicks, 
1988: 6). 
Injury or even death resulting from injustice is as real as that which is the 
consequence of being attacked physically. Systems which establish or perpetuate 
any denial of human rights are thus very properly seen as violent. Concern for 
eradicating structural violence carries with it concern about the nature of a just 
society or even world, and how it is created. (This seems very much in keeping 
with the aims of O'Connell et al. although they use the phrases 'negative peace' and 
'positive peace' slightly differently.) Structural violence, characterised in these 
_terms, is surely likely to be one cause of war and its absence is something to be 
sought. 
Curle (1984) is evidently thinking in similar terms when he writes, 
Peace, in the positive sense, means a state of human 
living together, whether the scale be large or small, 
characterised by conditions that make for the 
realisation of human potential. 
and 
Unpeacefulness implies the exact opposite, a state of 
affairs that is detrimental to the fulfilment of our 
potential. By physical means, as in war, or by 
psychological manipulation, economic exploitation, 
political oppression, or many other subtle methods, 
we damage each other's chance of achieving 
realisation. (Curie, 1984: 8) 
153 
Although not all the uses of the phrases 'negative peace' and 'positive peace' are 
entirely satisfactory, when 'positive peace' identifies actively building peaceful 
circumstances and the absence of structural violence it does seem useful 
terminology, and picks out concepts relevant to teaching on war. 
My purpose in examining Peace Education has not been to debate its importance as 
a discrete subject named on the curriculum, but to clarify what it is. Because I wish 
to confine my evaluation of Peace Education to those aspects which concern war, 
consideration of specific content which has been put forward by Hicks et al. will be 
included in the final chapter on the content of teaching on war. 
It is evident that Peace Education is intended to include consideration of war and its 
central concerns, examined above, should be taken into account when deciding how 
best to teach on war. 
Before exploring further the principles which should underpin such teaching, it is 
important to look at some of the criticisms which have been levelled at Peace 
Education, for objections to its inclusion in the school curriculum are likely pertain 
to teaching on war in more general terms. 
II Objections to Peace Education Examined 
Objections to Peace Education are typically levelled at its content or the form it 
might take, yet it seems to me that, underlying much criticism, there are doubts 
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about its aims and confused presuppositions which require clarification. By 
examining objections to Peace Education, the intention is to draw attention to some 
of the problems which face teachers when presenting issues of war in the 
classroom, and to identify those which must be taken into account in deciding on 
principles for teaching on war. 
Some of the objections examined in this section concern what are feared to be likely 
consequences of such teaching, while others focus on the methodology or subject 
matter. The categorisation of anxieties over Peace Education into separate 
objections is necessarily somewhat artificial since they are often closely related and 
implicit in many is the fear that such teaching will be indoctrinatory. 
The charge that Peace Education will amount to indoctrination is extremely serious 
and must be addressed specifically, together with idea that it will comprise 
propaganda. Criticisms that Peace Education will not aid the achievement of a more 
peaceful world and, in sharp contrast, that it will endanger peace are also important. 
It may seem that the accusation that Peace Education is irrelevant is of little 
significance, but this too raises pertinent issues and will be explored. 
The first idea to be scrutinised relates to the value of peace. The assumption that 
peace is universally valued might seem to be inappropriately described as an 
objection to Peace Education, but it will be shown that it can lead to the notion that 
Peace Education is unnecessary. 
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II a) 	 'Peace is universally valued.' 
The assumption that peace is universally valued is widespread. Riddell, in his 
introduction to the Nottinghamshire report, confidently asserts, 
We are in no doubt that every thinking person 
subscribes to the view that all the difficult problems 
which face us in our country, in society as a whole 
and on an international scale should be resolved by 
peaceful means. (Riddell, 1981: 3) 
Wragg's oft echoed remark endorses this view: 
I don't actually know anyone who is against peace. 
Try as I might to trawl through my memories of all 
the people I have ever known, I cannot for the life of 
me find one who is against the notion of living in 
peace. (Wragg cited by Aspin, 1986: 131) 
Yet Peace Education explicitly intends to promote the value of peace - this is its 
overarching aim. If peace were universally valued there would be less reason to 
educate for peace. 
II a) i) 	 Disagreement over what peace is 
There are undoubtedly disputes over peace and war, and these seem to indicate that 
there is little consensus over the value of peace. Aspin suggests that one reason for 
such disputes is that, while people may agree on the desirability of peace, they 
differ in their conceptualisation of what this might mean: 
What debates about peace often come down to is the 
articulation of notions of human being and human 
flourishing that are radically different. Thus 
discussions about the nature of peace often involve 
fundamental differences in our metaphysics of man 
and society - of what counts as human nature, human 
welfare, and an acceptable basis of social relations 
for its optimum realisation. (Aspin, 1986: 131) 
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Common ground may be lacking, but if the problem is mainly one of language, in 
the articulation of our ideas, there is some cause for optimism. It may be possible 
to develop a language which has, 
some sort of common logic for the elucidation and 
evaluation of even the most fundamental ideological 
differences as to what counts as human welfare and 
harm. (Aspin, 1986: 131) 
Without this common conceptualisation people will continue to differ, but, given 
some shared understanding of fundamental concepts, movement towards agreement 
will be facilitated. 
II a) ii) 	 Disagreement over how best to achieve peace 
Those who believe that peace per se is valued to such an extent that debates on the 
subject of peace are in fact only arguments about how best to achieve it, also seem 
to believe that fundamentally there is consensus on the value of peace. If this were 
the case, it would not be necessary to promote its value and Peace Education could 
be exclusively a matter of bringing about increased understanding of how to cope 
with conflict and bring about the conditions necessary for a peaceful world. 
It may well be that most discussion of peace is actually talk about how best to 
achieve it, but, illuminating though this might be with respect to what people talk 
about, it does not show that there is consensus with regard to the value of peace. 
II a) iii) 	 There are those who do not value peace 
I would suggest that there is nothing like universal agreement that peace is 
desirable. It is surely evident that there are those who value war and not peace. 
There are people who wage war in the belief that it will lead to peace, but there are 
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also those who do so because they enjoy fighting or for extrinsic personal benefits 
(other than peace) which may accrue. 
This is not reducible to any misunderstanding of what peace is, nor is this an issue 
of how peace might be achieved. It may be a matter of priorities, but I do not refer 
here to the conviction that a preference for a peaceful unoppressed life might on 
occasion lead one to choose war rather than peace as explained in Chapter 3. There 
is a distinction between those who value peace and justify war by reference to just 
causes, and those who subordinate peace to personal gain. 
Choosing in favour of war over peace for purely personal profit is very different 
from opting for war as a sad necessity to gain a 'higher end'. The mercenary who 
glories in battle, irrespective of the cause, cannot be held to prefer peace. Those 
who choose to earn money from the sale of arms, indifferent to the outcome of the 
conflicts in which their weapons are used, cannot consistently claim to hold peace 
in high esteem or to view war, and the absence of peace, as a sad necessity. It 
might be argued that the mercenary still values a different sort of peace, financial 
security for one's family at home perhaps, but this would merely underline the 
elevation of a form of self-interest over exclusively moral concerns. 
To deny that a considerable number of people do not, as a matter of fact, hold peace 
in high esteem is to ignore or to dismiss reality. This is not to say that peace is not 
valuable, but to establish that any assumption that all those who discuss peace are 
agreed on its value is unwarranted, and that it may not be the case that all arguments 
about peace are merely about how best to achieve it. 
Any attempt to judge the extent to which peace is valued is complicated by our use 
of language. 'Peace' has perhaps always had an emotive force as well as 
descriptive content. Despite Orwell's warnings, we largely accept and are inured to 
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the erosion of the descriptive content of many words - so much so that the 
deployment of first strike weapons is rarely noted as absurdly inappropriate to 
defence. Just as any predominantly emotive word can be used to disguise 
arguments, so 'peace' can be employed as a rallying cry to banners more 
appropriately emblazoned 'war'. 
The strength of 'peace' as a call to arms is that it evokes approbation. But this is 
not always the case. In some contexts, the emotive force of the term seems to 
change direction. In some situations, wartime perhaps, to say someone favours 
peace may be to denigrate that person. Doves have been jeered at by hawks in 
peace time too. To declare too often in favour of peace may be to be seen as 'wee, 
a denigratory term for many politicians. 
Consequently, we cannot infer from the way in which the word is used, that peace 
is always held in high esteem. Current usage suggests otherwise. 
This is underlined in the oft repeated wry comment that 'War Studies' would cause 
less stir than 'Peace Education'. 
What fascinates me is peoples' reaction to the word 
'peace'. War studies are much more acceptable to a 
lot of people. (Hicks in the Guardian, 1981: 21 
April) 
There are, of course, no grounds for the belief that all who object to peace 
education implicitly disparage peace, but the contingency that some may do so 
remains. Moreover, one reason for the perception that Peace Education is needed 
must be an awareness that peace is not universally valued and that it would be 
unwise to suppose that all our pupils value it. 
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II b) 	 'Peace Education cannot contribute to or further the 
pursuit of peace.' 
In the belief that peace is valuable, the importance of working for a more peaceful 
world via education is recommended in the UNO Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: 
Education...shall promote understanding, tolerance 
and friendship among all nations, racial and or 
religious groups and shall further the activities of the 
United Nations for the maintainence of peace. (UNO 
cited by Aspin, 1987: 12) 
There are those who see this as an unattainable desire, and for this reason take the 
view that Peace Education is therefore futile. 
It must at once be conceded that there is no logically necessary relationship between 
the implementation of Peace Education and the furtherance of peace. Studying 
peace does not necessarily lead to valuing peace any more than studying 
mathematics leads students to value mathematics - unless something more is meant 
by studying than is usual. 
Even were a person to come to value peace via her studies in Peace Education, it 
would not logically follow that she had the ability to contribute to it, just as one 
who values literature is not necessarily capable of writing poetry. The ability to do 
something is a necessary condition of actually doing it, but it does not follow that 
those who develop the ability to further peace will actually do so. Given that a 
person can do something, it is always a further question whether or not that person 
will in fact do it. So to concede that Peace Education will not necessarily contribute 
to peace is surely to concede very little. It is not to admit that it is logically 
impossible. 
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The question is rather whether or not the adoption of Peace Education can and is 
likely to contribute to the achievement and perpetuation of peace. Some information 
would seem relevant to the founation and modification of attitudes, and some 
knowledge to the making of rational decisions. If a person is ignorant of any 
alternatives to war as a means of settling disputes, she is in no position to value 
peace nor to opt for peaceful resolutions. 
If Peace Education provides relevant information, fosters understanding and 
develops skills, it comprises the provision of that which is likely to contribute to 
peace. To exclude Peace Education from schools is to leave to chance whether or 
not pupils have access to these facts, and to take no steps to further the cause of 
peace. In so far as it furthers understanding of the issues involved and dispels 
ignorance and incomprehension, to that extent it is at least likely to foster some 
active concern for peace. All teaching on war should take account of the need for 
that knowledge and understanding necessary to giving children real choice in 
relation to peace and war. 
In strong contrast with any who feel Peace Education is not worth attempting 
because it has little or no chance of success, are those who fear it will be all too 
successful in promoting peace as a value and will inculcate a reluctance to fight if 
n.n 
not downright pacifism. 
II c) 	 'Peace education will endanger peace.' 
This rather extreme view is implicit in the objection that peace education will 
succeed in fostering certain attitudes to peace and war such that it will inevitably 
lead to pacifism. The reasoning appears to be that this nation-wide pacifism will 
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then be taken as a sign of military weakness, encouraging our enemies to attack. 
Reid cites this assumption as one objection to Peace Education: 
Peace Education will not be acceptable to the wider 
public and to the State ... because it plays into the 
hands of our enemies, (Reid, 1984: 129) 
Marks (1984) expresses the fear that teachers of Peace Education will have the 
effect of those people who talk incessantly of peace and were castigated for this by 
Plato: 
on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, 
which is often out of season where their influence 
prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and 
bring up their young to be like themselves; they are at 
the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years 
they and their children and the whole city often pass 
imperceptibly from the condition of free men to that 
of slaves. (Plato, cited by Aspin, 1986: 122) 
The presuppositions on which this objection rests are at least questionable. The 
assumption that Peace Education will inevitably engender pacifism is dubious in the 
extreme. For exactly the reason it must be conceded that Peace Education would 
not necessarily promote peace, it cannot be held that it will necessarily produce 
pacifists. Only successful brainwashing and indoctrination would inevitably bring 
about the programming of unshakeable pacifists. These methods of belief and 
attitude modification are held to be entirely inappropriate to the educational context, 
so much so that fear of them comprises a further objection examined below. 
Whether or not pacifism will in fact result from Peace Education without employing 
indoctrination must, at the moment, be a matter of conjecture in the absence of long-
term empirical studies. But it is in any case important to recognise that it is still a 
further question whether a nation whose youth is predominantly pacifist will be 
seen as vulnerable, and yet another whether or not this would encourage attack. I 
have no wish to discuss the psychological effect on other nations of a hypothetical 
situation in which all citizens of one country have embraced pacifism, nor to debate 
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the consequences of regarding other countries as potential enemies. I am not 
qualified to do so - but perhaps if I had engaged in peace education at school I 
should be more knowledgeable, have greater understanding and be better able to 
attempt such evaluations. 
It does seem the claim that Peace Education will endanger peace cannot be proven 
and possibly the very fears implicit in this objection might be allayed were a form of 
peace education to be introduced in schools, for, as was made plain in the previous 
section, the inculcation of pacifism has no place in educating for peace. This too 
should be the case in any teaching on war. 
II d) 	 'Peace is a matter for the experts.' 
Perhaps believing that the safety of the state to be at stake, some might argue that 
Peace Education concerns issues of war and peace so vital and momentous that they 
should be left to the experts - among whom teachers and pupils are not numbered. 
The argument seems to assert that the complexity of politics and military stategy is 
such that none but the expert is appropriately qualified to give anything other than 
an over-simplified, and thus distorted, picture. The implication of such assertions 
is that inadequate understanding (presumed to be inevitable in the classroom) will 
have dire consequences: bluntly, a little learning on this subject is a dangerous 
thing. 
If it were true that incomplete comprehension of peace had appalling effects and this 
were unavoidable, there would be good cause for alarm, but even then would this 
be good reason to allow only the experts to present, debate and make decisions on 
these matters? 
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II d) i) 	 Who are the experts? 
In this context, by 'experts' is generally meant those who are authorities in the 
fields of science, political and military affairs, both academics and professionals. 
They are experts in virtue of being better informed and more experienced in these 
areas than the ordinary teacher or pupil. 
Given that they know and understand more of such things than we do, should we 
not be content to leave peace and war in their hands, accepting their conclusions and 
following their instructions? Of course we should not. As educators, teachers 
surely share a reluctance to accept conclusions when permitted only limited access 
to the reasons for them, or no access at all, on the assumption that they and their 
pupils are incapable of the requisite understanding. There is a strong sense of 
undue paternalism about the implied suggestion that we should not expect 
explanations which will inevitably be beyond our ken, and this sits uneasily with 
the educational aspiration to develop knowledge rather than simply inculcating 
facts. Even when it is intended to be in their best interests and for their own good, 
teachers and their pupils should not be deprived of the right of rational enquiry into 
matters of peace and war in an educational setting. 
While I think it right that teachers should not attempt to teach subjects they know 
nothing of, this is not the situation here. Teachers and pupils will have some 
knowledge and understanding of the issues. Some will have relevant specialised 
knowledge of at least the scientific aspects. In 'The facts of life', Harris 
emphasises the importance of raising such issues in school: 
schools are one of the few, if not the only, 
institutions to which many citizens will have access, 
which can hope to help with the clarification of the 
issues involved, and with providing at least some of 
the relevant scientific and medical information. 
(Harris, 1986: p. 101) 
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Some expertise on these matters resides in schools, but, more importantly, 
competent teachers must be deemed experts on teaching and learning. If people are 
to understand issues of peace and war, then teachers be among the experts needed. 
II d) ii) 	 Military and political expertise is not enough 
Superficially it might seem reasonable to trust experts in relation to war. On the 
whole, we are happy to allow doctors to diagnose, prescribe and effect cures. 
Although our faith in a doctor's expertise may at times be misplaced, to most of us 
it is preferable to giving an unqualified layperson a free hand in the operating 
theatre. It may seem similarly sensible to peiliiit political and military experts to 
sign treaties and to wage wars. 
However, not all problems related to medicine or war are to be solved in this 
comparatively simple way. A medical degree is not always the only nor the best 
qualification for deciding issues which concern our health. The doctor may be the 
best person to perfoiiii an abortion, yet not the best qualified to decide whether or 
not that abortion should be carried out. Equally, the assumption that peace is 
exclusively the domain of political and military expertise is plainly wrong. 
It has been established in the preceding chapters that war poses moral problems. 
Whether or not we ought to go to war is a moral issue. Moral considerations are 
often relevant to decisions made about the conduct of war, and when they are, they 
are invariably overriding. In purely military terms, it might be sound on occasion 
to kill all prisoners, thus saving on staff in the form of guards and on supplies, 
while at the same time, ensuring a reduction in the enemy forces. Morally, as we 
saw in Chapter 3, in the discussion of jus in bello, this might be quite unacceptable. 
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II d) iii) 	 Professional interests may exert undesirable influence 
Political and military knowledge is not sufficient qualification for moral decision-
making. Moreover some political and military experts may actually be less well-
placed to make moral decisions in their fields than the layperson, precisely because 
their careers lie in those areas. A deep anxiety about one's popularity with the 
electorate is not a worry the lay person has to contend with, yet which may be 
sufficiently strong to impair the moral judgement of a politician. 
There may be reasons other than self-interest of the supposed experts for not 
relying too far on what they have to say about warfare. The activity of research can 
generate an all-consuming eagerness to solve a problem and a narrowly focussed 
view of the enterprise. What makes people experts is their engagement with their 
world - in this instance the world of nuclear science. In his first Boutwood lecture, 
MacKinnon points to: 
a chasm, not simply of language, but of outlook 
between those who, by reason of their special 
expertise, are more or less at home in that world, and 
the rest of mankind, who find the realities too 
horrifying, ultimately too inhuman to envisage for 
more than the passing moment. (MacKinnon, 1981: 
8) 
MacKinnon talks of the attitudes of the Los Alamos scientists, and how their 
excitement and enthusiasm for their task was replaced by very different feelings 
when they realised what they had achieved. 
Yet when success in the full sense of August 6 1945 
crowned their labours, it was as if in a moment of 
time the language, the traditional, often embarrassing 
language of penitence replaced almost by force the 
idioms of enthusiasm that had come readily to their 
lips in the exciting months of preparation. 
(MacKinnon, 1981: 6 - 7) 
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As Oppenheimer discovered, the horrifying realities may be more important to us as 
human beings than the successful conclusion of scientific endeavour. For both 
scientists and military personnel, the immersion in worlds where specific problems 
require solution and where there are specific ends in view may be a limiting factor. 
Yes, they have more knowledge and understanding of some aspects of weaponry 
and warfare, but not only might they be lacking in moral expertise, the moral sphere 
might be outside their viewfinder. 
II d) iv) 	 Should we rely on moral experts? 
If there were moral experts as well as political and military experts, easily 
identifiable, the problem of whether or not we should leave peace to them would 
remain. 
I have no wish to suggest that some have access to moral truths hidden from the 
rest of us, but would concede that some people are better than others at making 
moral judgements. Nevertheless, such people do not form a class comparable to 
other sets of experts, to whom we might apply to answer our questions and solve 
our problems. One might formally draw up criteria by which those who are better 
rather than worse at moral reasoning might be distinguished, but it is difficult to 
imagine how such criteria might be applied. A degree in moral philosophy would 
not necessarily signal the specific expertise needed nor the ability to pick out other 
experts. Undoubtedly training in moral philosophy would be useful in clarifying 
and analysing the nature of particular ethical dilemmas, but more is needed. The 
expertise required includes practical wisdom and being a good person, and there is 
little reason to suppose that moral philosophers are morally better persons than 
others. 
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Far more important, even if there were an identifiable set of moral experts, the 
notion of leaving moral problems to them is unacceptable - morally unacceptable. 
To rely on the moral understanding of others and to surrender one's choice of moral 
action in unreflectingly accepting their advice, is to relinquish part of being a 
person. A person thinks and acts morally in virtue of doing so with some relevant 
autonomy. In simply conforming to the ideas of the expert, one has abdicated from 
making further moral choices with respect to their sphere of enquiry and cannot 
properly be said to think or act morally in any consequent conformity. (This is not 
to suggest that no expert judgement is ever relevant to making moral decisions, but 
to maintain that mere conformity to another's advice cannot be autonomous thought 
or action. It is of course distinct from applying to experts for their specialised 
understanding of a particular area and, relying on their authority in specific matters, 
taking their views into account in arriving at one's own decision.) 
Neither Peace Education nor any teaching on war should be ruled out on the 
grounds that its content is best left to the experts. Even were political and military 
expertise to be complemented by moral expertise, to suggest that issues of peace 
should not be presented and discussed in schools, but dealt with only by experts is 
to deny to teachers and pupils a significant part of personhood. We may not be all 
equally qualified to or good at making moral judgements, but to permit others to 
decide for us is to stop being moral at all. We need to achieve more expertise 
ourselves and to acquire the disposition to act in the light of it, not to leave it to 
others: 
if a question which affects the lives, the deaths and 
the future of all of us is one on which only experts 
can speak, then that fact itself should properly terrify 
us all. (Williams, 1982: 288 cited in White, 1988: 
44) 
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II e) 'Peace education is irrelevant.' 
Not everyone is convinced that matters of peace and war are relevant to us all. 
Norman Tebbit (reported in the Guardian, 1983), complained that some peace plays 
he had seen in a school were 'irrelevant'. He did not make clear exactly to whom 
or to what he considered them irrelevant. Given that his complaint related to what 
he had seen in a school, it seems quite likely that he meant that questions of peace 
are irrelevant to school children - irrelevant in the sense of having no bearing on 
their lives - and yet this appears extraordinary. 
II e) i) 	 Peace Education is not irrelevant to children 
Surely issues of peace and war, violent and non-violent resolutions of conflict, are 
among those which affect anyone who has direct experience of the human species. 
As noted in the introduction, for many of us, images of war, both factual and 
fictional, cross our television screens almost daily and it is difficult to distance the 
problems they raise. We readily identify with characters in films and books, while 
news coverage reminds us that deployment of our own forces involves sons and 
daughters, wives and husbands, brothers and sisters of people we know. It cannot 
be that peace and war have no bearing at all on the lives of school children. 
It could be that 'irrelevant' is intended to suggest 'unimportant'. The implication 
might be that, although the lives of all children and adults are touched by such 
problems, it is only in a negligible way. The very triviality of of the subject makes 
it irrelevant to the education of children in school. This seems equally absurd. 
How could matters of life and death count as unimportant? 
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II e) ii) 	 Relevance is not a strong justification for Peace 
Education 
The issues addressed in Peace Education are surely relevant, not irrelevant, to 
pupils in school, in the sense of affecting their lives in important ways. However, 
it should not be imagined that, in denying its irrelevance, the corollary must be that 
relevance is a prime justification for the inclusion of Peace Education, or any other 
topic, on the curriculum. 
Assumptions about what is relevant can be mistaken. What a teacher may think 
relevant to children of widely differing backgrounds, cultures and religions is not 
always accurate. What is relevant today may not be tomorrow; what is relevant 
here may not be there. In his analysis of key ideas in A. S. Neill's educational 
philosophy (Barrow, 1978: 72 - 73 and elsewhere), Barrow makes clear the 
inadequacy of relevance as a criterion for deciding what should be taught. 
Similar concerns may play some part in the anxiety of Cox and Scruton (1984) 
when they disparage Peace Education for being relevant. However, in their 
demand for irrelevance and remoteness, they imply far more. They of course are 
objecting that, in virtue of being relevant, Peace Education lacks a significant 
academic credential. 
As for Cox and Scruton's demand for irrelavance, 
remoteness and abstractness as the sole detenninants 
of academic and educational respectability: their 
adducing of such criteria suggests covert prescription 
rather than any well-founded analysis of what 'true 
education' (whatever that might be) might look like. 
(Aspin 1986: 125) 
As Aspin goes on to point out, 
The demand for irrelevance would seem immediately 
to rule out much of the staple of contemporary higher 
education, at any rate: medicine, law, engineering, 
economics, policy analysis... (Aspin 1986: 125) 
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Although Aspin's comment suggests that irrelevance employed as a criterion might 
have some wide reaching practical implications, it does not provide a strong 
argument in favour of relevance as a justification for subjects such as Peace 
Education. 
Relevance, in the abstract, cannot be a satisfactory justification. In educating with 
relevance as a first consideration, we risk limiting pupils to their own here and 
now. The notion of relevance needs treating with some caution lest it is used to 
justify an exclusive concern for that with which children are already familiar, their 
own 'present and particular' (Bailey, 1984). 
If on the other hand, what is 'really relevant' is held to be the introduction of new 
ideas and wider horizons, an education that takes account of the unpredictability of 
the future and enables children in a significant way to create their own adult lives 
rather than merely implementing our visions, then it must be desirable in education. 
The term 'irrelevant' is so vague as to be meaningless when applied without any 
context to give it substance, but this objection should not be ignored. If irrelevance 
to children and to their present and future concerns is intended, it is inappropriate 
and unjustifiable to describe Peace Education as irrelevant. When teaching on war, 
educators should keep in mind that it is not a trivial matter and that their pupils' 
present and future lives may be touched by war. 
II f) 	 'Peace Education will inevitably be indoctrinatory.' 
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This is perhaps the single most serious objection to Peace Education, for if it were 
true that we could not teach about peace and war without indoctrinating, as 
educators we should have to refrain. 
II f) i) 	 Indoctrination 
'Indoctrination' in education, although not always in other contexts, is a pejorative 
term: 
educators seem agreed, on the whole, that it is bad. 
What they are not agreed about entirely is what it is 
about indoctrination that makes it bad. (Bailey, 
1984: 142). 
A brief glance at the wealth of literature within philosophy of education on 
indoctrination is sufficient to make one aware that differences of opinion on the 
subject abound (see Atkinson (1965), Bailey (1984), Gregory & Woods (1970), 
Gribble (1969), Snook (1972), White (1967) and many more.) Snook, in both 
Concepts of Indoctrination (Snook ed., 1972) and Indoctrination and Education 
(Snook, 1972), draws attention to various debates over the criteria which might 
pick out a case of indoctrination conceptually. 
There is no need to engage in argument over all the various claims here, since the 
central points relevant to this discussion are relatively uncontroversial. There is 
agreement that beliefs are appropriate objects of indoctrination. Those who would 
maintain that facts can be the content of indoctrination would not deny that beliefs 
can also be indoctrinated. 
With Bailey, I believe that behind the different views on the concept of 
indoctrination, 
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is the common ground, not always made explicit, 
that to indoctrinate someone is to get that someone to 
hold a belief in ways and on grounds that are non-
evidential. (Bailey, 1984: 142) 
I therefore take indoctrination to be at least the inculcation of unverifiable belief, 
without regard for the logical status of that belief: that is, the uncertain taught in 
such a way that no note is taken of its uncertainty. If beliefs about peace and war 
were to be taught as facts, indoctrination would be likely to occur. 
Clearly the value of peace is logically uncertain. Much that is fact may contribute to 
the study of peace, but statements relating to the value of peace and to the morality 
of war do not in the end express propositions capable of truth or falsity. That there 
lurks the danger of indoctrination in all teaching of values cannot be denied. 
II f) ii) 	 Peace Education is not inevitably indoctrination 
Scruton et al. maintain that indoctrination is more than a contingent danger in Peace 
Education. They claim that it is not only, 
often taught in a biased and irresponsible way, but 
that it could be taught in no other way. (Cox and 
Scruton, 1984: 40) 
However, the study of peace and war need not involve indoctrination any more than 
does the study of religion or English literature. Where material and ideas are 
presented in such a- manner that a distinction between matters of fact and and 
questions of value is clearly retained and understood, there need be no 
indoctrination. 
Peace Education no less than any other education demands that teaching is 
evidential, respecting the capacity for understanding and the autonomy of the 
learner. Teaching which fails in these respects might be a foul' of training, 
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preaching or propaganda, but could not properly be termed 'education'. More than 
this, as Hicks emphasises in his article in Peace and Security, 
Since one of the aims of education for peace is to 
develop children's critical judgement, so that 
propaganda in any form may be more readily 
identifies, this seems an unwarranted criticism. 
(Hicks, 1988) 
Peace Education then, would pay particular attention to the dangers of unreflective 
acceptance of ideology or political doctrine, deliberately developing those skills 
needed as a protection against indoctrination. 
It might be argued that the beliefs related to peace are of particular and crucial 
importance, so that even to risk indoctrination in this context is unjustifiable. But to 
accept that more hangs on our attitudes to war and peace than our beliefs about the 
quality of Shakespeare's sonnets is not to accept that indoctrination is more likely in 
peace studies. Alerting children to the dangers of indoctrination seems to be part of 
Peace Education, so that it may be less likely here than elsewhere on the 
curriculum. 
II f) iii) 	 The danger of unintentional indoctrination 
Snook claims that intention is both a necessary and sufficient condition of 
indoctrination: 
A person indoctrinates P (a proposition or set of 
propositions) if he teaches with the intention that the 
pupil or pupils believe P regardless of the evidence. 
(Snook, 1972: 47) 
This would seem to deny that the possibility of unintentional indoctrination, but, 
whether it satisfies the criteria for indoctrination or not, an approach so heavily 
biased towards one viewpoint that it appears one-sided, may have the same effect as 
indoctrination. 
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Such presentation is calculated to result in ignorance or incomprehension of any 
conflicting opinions so that pupils might well assume that there is only one possible 
view, mistakenly assuming it to be undeniably correct and coming to believe it in 
unshakeable way. 
I would argue that it is possible to indoctrinate unintentionally, attempting unbiased 
teaching, but in practice giving the pupils only one option. Snook, although not 
allowing this terminology, might well concede that this comprises one of the 
'problematic cases', since it would be an example of, 
Teaching any subject without due concern for 
understanding. (Snook 1972: 65) 
A lack of due concern for understanding, and effectively only one view, is being 
offered if, while able to describe their own beliefs clearly, teachers' explanations of 
alternatives are so incompetent or beyond the cognitive ability of their pupils that 
they cannot be assimilated. 
There is nothing to suggest that this is more likely in Peace Education than in any 
other subject where the content involves consideration of beliefs, but it must always 
be important to take steps to minimise the risk. Incompetence is not confined to 
peace educators and all responsible teachers should be conscious of the need to 
avoid it. 
While some, with Snook, might not wish to allow 'unintentional' or accidental 
indoctrination, there may well be consensus that the state of affairs being described 
is as deplorable as intentional indoctrination and for the same reasons. 
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II f) iv) 	 Could giving compelling reasons be a form of 
indoctrination? 
Critics of Peace Education are not, I think, primarily accusing teachers of what is 
plainly incompetence in any lesson, and they do often seem to imagine that 
intentional indoctrination is the aim, but they may also fear that the arguments 
against all war are so convincing that any opposing viewpoints appear to children to 
be totally untenable. This would not easily fit indoctrination conventionally 
delineated, but the fear may be that it would amount to the same thing - somehow 
choice is being denied them. 
It does seem odd that those who very evidently are not pacifists and recognise no 
convincing arguments for the pacifist position, could yet be worried that peace 
education must raise arguments so compelling that unshakeable pacifism is even a 
likely consequence. But let us suppose that these people see more clearly than I 
and, while themselves rejecting the arguments, they yet fear with good reason that 
our pupils will be taken in and become pacifists. 
If it were the case that war could undeniably be shown to be always, in every 
conceivable instance totally unjustifiable, then in allowing children access to this 
insight, peace educators might be likely to inculcate pacifism. (Remembering the 
infinite capacity some children appear to have to ignore all reason and evidence, I 
admit this does not seem very likely, but it could happen.) However, this should 
not be the case. While it is widely believed that there can be just wars, Peace 
Education ought to take account of this and is intended to do so (Yarwood & 
Weaver, 1988: 99). In presenting the just war tradition, examined in Chapter 3, 
teachers can refute the accusation of giving a picture so coloured as to lead their 
pupils to reject all war per se. 
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II f) v) 	 Peace Education may protect pupils against 
indoctrination 
There is no good reason to suppose that the indoctrination of beliefs about peace 
would be avoided by the rejection of Peace Education in schools. All subject areas 
dealing with values and beliefs are, in principle vulnerable to indoctrination. 
However, Peace Education is specifically intended to ensure that children can 
protect themselves from indoctrination. Hicks includes in his list of the objectives 
for Peace Education, that, 
Students should be able to approach issues with an 
open and critical mind and be willing to change their 
opinions in the face of new evidence and rational 
argument. They should be able to recognise and 
challenge bias, indoctrination and propaganda. 
(Hicks, 1986: 16 and 1988: 14) 
Some feel that much of what is taught in schools implicitly presents, without 
reasoned explanation and as fact, the case in favour of war and the violent 
resolution of conflicts. There is some force in this. Teachers often cite in this 
respect the celebration of heroes famed for their prowess in war and the popular 
tales in which the protagonist wins love, fame and fortune by killing dragons or 
knights. O'Connell too believes there is a need for a stress on peace in teaching on 
war, and that this might valuably be echoed in its label. 
I think however that it gives a psychological 
advantage to war to construct the relevant theory in 
its name. (O'Connell, 1984: 30) 
Peace Education, engaged in with due regard for the status of beliefs about peace 
and for rationality, could provide a necessary corrective and protection against 
indoctrination. 
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I would maintain that indoctination is both morally objectionable and educationally 
inappropriate, whether in Peace Education or in any other educational programme 
of study, but there are no grounds for the assumption that the danger of 
indoctrination in teaching on war and peace is such that it constitutes an adequate 
objection to Peace Education itself. 
It would be foolish to deny that heavily biased presentation of war in the classroom 
is possible, but it is not inevitable. Neither indoctrination itself, nor any activity 
which has the same effect, is an acceptable teaching method in educational 
institutions. This must be one of the precepts on which teaching on war is based. 
II g) 	 'Peace Education will be a vehicle for subversive 
propaganda.' 
This may seem to be merely a more extravagant and emotive expression of the 
previous objection. Propaganda and indoctrination are very closely related and 
both are clearly objectionable in the classroom for similar moral and educational 
reasons. Nevertheless, the accusation that peace education will be a vehicle for 
subversive propaganda is worthy of separate consideration since it focuses more 
obviously on the actual views attributed to teachers of Peace Education. 
In the nineteen eighties, the objection that Peace Education would facilitate the 
dissemination of certain ideologies, characterised by a disregard for the truth, was 
familiar. Reports in the media, echoing the extract from the I ES below, were 
common. 
Teachers pressing for the introduction of peace 
studies into schools this week rejected allegations 
made by Dr Rhodes Boyson, education junior 
minister, that they are simply a front for appeasement 
and surrender to totalitarianism. 
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Dr David Hicks, secretary to the 200-strong Peace 
Education Network, denied that teachers are planning 
to indoctrinate children into support for unilateral 
disarmament and pacifism. (TES: 7.5.82) 
A decade later, accusations such as those levelled by Boyson are perhaps unlikely 
and sound embarrassingly paranoic. Teachers are no longer used to charges of 
subversion. Nevertheless, the belief that Peace Education is related to subversive, 
political propaganda should not be forgotten. Increased confidence may have 
quieted some fears of the political establishment and the demolition of the Berlin 
Wall may have exorcised fears of Soviet communism, but there is no reason to 
suppose that teaching about war and peace will not again to be denigrated as 
subversive propaganda. 
When he was Peace Education Officer for the Quaker Peace Service, in 1981, John 
McConnell expressed his increasing dismay that, 'peace education is becoming a 
party political issue'. Others share his worry, realising that for many of its 
opponents Peace Education is inextricably associated with political beliefs, not just 
in the broad sense but more precisely in teinis of party politics. 
The assumption seems to be that these political beliefs are of a particular type, 
variously and somewhat confusingly described as 'left wing', 'socialist' or 
communist' and more specifically as those held by people in favour of unilateral 
disarmament. Marks (1984) maintains that teachers responsible for peace studies 
courses have a clear political agendum, which is, 
the favourable representation of a view of the need 
for 'peace studies' that may be associated with the 
Marxist - Leninist political imperatives that underlie 
and govern 'Peace Studies' courses in state schools 
in countries under Soviet domination or control. 
Courses in peace studies in the UK, he claims, run a 
gamut from merely stressing the need for good 
manners to outright political indoctrination. (Aspin, 
1986: 121) 
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It has been implied that, somehow by definition, to be pro-peace is to to be firmly at 
one end of the political spectrum. 
An interest in in studying peace equalled commitment 
to unilateral disarmament, which equalled a pro-
Soviet stance, which meant appeasement and 
surrender being taught in schools. (Hicks, 1987: 7) 
It is questionable whether or not teachers of Peace Education are in fact always of 
one of these political persuasions and, if they are, whether Peace Education is used 
as a vehicle for spreading their beliefs. Athough both of these possibilities seem 
unlikely to me, I should not wish to seem to dismiss them as unimportant since for 
many they constitute a genuine anxiety. But hard evidence is necessary to prove the 
point either way, evidence to which we do not have access. 
My concern is that, in attempting to argue the facts of the case, there can be a failure 
to to recognise what is often the real issue - the accusation of subversion. 
'Subversive' appears often to comprise questioning or contradiction of government 
policy. Consequently there is often nothing to be gained from arguing that not all 
those in favour of disarmament are communists or that discussion of peace and war 
in school is not calculated to to endanger the state. When 'subversive propaganda' 
is taken to mean the expression of views which are in any way incompatible official 
policy, then a different issue is under debate. 
When subversion consists in the production of terrorists, there are many good 
reasons why we should blench at the prospect, but when subversion merely 
describes the discussion of alternative views on peace and war it would seem that 
good reason to refrain from presenting them is harder to find. That the government 
may be opposed to certain views about war does not of itself seem sufficient 
grounds for excluding presentation of those views in the classroom. 
Reid associates 'subversive' with questioning the established order, and maintains, 
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Peace education is subversive of teachers, and 
schools. (Reid, 1984: 129) 
He does not however perceive this to be a bad thing, but rather a strength. 
Peace students are likely to be more restive, more 
questioning than the general run and it would be 
wrong if this were not the case. (Reid, 1984: 129) 
I would agree. When 'subversive' means the development of critical evaluation and 
the opposite of unquestioning acceptance, Peace Education ought to be subversive 
and so should any teaching on war. When, on the other hand, it is intended to 
signify an exclusively left-wing, unilateralist conspiracy which threatens the state, 
subversive propaganda has no legitimate place in education. 
The objections to Peace Education examined here do not comprise an exhaustive - 
list, for this section was not intended primarily as an exercise in discovering or 
refuting accusations. The intention was to highlight issues relevant to deciding how 
war and peace should be dealt with in the classroom. 
The objectionsof some of Peace Education's critics do draw attention to educational 
considerations, such as the need for unbiased teaching, which cannot properly be 
ignored. The extravagant nature of some of the allegations makes clear the depth of 
anxiety people may experience about teaching on war and the consequent practical 
problems to be addressed, if parents are to understand its value. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Teaching on War: the underlying principles 
It will be clear from the preceding chapters that there are many problems for the 
educator wishing to address issues of war in the classroom. They arise from the 
nature of the topic and from anxieties about methodology. In the classroom these 
become problems for which practical solutions need to be sought. 
Peace Education has been put forward as a way in which such matters can be 
confronted in the curriculum, but, as we have seen in Chapter 4, its critics have 
been vociferous and their objections must be taken into account if the anxieties of 
parents and the wider community are to be allayed. Educators for peace are surely 
right when they suggest that we should be working for a more peaceful world and 
claim that this task, far from being inappropriate to teaching in schools, should be 
addressed in an educational setting. The difficulty of pursuing war in modern times 
in a morally tolerable fashion, noted in Chapter 3, is such that a more peaceful 
world must be desirable. 
War and peace should not be left to putative experts, for the reasons cited in 
Chapter 4. Not all teachers will be among the most knowledgeable of the 
population with regard to the latest weaponry or military strategy. Nor will all 
educators claim to be in the best position to judge the political circumstances which 
give rise to wars. But teachers can properly claim expertise in teaching. They are 
precisely the people concerned and able to present the topic in an educational 
manner. They, above all, will be committed to ensuring that their teaching is not 
indoctrinatory. In addition, teachers have a specific understanding of childhood 
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and of the particular individuals in their classes. Consequently they are well-placed 
to approach issues sensitively, without causing undue anxiety or distress. 
In order to contribute to a more peaceful world we need to do various things: to 
educate children so that they understand the implications of war, both moral and 
factual, so that they can make informed decisions, arrive at their own judgements 
and act in the light of these. 
To achieve this it is necessary first to ascertain those principles which should 
inform all teaching on war. It will be argued that war is a controversial issue and 
that the principles specifically relevant to classroom practice in this context emanate 
from its controversial nature. 
The place of teaching on war in the curriculum will be explored. In Chapter 1 it 
was demonstrated that war undoubtedly falls within the moral sphere. It will be 
maintained not only that moral education is indispensible to education on war, but 
also that war must be a topic addressed explicitly in the moral context. 
The practice of war is also a political matter. 'Wars are not random events; they are 
the products of decisions,' (Welch, 1993: 9) and these decisions are political. I 
would not deny that, as Welch argues, politicians may be motivated by moral 
concerns such as the desire for justice, but their decisions are also likely to be 
related to that which specifically concerns the state and to judgements made within a 
particular political context such as democracy. Consequently, political education is 
essential to understanding the contribution citizens can make to the creation of a 
more peaceful world, and it will be submitted that war should explicitly be 
addressed in this context too. 
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Today, moral and political education in school is most often offered through the 
curriculum rather than occupying a designated slot on the timetable. Considerations 
which ought to underlie cross-curricular teaching and concerns relating to the 
hidden curriculum, will be identified. 
The principles formulated will provide criteria for how war ought to be taught, the 
methodology, including where on the curriculum it should appear. (They will also 
be vital in the proper selection of content, but this will explored be separately in the 
following chapter.) 
I War as a controversial issue in school 
I i) 	 There is disgreement on the issue 
A topic is said to be controversial if there is considerable disagreement about it - 
when it is the object of controversy. 
In a sense an issue is controversial 'if numbers of 
people are observed to disagree about statements and 
assertions made in connection with the issue'. 
(Stradling, 1984: 1) 
People do disagree about war. Pacifists claim that it can never be morally 
acceptable to take human life, but Chapter 2 revealed it cannot be demonstrated this 
is self-evidently true. Others argue that war can be justified and that loss of life in 
war may be a necessity in pursuit of a higher end. The means by which war is 
waged have been debated over the centuries and in Chapter 3 it was noted that the 
deployment of modern weapons has added further dimensions to the scope for 
argument. The pursuit of war remains highly controversial. 
184 
I ii) 	 It is a weighty issue 
In the educational context, a controversial issue is one which is not only commonly 
debated, but which is in some way important and felt to be crucial. Many issues 
raised by any consideration of war can be seen to be important and weighty in the 
way that the rival merits of tinned and frozen peas are not. The school curriculum 
need not, and of course could not, include all differences of opinion. As Hare 
explains: 
The value issue of apartheid is controversial, 
however, not because we believe that a case has been 
made against our conviction that racial groups should 
be treated equally, but because we regard the 
consequences of the system to be so pernicious that 
we must be concerned. (Hare, 1985: 112) 
War, by definition, is life-threatening and its consequences so dire that it is clearly a 
vital issue. 
Furthermore, wars have more than the academic interest for us that some potentially 
fatal illnesses might have. Unless we are at risk ourselves or number sufferers 
among those we know, we may be concerned about meningitis for example, but it 
is unlikely to be crucial to or affect most of our lives. War is different. At any one 
time, it may be what happens to other people, but all too often we are brought up 
short by the involvement of our own forces. News coverage of military action, 
vividly presented in the media now brings even distant conflicts close to home. Our 
living rooms feel the draught of the guided missile. It is no longer easy to ignore 
war and to feel entirely uninvolved. The living memory of the horrors of the First 
and Second World Wars and their place in both documentaries and fiction ensure 
that none of us remain entirely untouched by the knowledge of war. 
Questions about war are important in all our lives. It is likely to be of concern to us 
individually, but it is also a matter of public interest - a matter for us as citizens. 
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Hare's first criterion for the description, controversial, is plainly satisfied by debate 
over war, since, 
it is a dispute of some significance in a public forum. 
(Hare, 1985: 112) 
In other words, war is controversial, not merely in being argued over, although this 
is certainly the case, but also in that more significant sense intended when 
controversial issues on the curriculum are talked of. 
As a weighty matter, it is likely to be the subject of hot debate rather than idle 
argument. The passion with which aspects of war are debated may be some 
reflection of their felt significance, but, given that people have apparently come to 
blows over trivialities, the heat generated in an argument is not necessarily a good 
guide to the importance of a subject in the wider scale of things. War is 
controversial, not merely in the sense that people disagree about it, nor because it 
provokes impassioned advocacy ('though both these may be true), but because the 
issues it raises are appropriately close to our hearts and crucial to us as persons and 
therefore do often provoke hot debate. 
I iii) 	 It is a question of value 
Heared arguments often arise when one or more of those involved has no 
knowledge or understanding of the relevant factors which could prove the case one 
way or the other, but these are not usually controversies described as 'controversial 
issues'. A question can also be controversial when there is insufficient evidence 
available to resolve it with certainty. Some questions in astronomy would fall into 
this category, when the problem to be solved is essentially an empirical one, but the 
technology needed to discover the answer is not yet available. There is nothing 
which logically precludes a solution in the future, but, at present, even the most 
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erudite experts do not have access to the the means of arriving at the answer. Some 
questions of war must be unanswerable in this sense, but these are not what is 
meant when war is cited as a controversial issue. 
'Controversial', used in the context of schooling, most often refers to areas of 
enquiry which are not exclusively empirical and in which no conceivable scientific 
advance would provide verifiable and conclusive evidence that one's assertions 
were true. Issues relating to war are controversial, 
precisely because they are not capable of being 
settled by appeal to evidence. These are issues 
where the disagreement centres on matters of value 
judgement. (Stradling, 1984: 2) 
Just like other controversial issues approached in the classroom, war raises 
questions of value, many of them moral questions, which are controversial in their 
logical status. They are issues which are inherently controversial. The nature of 
these is such that they cannot be resolved by reference to facts alone. Knowing that 
Napoleon treated his prisoners in a certain way will not of itself suffice to tell us 
how prisoners ought to be treated. Moral conflicts often appear to be disagreements 
about what is or was the case, but whether an action was morally right or wrong is 
significantly different from whether or not a deed actually took place. It is not only 
a matter of what happened, but of a judgement about the moral value of the event. 
(I do not wish to claim here that there are no moral truths, nor to suggest that moral 
judgements are mere expressions of taste, but to stress that we cannot know 
something is morally right solely by reference to the same sort of evidence which 
would entitle us to claim knowledge of exclusively empirical matters.) 
Facts and reasoning are not totally irrelevant, and indeed may be of critical 
importance. The realisation that the effect of nuclear weapons is unpredictable is 
obviously highly relevant to deciding whether or not we ought to use them, but this 
information cannot make redundant the value judgement involved in arriving at 
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what should be done. The rights and wrongs of war and how it is waged are not 
simply factual matters, nor can they be arrived at merely via logical reasoning. The 
more knowledge we have, the better informed our judgement may be and the 
sounder our reasoning, the safer our conclusion is likely to be, but there is a logical 
stopper on the extent to which factual knowledge and logic can be appropriately 
employed in answering questions about what we ought to do. Something more is 
required: a belief in moral principles, values, which are in essence unverifiable and 
the disposition to decide by reference to them. 
War is a question of value and controversial in this sense too. 
I iv) 	 Controversy surrounds teaching on war 
It is material to note that, in addition to the controversial nature of war as a topic, 
controversy arises over its inclusion on the school curriculum and the methodology. 
Chapter 4 revealed that teaching on war in school, at least in the form of Peace 
Education, is strongly contested. 
Controversy over the inclusion of certain subjects is familiar. A subject can be 
controversial in this sense, without being essentially a matter of value. Whether or 
not modern languages should appear on the primary school curriculum seems to 
arise at regular intervals, but verb endings are not in themselves inherently 
controversial or value laden. The controversiality arises over whether or not young 
children should be learning modern languages rather than something else. 
In contrast, there seems to be broad consensus that sex education should be part of 
schooling. The controversy about sex education relates less to-whether or not it 
should be included at all and more to the form it should take, the methodology 
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employed and the specific content taught. Like moral education, sex education 
raises questions about how people ought to behave, so its content is also inherently 
controversial. 
To summarise: war counts as a controversial issue for curricular purposes because 
it is widely debated, because it is a matter of importance and of public concern, and 
because it is an area of enquiry which raises questions of value which are 
controversial in their logical status. Controversy also surrounds the actual practice 
of teaching on war. 
If teaching on war is to be educationally valuable, it must be recognised as a 
controversial issue and treated as such in the classroom. What might this mean for 
the teacher? What principles or criteria ought to be applied to teaching on war? 
II Principles for teaching on war 
II i) 	 Teaching on war should be unbiased. 
It has been maintained in earlier chapters that the controversial nature of war entails 
that questions, such as 'Is it right to go to war?', are essentially open-ended. They 
are questions of value which, it was claimed above, are not susceptible to 
incontrovertible proof. Consequently teaching on war is dealing with an area where 
differences of opinion are rife and where people's views may be deeply felt and 
tenaciously held. 
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Because questions of value are inherently debatable and in the final analysis the 
appropriate object of belief rather than knowledge, it is often feared that teachers 
will improperly inculcate their own beliefs when addressing controversial issues. It 
was maintained in the examination of objections to Peace Education, in Chapter 4, 
that there is no reason to suppose that teaching about war and peace need be 
indoctrinatory, but it cannot be denied that fear of biased teaching affects many 
teachers themselves as well as parents and people in the wider community. 
Teachers may be very conscious of the possibility of that unintentional 
indoctrination described in Chapter 4, and aware that, if children in effect receive 
only one view of a controversial issue, such teaching amounts to indoctrination, yet 
still be uncertain about the question of bias. 
To be biased is to favour one view unduly, ignoring or dismissing the strength of 
counter claims. In discussing bias here, it is the promulgation of teachers' opinions 
that is of concern, not the fact that they hold opinions, biased or otherwise. 
Indoctrination might be thought of as an extreme form of biased teaching, insofar as 
it ignores any opposing views, but biased presentation can occur without that 
indoctrination characterised in Chapter 4. 
To teach in a biased manner is to openly espouse one view rather than another, 
when to do so is to go beyond one's legitimate authority. As Crick explains, 
I have a ... modest and tentative authority as a 
political philosopher in analysing what kind of 
principles, rules or standards can be sensibly 
invoked in debate about political differences (which 
has nothing to do with the differences themselves). 
But I have no kind of authority whatever in 
propagating political doctrines, that is to say what 
should be done. I may say so, I do frequently say 
so; but in doing so either abuse my authority in 
speaking thus on formal or academic occasions. 
(Crick, 1977: 38 - 39) 
In the same way, a teacher's authority does not extend to particular moral or 
political beliefs with regard to war. To present pacifist arguments is one thing, but 
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to sneer at all other viewpoints and to claim that pacifism is the only acceptable 
moral stance is quite another, exceeding one's authority as a teacher. 
Acknowledgement of this can be difficult. While not consciously intending to 
indoctrinate, teachers may feel that the need to foster a certain opinion is so strong 
that they are tempted to engage in 'proselytisation' (Bridges, 1986: 25 ff.). 
It is not difficult to imagine the conviction that racism, for example, is so obviously 
morally obnoxious that strong persuasion is needed to bring an end to the ingrained 
racist attitudes and behaviour exhibited by some pupils. Reasoned discussion and 
allowing children to come to their own conclusions seems fraught with danger and 
unlikely to achieve the desired result. Why should teachers shrink from biased 
teaching if this will eradicate racism (or gung-ho attitudes to war for that matter)? 
As Bridges explains, the ends cannot justify the means in this context. 
Proselytisation is incompatible with values which, with Bridges, I take to be central 
to education in this country: 
For example, it appears at least to to offend against 
most notions of respect for other people and their 
opinions. It appears to to conflict with social values 
to do with personal autionomy, which in the 
educational context often seems to require that pupils 
come to understand the choices open to them and to 
make these choices freely, intelligently and 
authentically for themselves. (Bridges, 1986: 25 -
26) 
Teaching children what they ought to believe, could not be acceptable, whether this 
comprises an exercise in 'flagrant bias' (Crick, 1977: 39), indoctrination or direct 
instruction. Even in what might be widely agreed to be a good cause, such teaching 
cannot be educational. Its probable result would be the replacement of one 
unfounded belief with another and contributes nothing to a child's education: 
We simply replace one dogma, one prejudice, one 
unintelligent and irrational belief or one closed mind 
by another. (Bridges, 1986: 26) 
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Instead we want children to understand that some evidence is relevant to deciding 
what to believe, and that some beliefs are better grounded than others. Some 
reasoning is compelling, and a person's convictions about race and war need not 
be randomly chosen, not mere likes or dislikes, and not immune from moral 
evaluation. All this falls within the teacher's authority for these are educational 
matters. Biased teaching or proselytisation, which passes on beliefs themselves as 
if they are pieces of information, will hinder this understanding. 
A biased presentation is unlikely to enable pupils to take seriously and respect the 
diversity of beliefs. Crick recalls how Harold Laski's impassioned airing of his 
views in lectures rarely stimulated students to foilii their own opinions and asks, 
If university students did not respond by 'creative 
antagonism' to this one-way dialectic, how much 
less likely that school pupils will? They will either 
accept or reject not just it, but the whole problem or 
subject. (Crick, 1977: 39) 
The teacher of controversial issues must be concerned to help pupils to take them 
seriously and arrive at judgements to which they are personally committed. 
Impassioned advocacy or proselytisation is unlikely to achieve this. 
There may be wide agreement that teaching for a more peaceful world is desirable, 
but to advocate pacifism as if it is the only tenable position would be to distort the 
case and to be dishonest. 
The obligation on the teacher to present the issue 
fairly, (and it is an analytic truth in such cases that 
each side has some merit) is derived from the concept 
of education which involves the pursuit of truth. An 
unsupported opinion from the teacher favoring one 
side does not contribute to this feature intrinsic to the 
idea of education. (Hare, 1985: 117) 
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Pacifism, as we saw in Chapter 2, cannot be shown to be self-evidently true. Just 
war theorists hold very different views. Teachers have a duty to do justice to both 
sides in the debate. 
Reference to evidence and reasoning will not remove all danger. Explaining why, 
in the teacher's view, it is wrong to kill, while, for example, castigating as flimsy 
opposing arguments, will still be to exhibit unacceptable bias. The adducing of 
reasons as if they are obviously overriding may imply that the proposition is proven 
and incontrovertible, and be as misleading as simply asserting it as fact. 
Issues of value are fundamentally controversial in a way that empirical matters are 
not. The two must not be presented as if they are similar in kind, since, 
A teacher cannot teach and demonstrate the truth of a 
proposition like 'pacifism is always right' as he (sic) 
can teach and demonstrate the truth of the proposition 
'oil is less dense than water' or 'plants need light in 
order to grow.' (Bailey 1973: 35) 
Honesty and regard for the development of understanding demand that teaching on 
war and any other controversial issue should be unbiased if, as it should be, the 
teacher's commitment is to education rather than to particular views on the issues 
(see The Schools Council Humanities Project, 1970). 
This said, avoiding presenting issues in a biased manner may not be easy. Other 
principles may usefully complement the idea of unbiased teaching. Undue weight 
given to one viewpoint amounts to bias, so the notion of balance too would seem 
relevant. 
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II ii) 	 Teaching on war should be balanced 
In order to avoid inculcating only one opinion, it is often agreed that we should 
present a balanced view of controversial topics - not merely passing on our own 
particular opinions but ensuring that children have access to the range of opinion. 
Dearden (1984) analyses the concept of a balanced curriculum. He is not 
discussing specifically the teaching of controversial issues, but nevertheless his 
comment that balance is related to breadth is noteworthy. As he points out, to some 
extent this is a matter of logic: balance demands that more than one element is 
needed, (Dearden, 1984: 62). So the very idea of balance in teaching on war 
presupposes that diversity of views typical of controversial issues noted earlier. 
Attention to balance would logically preclude the presentation of only one 
perspective and the resulting indoctrination, intentional or unintentional. 
Furthermore, 'balance' can suggest due weighting given to competing views and 
thus lack of bias. Balance would seem to be highly relevant to addressing war in 
the classroom. 
However, attractive as it sounds, what balance might mean in practice is not always 
easy to identify. 
The idea of balance, 
assumes prior judgements as to the elements between 
which you are to find a balance. (Dearden, 1984: 
61) 
Sometimes these judgements are relatively simple in that two views, which are in 
direct opposition to each other, are plainly evident. A person might be for or 
against fox-hunting, and thuS balance would require that both cases were presented. 
But on many issues more than two positions are possible. Views on the morality of 
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war are likely to range from those of absolute pacifists, through those which would 
allow some defensive wars, and those which concede the justice of some 
aggressive wars to, at the other end of the spectrum, militarism. 
Judgements over which views need to be offered in school in order to achieve 
balance may be difficult. They cannot be evaded on the assumption that all 
available options can and should be dealt with in the classroom. Teachers cannot 
always be aware of all the different perspectives on an issue. Decisions on what 
should be presented may also be imperative due to limits on time and resources in 
schools. 
In addition, it should be remembered that it is at least arguable that the expression of 
some viewpoints is inappropriate in certain circumstances. The claim is not that 
some views should never be mentioned in the classroom, but rather that to teach the 
views which amount to extreme racism or mindless war propaganda, for example, 
on equal terms with more reasoned discussion must be inappropriate. This is not 
just a matter of presentation, such that if these positions were politely articulated in 
a low key manner they would be acceptable in the classroom. It is a question of the 
nature of such beliefs. 
Racism and war propaganda are, by definition, biased. To be racist is to judge 
irrationally, invoking race when this is an irrelevant criterion, and 'propaganda' 
means an attempt to bias opinion. To offer these on par with more rationally 
justifiable views could comprise what Crick terms, 
that gross bias which leads to inaccurate perceptions 
of the nature of other interests, groups and ideals. 
(Crick, 1978: 67) 
Balance does not demand that all views on controversial issues are taught as equally 
acceptable. Balance is the antithesis of bias, and while educators should rightly be 
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concerned to avoid teaching 'inaccurate perceptions', they should moreover realise 
that, whatever else balance may imply, it cannot mean 'gross bias'. 
I should not wish to maintain that views of dubious moral value should never be 
aired in class, nor that they should be permitted and then instantly refuted with the 
full weight of teacher authority, but would emphasise that they, in common with 
other opinions on controversial issues proffered by teachers or pupils, should be 
open to rigorous scrutiny. It is that teaching which effectively permits no 
contradiction, and thus is biased, which should be excluded from schooling. 
Deciding what is necessary to balanced teaching on war must therefore include 
judgements on methodology, on how various positions are presented. 
Balance requires that diverse views should be addressed, and not that every opinion 
can or should be presented in the same way. While it would be inadequate to 
consider only the cases for and against pacifism, ignoring other shades of opinion 
on war, it is also clear that balance does not call for militaristic propaganda. 
Some very practical questions remain. It is not immediately clear, for example, if 
balance demands that various stances be given equal weighting nor if weighting 
might translate into time. There are qualitative as well as quantitive considerations 
to be remembered. A two minute well-prepared talk, followed by a short 
interesting film is likely to have more impact than a thirty minute speech from one 
unused to teaching. But to conceptualise the call for balanced presentation in this 
rather crude fashion is a mistake. 
A balanced diet does not consist of equal parts by 
weight of each essential foodstuff; it includes 
sufficient of each of the necessary elements. 
(Dearden, 1984: 61) 
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In the same way, a balanced presentation of views in the classroom requires 
judgements to be made with regard to what would be sufficient and necessary to 
provide an unbiased learning environment. 
Judging the likely effect of different types of presentation is part of what it is to be 
an effective teacher. If the resources on pacifism are all new and enticingly 
packaged, while the teaching materials for the just war are limited to a dog-eared 
book written in inaccessible language, it is not impossible to realise that balance in 
this respect is lacking. Judgement will be required if justice is to be done to the 
various positions, but it is the sort of professional judgement teachers have to make 
all the time. The notion of balance can provide a criterion by which to make 
decisions about resources and presentation. 
If it is the child who is to receive a balanced education on the subject of war (and 
surely that is what is intended, rather than balance solely judged according to what 
is provided in school) it would seem that prior learning should be taken into 
account. Is it necessary that the school rehearses what children already have heard 
outside school? Perhaps teachers need not present the full range of views, but 
compensate, choosing to teach that which has not been experienced elsewhere. 
Wellington asks, 
how is the teacher to judge or even collect 
information on the facts' and views fed to pupils 
outside school? This is an impossible task. In 
addition, the information and attitudes pupils acquire 
outside school will vary enormously from one to the 
other. To redress the balance for all would require a 
separate curriculum for each pupil. (Wellington, 
1986: 164) 
This seems to overstate the case somewhat, rather in the way that objectors to child-
cetred education often point to the impossibility of teaching each pupil individually 
and conclude that therefore the whole theory is untenable. Of course it is true that 
teachers could never know exactly all the details of each child's background, but 
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this does not mean they have no idea at all of what children have learnt and what 
they believe. Teachers too watch television and go to popular films. They have 
some insight into prevalent opinions which are likely to influence their pupils. 
Teachers meet parents and there is opportunity to discover something of individual 
children's experiences. Pupils themselves can be encouraged to share their 
thoughts and their beliefs. 
Their prior learning in any subject is likely to vary tremendously. By listening to 
them teachers discover what needs to be taught and at what level. To presume that 
even whole class lessons will always comprise didactic delivery of information to a 
passive group of unknown children, who may or may not have heard it all before, 
seems extraordinary. All teaching must surely allow for individual differences. 
Wellington's comment, though, should not be ignored. It provides a salutary 
reminder that teachers should not make careless assumptions about what their 
pupils might share in common and what they may individually believe, and it 
indicates that balance, conceived in precise quantifiable terms, will be impossible. 
But it does not show that all balance is unattainable and not worth striving for. 
Teaching on war should not be one sided or loaded toward any one stance, and 
some balance can and should be preserved in presenting a range of opinions. If 
teachers attend to balance they can avoid merely inculcating their own views and 
thereby avoid bias. 
The notion of balance helps a clearer understanding of what it would be to teach in 
an unbiased manner. It provides a criterion plainly relevant to the choice of 
resources and the content of lessons and is important in this respect, but little has 
been said with regard to the teacher's own stance in the classroom. This too needs 
to be considered. 
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II iii) 	 Teachers should be neutral when teaching on war 
For some to be unbiased is to be neutral. A person is thought to be neutral when he 
or she favours no one side over another. A neutral presentation cannot be biased. 
Much that has been written, questioning and defending neutrality in relation to 
teaching controversial issues, is particularly aimed at the idea of the neutral chairing 
of discussions in the classroom (Bailey 1973, Bridges 1986, Elliot 1973, Ruddock 
1986, Singh 1988 et al.). 
Rudduck (1986) is not suggesting that teachers should not actually prefer one 
position, only that they fulfil a neutral role in not expressing their preferences 
during discussion of controversial issues. They should adopt procedural neutrality, 
and thus avoid the biased teaching they fear. She explains, 
Our assumption was that schools would not want to 
assert an institutional position on controversial issues 
in the face of the diversity of view held by teachers. 
We also assumed that teachers would be cautious 
about exposing their own views unless they could be 
sure that their authority as teachers would not lead 
pupils automatically to accept their view as the right 
one. (Rudduck, 1986: 9) 
The adoption of a neutral stance is claimed to facilitate the airing of diverse 
opinions, encourage critical scrutiny of views and permit children to think things 
out for themselves. The success or otherwise of neutral chairing is in the end an 
empirical matter, but the idea raises some pertinent questions. 
If neutrality were to suggest to pupils that teachers are unwilling to make up their 
minds or uncaring with regard to an issue, it would be undesirable. We do not 
want pupils to receive the impression that their mentors are just sitting on the fence 
about controversial issues: 
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Teachers must not give the impression, however, 
that they are devoid of any commitment. (Singh, 
1988: 99) 
Ruddock denies that this will happen: 
This is a misconception, for it is important to discuss 
with pupils why the teacher is adopting a procedural 
neutrality. Indeed it is precisely because teachers do 
have strong personal commitments on the issues 
under discussion and recognise that pupils have a 
right to develop similar commitments that they might 
wish to adopt the convention of the neutral 
chairperson during classroom discussion. 
(Rudduck, 1986: 10) 
This must be right and explanation of the aims of the exercise vital. But Singh 
claims there is a further difficulty: 
while the principle of the neutral chair is correct in 
advocating that teachers should maintain open 
enquiry and encourage rationality, it fails to take 
into account that such ideas may require the teacher 
to take the opposite view. It may demand that 
teachers put forward counter arguments in order to 
redress the balance. (Singh, 1988: 97) 
If all opinions are to be subject to similar interrogation in the interest of balance, he 
may be correct that counter arguments are needed, but there is nothing to necessitate 
the presentation of these immediately, within the discussion. Teachers could 
supplement the debate after the discussion, when procedural neutrality has been 
replaced appropriately by a more didactic role. While not suggesting that all 
discussion should be followed by a teacher commentary, which would be likely to 
destroy all that is intended by Rudduck, I would note the availability of this option, 
for a different danger lurks if it is forgotten. 
Although teachers may be retaining neutrality in some sense, in offering views to 
which they are not personally committed, they will be adopting the role of devil's 
advocate. On the one hand, pupils may imagine the arguments offered are actually 
200 
the teachers' and that, whatever has been said before, believe the teachers are 
introducing bias. On the other, when it is evident that there is no personal 
commitment, teachers may be thought to be insincere or reducing the discussion to 
an academic game in which arguments must be marshalled as part of the rules. As 
an educational experience, the recognition of counter arguments is essential, but 
their importance is in the pursuit of well-founded judgements. Discussion of 
controversial issues is not a game which is won and lost. There is no winning side. 
The discussion should protect divergence of view 
among participants and not force consensus. 
(Rudduck, 1986: 8) 
It can also be argued that for a teacher to express her own opinion is not necessarily 
to be coercive or to arrest critical discussion. More than this, Warnock views such 
declarations as a duty: 
Unless a teacher comes out into the open and says in 
what direction he believes the evidence points he will 
have failed in his duty as a teacher. For what his 
pupils have to learn is not only in an abstract way, 
what counts as evidence, but how people draw 
conclusions from evidence. (Warnock, 1975: 165) 
Those who recommend procedural neutrality do so in the conviction that authority 
conventionally attributed to teachers in practice carries weight and personal 
declarations will in fact, albeit unintentionally, bias a discussion. Experience 
suggests this is very likely, but if children can be persuaded that, irrespective of 
who makes them, 
All statements are subject to rational criticism 
(Bailey, 1975: 126), 
then there can be no justification for teachers to hide or disguise there own 
opinions. 
Insofar as procedural neutrality on the part of the teacher actually does remove blind 
acceptance of the teacher as the authority, encourages independent thinking and the 
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expression of diverse views and fosters reasoned reflection, it must be the antithesis 
of bias, and an appropriate strategy to employ in the teaching of controversial 
issues. Pupils need not only see teachers in the role of neutral chair and assume a 
disturbing lack of commitment to any views on war. It is a practical way to avoid 
adding weight to any one view during open discussion. 
This same 'procedural neutrality' can be achieved by many teaching strategies 
which put learning explicitly in the hands of the pupils themselves. Role play and 
improvising scenes with puppets can allow quite young children to express and 
explore their own beliefs, examining a diversity of opinions safely. Examples of 
games can be found in books such as Winners All (Pax Christi, 1980) and, for 
older children, Conflict and Change (Nicholas, 1983). Brainstorming, values 
clarification exercises and hypothesising in the classroom all can contribute to 
reflection on personal values in a protected environment. 
Examination of procedural neutrality has convinced me that it is best described as a 
teaching method, rather than a principle by which to identify methodology or 
content. Procedural neutrality is a practical solution to one aspect of the problem of 
bias. It complements the idea of balance in offering a teaching strategy believed to 
minimise the possibility of a teacher's views carrying undue weight in class 
discussion. 
But there must be more to the teaching of controversial issues than this neutralising 
of bias. Educators are concerned about what should children learn, as well as what 
they should not learn. They not only want children to be protected from the 
teachers' bias, but also to learn not to be biased. 
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A further criterion, which relates especially to the teacher's own stance but also 
offers teaching by example, is still needed to stand alongsided balance in 
illuminating what unbiased teaching must be. 
II iv) 	 Impartiality 
The opposite of bias is surely impartiality. To be biased is to be partial, to favour 
one claim unduly. The judge who gives longer sentences to women than to men, 
irrespective of the nature of their crimes, is biased and is demonstrating partiality 
towards men. Gender, the criterion used, is irrelevant and the judgement has been 
made irrationally. To be impartial is to decide on the basis of good reasons, not to 
prejudge without, or despite, appropriate evidence. 
Impartiality demands objectivity, the ability to assess beliefs, evidence and 
argument on their objective merits, not swayed by self-interest or prejudice. This 
surely is what we are hoping for when discussing controversial issues in the 
classroom. Impartiality does not preclude one from having strong convictions, in 
the way that neutrality might seem to, but it does mean that my views are not 
necessarily better than yours solely in virtue of being deeply felt, mine or a 
teacher's. 
To be impartial is to consider views and interests in 
the light of all possible criticisms and counter-claim, 
and to ignore any kind of special pleading, whether 
from authority or whatever, from myself or 
whomsoever. (Bailey, 1975: 127) 
The teacher's stance in the classroom should surely always be characterised by 
impartiality and children should be educated so that they acquire impartiality and 
recognise when it is appropriate. 
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With impartiality as a criterion, teachers could, without impropriety, sincerely admit 
their own views. 
the teacher who takes a stand on one side of a 
controversial issue may nevertheless do justice to 
other points of view, and present his own position as 
subject to revision. (Hare, 1985: 117) 
Hare (1985) and Bailey (1973) both maintain that being open about one's own 
beliefs is desirable and therefore preferable to assuming a neutral stance. I would 
agree that sincerity is morally desirable, but would contend that it is not 
incompatible with the procedural neutrality expounded by Ruddock (1986). 
Neutral chairing of discussion is a practical strategy to prevent the introduction of 
undue influence in a very specific classroom situation. A neutral chair can still be 
an impartial teacher. 
Impartiality should underpin all teaching on war. It should be a feature of of all 
education in any subject area, but although it is self-evident that chemistry teachers 
who claim a proposition is true merely 'because I say so', are failing in their task, 
the need for impartiality can be overlooked in lessons on controversial issues. And 
yet it is in the sphere of values that impartiality is crucial. 
I have to endorse Sir Keith Joseph's words in this instance, when he asserts, 
The teacher's presentation needs to be as objective as 
he can make it, in the sense that what is offered is 
indeed true; that the selection of facts gives a clear 
picture which is neither unbalanced or superficial; 
that facts and opinions are clearly separated; and that 
the pupils are encouraged to weigh evidence and 
argument so as to arrive at rational judgements. 
(Keith Joseph, cited in Bridges, 1984: 31) 
Teaching war as a controversial issue then should be impartial. An impartial 
presentation is necessarily unbiased in the senses outlined in the preceding sections. 
Attention should be given to balance and neutrality in selecting resources and 
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choosing teaching methods, for these will be needed if impartiality is to be 
maintained. 
III War and Moral Education 
III i) 	 Moral education is necessary to teaching on war 
War is clearly a matter of life and death and the morality of war is heavily dependent 
upon the acceptability of intentional killing, shown in Chapter 2 to be a particularly 
intransigent moral problem. Moral education is surely necessary if people are to be 
able to make wise judgements on such complex issues, for, as I argued in Chapter 
4, they cannot rely on others, even assumed experts, if they are to judge morally. 
'Moral education' is intended to refer to more than teaching pupils to be good, in 
the sense of training them how to behave in a morally acceptable manner or 
inculcating in children a set of moral values (c. f. Straughan, 1982: 9 and Pring, 
1984: 61 ff.). Moral education aims to put children in a position where they can 
become moral agents, developing moral views which are significantly their own 
and the disposition to think and act in accordance with these. This will involve 
consideration of moral principles and establishing priorities, for, 
acquiring the dispositions is to some extent accepting 
priorities. Learning to tell the truth is in part learning 
not to lie even when lying would bring one's friends 
or family advantage. (White, 1990: 50) 
I am not suggesting that teachers should suddenly devote an enormous amount of 
time to holding moral philosophy lectures and seminars in schools in order to equip 
children to deal with the moral questions of war, let alone that we should confront 
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reception classes with questions about when it might be morally acceptable to turn 
off a life-support system. Nevertheless, some consideration of, for example, the 
prima facie value of human life, must be essential in teaching on war. 
Teaching on war would be incomplete if respect for life is not addressed. Without 
reflection on the place of human life in our hierachy of values, it is difficult to 
imagine how the pacifist position could be understood or evaluated. Moral 
education provides initiation into moral principles and moral reasoning without 
which understanding war would be completely inadequate. 
This is not to argue that other curriculum areas are irrelevant. Some subject 
teaching can contribute valuably in disabusing pupils of mistaken assumptions that 
war is unavoidable and thus outside the ethical sphere. Biology teachers are well 
placed to explain the inadequacies of any crude foul! of biological determinism, for 
they, in virtue of their particular expertise as biologists, are likely to understand its 
weaknesses and be aware of criticisms such as those explored in Chapter 1. It may 
be that explicit discussion of sociobiological assumptions with older children would 
pre-empt the misunderstanding which could lead to the conviction that aggression 
and war are reducible to biological impulses. Both biology and English language 
lessons are appropriate environments in which to address the varied meanings of 
'natural'. Similarly an historical or religious perspective on the just war could help 
children to appreciate the causes of war and how moral attitudes to them have 
changed in ways suggested in Chapter 3. 
Some knowledge of the means employed in modern warfare is needed if young 
people are to have infonned views on war. Harris claims, 
The so-called biotechnical revolution will continue to 
present us with complex dilemmas, (Harris, 1986: 
101) 
and, if the public is expected to participate in deciding them, 
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school is an obvious and important source of 
knowledge which will help to inform debate on these 
issues. (Harris, 1986: 100). 
He stresses that schools can provide at least some of the relevant scientific and 
medical information relevant to moral judgement, which is why the controversial 
issues of life and death are appropriately addressed in the classroom. Knowledge 
from various academic disciplines is needed to make better rather than worse moral 
judgements. 
However, such teaching would be only part of what is needed, albeit a prerequisite 
for moral evaluation of war. It would be inadequate to approach the topic only in a 
biological context, or in other curricular areas where the objectives of the lessons 
are likely to be the acquisition of predominantly empirical understanding. Initiation 
into moral discourse is also necessary, if children are to be given what they need to 
make proper judgements about war. 
It might be thought that moral education will provide children with the tools to deal 
with a range of moral problems, including those related to war, so it is not 
necessary to introduce it specifically as a topic. This would be a mistake. 
III ii) 	 Why should war be included in moral education? 
One of the stated aims of the National Curriculum is to promote the moral 
development of pupils, (Education Reform Act, 1988: Section 1). The wherewithal 
for arriving at moral judgements and acquiring the expertise to think morally cannot 
be approached in a vacuum. Children need to exercise their abilities and to practise 
on moral dilemmas. It might be argued that, even so, there is no need for 
discussion of war to be included. There are plenty of other topics which could be 
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used as vehicles for the development of moral reasoning and the formation of moral 
values. Why war? 
I do not wish to reiterate those reasons why war should be included in a form of 
Peace Education noted in Chapter 4, nor to attempt justification by suggesting that it 
is a stimulating topic, likely to capture the attention of jaundiced children (although I 
think this is often true), but to maintain that without an area of study called 'Peace 
Education', there would still be good reason for introducing reflection on war as 
part of moral education. 
It was argued in Chapter 1 that war is a moral matter and cannot be properly 
regarded as somehow outside the ethical sphere. Nevertheless, it is also a 
desperately practical matter and, in discussion of practicalities, the moral dimension 
can be all too easily overlooked or improperly diminished in importance. While 
teachers debate with their classes the wisdom of using the long bow rather than the 
cross bow, what it is 'right' or 'good' to do often has little moral significance and 
refers only to what will work best. 
_ Exactly because it is not always discussed as (or recognised to be) a moral matter, it 
is vital that war is addressed as such in schools, in an explicitly moral context. 
War concerns killing human beings, but the moral problems of war require attention 
to specific considerations in addition to those seen in Chapter 2 to have bearing on 
the intentional taking of life. Deciding whether or not war in self-defence is 
justifiable demands that the effects of war and weapons are understood. Unless 
moral education includes particular reference to warfare, teaching on war will be 
inadequate. 
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Part of learning about war in the context of moral education is to see that there is no 
one easy answer. Children may come to hold pacifist views or become confirmed 
militarists, but, if moral education is successful, they will not have merely adopted 
without reflection some attractive ideology propagated by government or teachers, 
family or friends. They will have arrived at their own moral viewpoint, will 
understand that there are competing arguments, have informed reasons for their 
opinions, and their views will be autonomously held. They will have learned to 
question the morality of war, but this will be questioning the wrongs as well as the 
rights of warfare. Questioning is the very antithesis of indoctrination and a defence 
against it. Looking at war within moral education is crucial if the moral dimension 
of its controversiality is to be appreciated. 
IV War and Political Education 
IV i) 	 Political Education is necessary to teaching on war 
Morality is not only a personal matter - and neither is war. Characteristically 
morality is a feature of interpersonal relationships, and in a democratic state, these 
extend into the political sphere. 
War is a political matter in being part of government policy. Schools should 
prepare children to make their contribution as citizens: 
Teachers have a responsibility to help their pupils 
understand and formulate their views on important 
areas of public debate. (NUT, 1984: 6) 
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Soon after completing their schooling, children become voters. Foreign policy is 
an area of politics and they should be aware that decisions are made relating to war 
and these are political decisions which we may have to live with, but which are 
made in climates we can affect. 
Although the moral implications of war are crucial, it cannot be understood 
exclusively in moral terms. 
War is a calculated political phenomenon undertaken 
at the behest of those in power in a society for 
political and economic gain. 'Hostilities' begin 
without the least hostility between individuals except 
as deliberately created by the organs of propaganda. 
People kill each other in wars for all sorts of reasons, 
not the least of which is that they are forced to do so 
by the political power of the state. (Rose et al., 
1984: 251) 
Furthermore, people's attitudes to war are politically sensitive in that governing in a 
democracy requires a measure of consent. Wars are fought between states not 
individuals and relate to governmental policy. I think we have to assume that the 
topic of war raises peculiarly political problems. 
The potential for a diversity of views on whether or not one's country should go to 
war is enormous. It is very obvious that, although there is considerable agreement 
that war can be justified, there not total consensus on the matter. Pacifism is 
recognised as an intellectually respectable alternative and famous pacifists are 
admired even by some who cannot agree with their principles. The lack of 
universal consensus, whether it is in relation to the morality of war generally or the 
expediency of a particular military engagement, is likely to worry politicians. 
In the conviction that all war is necessarily wicked, judging one's government to be 
morally culpable is surely near to wishing to be rid of them - something politicians 
must dread. But self-interest aside, widespread disagreement over government 
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policy with regard to military engagement could cause serious problems. More is at 
stake than individual politicians or one party retaining power. A refusal on the part 
of the populace generally ever to participate in fighting would be more than a minor 
difficulty for a government committed to keeping armed forces and whose defence 
policy includes the threat of armed reprisal. 
It is conceivable that war only requires that sufficient people can be coerced into 
fighting, but a democracy contemplating the possibility of war needs broad consent 
and sufficient citizens willing to fight in both principle and practice. Those who 
believe that some wars are justified and that the country may have to go to war are 
dependent on the agreement of others to a very significant extent. To engage in 
wars demands more than money from taxes; it requires large numbers of people 
actively to contribute to the war effort. 
It can easily be seen that if a large part of the youth of 
a nation were to object to war in general or to a 
particular war, that nation would have little chance of 
success in war, whether or not conscientious 
objection were legally recognised. Its armies would 
probably be demoralised. 
(C of E Board for Social Responsibility, 1982: 102) 
Individuals or small groups cannot wage war alone. War presents a situation, 
where survival largely depends on the actions of others. If sufficient people chose 
against war, there would be profound political consequences, which may include, 
but also go far beyond, the self-interest of politicians who wish to continue in 
power. 
So war very evidently is a political issue in a variety of ways. It is part of our 
political lives as citizens, it relates to governmental policy and often to party political 
interests. 
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What is learnt with respect to war therefore should be informed by political 
education for it is a political matter. 'Political education' is a term which might in 
practice be applied to many different sorts of teaching. There have long been 
debates, such as those discussed by Crick (1977) and Heater (1969), about what it 
ought to comprise. It is used here to refer to teaching which includes information 
about political systems, 
and the way in which political processes really 
operate, (Gardner, 1969: 47) 
but in which it is also recognised that, 
The teacher's task is, at whatever level, primarily a 
conceptual one, not a matter of conveying an agreed 
corpus of factual information. He needs to build up 
and extend an elementary vocabulary of concepts 
through which we both perceive the world and use 
them to try to influence it. (Crick, 1977: 14) 
Political education will be needed if much of the political practice of war is to be 
understood and if pupils are to have the opportunity to influence this practice. 
IV ii) 	 Why should war be included in political education? 
To maintain that political education is necessary to understanding war is insufficient 
to show that war ought to have a place in political education in school. It might 
appear that the political aspects of war, if not the moral dimension, receive adequate 
coverage outside the classroom. Not all a child's education is acquired in school 
and much of what we each have learned about modern war has been gleaned from 
information in books and the media generally, 
Most of the children say they learnt about nuclear 
weapons by watching television, but parents, 
teachers, newspapers, videos, books and friends are 
also mentioned as sources of information. (Jones & 
Saunders, 1984: 10) 
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This is information which is in the public domain in two senses. It is permitted and 
available, rather than being secret or private, but is is also widely disseminated 
through public channels. Since war is so public and brought to our attention so 
often, it might be thought that sufficient knowledge can be gained without further 
effort in the classroom. 
Jacobsen argues that public information, 
a neutral term that covers information irrespective of 
its use for good or evil purposes, (Jacobsen, 1984: 
52) 
is inadequate if we wish to give children a genuine insight into the problems of 
peace and security. Instead he calls for 'public enlightenment' which has an 
'intellectual/rational' component and an 'emotional/commitment component'. (He 
makes clear that he is not thinking of indoctrination into a specific ideology, but 
addressing how educators should contribute to informing the public about these 
problems.) 
In educational institutions, whatever else is aimed for, the development of the 
intellect and rationality occupies a high place in the hierarchy of purposes, which it 
need not in the media. Entertainment value or specific party political interests may 
justifiably take precedence outside the classroom, but not inside. Schools are 
ideally situated to contribute to public enlightenment on war in political education. 
I take Jacobsen to be highlighting, in his call for the emotional/commitment 
component, the need for political education which has among its aims the 
cultivation of a disposition. As White explains, 
A main aim of school education is to create the 
disposition to think that these political matters are 
worth bothering about and that it is worthwhile 
continuing the search for knowledge about them, 
wherever that leads ( White, 1987: 24). 
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War is surely a political matter of first importance, about which children need 
political understanding. In Britain young people have the right to vote at 18 and, 
properly to exercise that right they need to have been 
politically educated so that at least they understand 
the issues and how their resolution, one way or 
another, will affect their lives and those of others in 
their society and beyond it. (White, 1984: 33) 
Political education is essential in any democratic society if our children are to 
become participating citizens with knowledge and understanding of their roles, and 
war should be one of the topics studied in a political context if pupils are to be 
capable of contributing to public debate and influencing political decisions about 
international military conflict. 
Teaching on war can be viewed as part of, 
a very long and honourable tradition in the English 
Curriculum...in which teachers accept that one of 
their roles is to help young people understand the 
world in which they live and in particular the 
processes and machinery by which political decisions 
are made - the tradition of 'civics'. (John Slater at a 
DES/Regional course, cited by Hicks, 1986: 12) 
In 'Consultation on values in education and the community', the statement of 
societal values begins, 
We value truth, human life, justice and collective 
endeavour for the common good of society. 
((National Forum for Values in Education and the 
Community, 1996: 3) 
War is surely one of the greatest evils which threatens the common good of any 
society. To argue that it is imperative to encourage reflections on the justice of war, 
is not to argue that war can never be justified, but while wars may or may not have 
been won on the playing fields of Eton, it is unlikely that wars will be stopped 
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unless the possibility is discussed in appropriate educational contexts, in both the 
moral and political dimensions of the curriculum. 
V Cross curricular teaching on war 
Reflection on war might most profitably find its place in moral and political 
education. This may be explicitly addressed in periods allocated for Personal and 
Social Education, but moral and political education should not be restricted 
exclusively to designated lessons. An approach which is cross-curricular in a 
variety of senses is vital. (I believe this applies to some aspects of political 
education, but more generally to moral education so will confine my remarks in 
what follows to the latter.) 
V i) 	 Moral education should not be confined to special 
lessons 
We do not wish to give children the impression that moral thinking is only 
important in specific lessons. If we are unhappy at the way children seem unable to 
use any mathematical reasoning in geography lessons, we must also be concerned 
to avoid the impression that morality is a subject confined to certain times in the 
week. In this sense moral education should be cross-curricular, with a whole 
school approach planned, ensuring that the moral aspect is not lost when war is 
considered in history or geography. Just as the skills of literacy are important in all 
lessons, not just English, so too is morality. 
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V ii) 	 All teachers should be involved 
The nature of moral education needs to be understood by all teachers, irrespective 
of whether or not particular individuals have special responsibility, involvement or 
expertise in the area. This is because consistency of approach is needed. If moral 
education is aimed at putting children in the best possible position to arrive at their 
own moral judgements, it will be confusing if, for example, some teachers 
manifestly ignore or constantly denigrate pupils' own opinions. 
Not every teacher will address war in the same context and indeed for some the 
topic might never arise, but all the staff in a school need to have access to what is 
explicitly taught so that the child's experience of schooling is coherent, and 
contradictory messages can be avoided. For a popular teacher to maintain that war 
just is wrong, dismissing the problematic status of moral propositions, will be 
likely both to confuse pupils and complicate the task of those who teach Personal 
and Social Education. 
V iii) _ 
	
Morality should be a cross-curricular dimension 
The presentation of the moral aspects of war should also be cross-curricular in a 
slightly different sense. Teaching generally should not only be consistent with 
moral education, but ethical implications should explicitly be raised in different 
areas of the curriculum when relevant. 
Higgs argues forcefully that science courses must include reference to moral 
responsibility and accountability. She quotes the words of one engaged in 
designing the X-ray laser pumped by a nuclear explosion that foinied the basis of 
the 'Star Wars' defence system: 
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My view of weapons has changed. Until 1980 or so 
I didn't want to have anything to do with nuclear 
anything. Back in those days I thought there was 
something fundamentally evil about weapons. Now 
I see it as an interesting physics problem. 
(Hagelstein cited in Higgs, 1987: 26) 
Her point is not that Haggelstein has altered his moral stance, but that he has now 
rejected any moral view of his work. 
We should not give our pupils the idea that the application of science, or any other 
subject, can be completely isolated from ethical concerns. To do so would be to 
provide an inadequate education, and to fail to provide what Peters teinied 
'cognitive perspective', (Peters, 1966). In providing an education for all children, 
it must not be forgotten that among those we teach are tomorrow's research 
scientists - people whose careers are particularly associated with their scientific 
education - and we must ask whether we want them to perceive their studies as 
value free. 
Where consideration of war is part of historical or literary study, or any other 
subject, that it presents moral problems should not be forgotten. This is not to say 
that lengthy moral debates should ensue from any mention of warfare in each and 
every lesson, but rather to assert that the pursuit of historical understanding and 
literary appreciation ought not to obscure or seem to deny the underlying moral 
dimension. Some of our pupils will go on to hold high office in politics and in the 
armed forces, and exert particular influence over their country's fate in international 
conflicts. If we have not educated them to recognise moral questions wherever they 
arise, we should not be surprised if they approach intellectual problems in a purely 
pragmatic way. 
V iv) 	 The hidden curriculum 
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Much of what has been said about cross-curricular teaching concerns the hidden 
curriculum. Learning that moral thinking is not peculiar to P.S.E. lessons and that 
citizens have responsibilities for political decisions with regard to war depends on 
the hidden curriculum as well as on any explicit syllabus. 
The 'hidden curriculum' is intended to signify that which is taught implicitly rather 
than overtly. The hidden curriculum can encompass the lessons children learn from 
how they are treated in school, from what is displayed on the walls of classrooms 
and from the resources available. 
It is commonly assumed that values are most often absorbed from the hidden 
curriculum. Concern for others is frequently presumed to be learnt from the ethos 
of a school rather than from explicit teaching. Bridges defends procedural 
neutrality on these grounds: 
if the societal values that teachers wanted to promote 
were in fact of a roughly democratic order, they 
might well discover that their ends were better served 
through the so-to-speak 'hidden curriculum' of 
procedural neutrality than through any explicit 
attempt at their promotion. (Bridges, 1986: 30) 
He goes on to cite the Humanities Curriculum Project trials (1970): 
The evaluation study suggested that marginally, but 
by a statistically significant degree, teachers who 
adopted the stance of procedural neutrality were more 
likely to encourage tolerant interracial attitudes than 
those who sought actively to promote such attitudes. 
(Bridges, 1986: 30) 
It has been found that teacher behaviour, such as displaying children's work, 
praising achievement, preparing lessons thoroughly, being punctual, and displaying 
trust by giving pupils responsibility, correlated highly with less bullying and 
rudeness. 
It was striking that the schools in which children 
were expected to take responsibility for their own 
things had better outcomes with respect to 
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attendance, behaviour and delinquency. (Rutter et 
al., 1979: 132) 
By example, in what they say and do, teachers may all be responsible to some 
extent for the values our pupils come to hold and their actions. 
It is a common misconception that teachers can have no influence over the hidden 
curriculum. It is pointed out that messages our body language sends might count as 
part of the hidden curriculum, but our habits and gestures are usually involuntary. 
That being the case, there is little which can be done. However, even our habitual 
gestures can be brought to our attention. Video taping one's own teaching is not 
impossible. It may be difficult to eradicate all unwanted nasty grimaces or pointing 
fingers, but made aware of the problem, a teacher can at least take steps to counter 
their effect. Once conscious of the fact that I wince visibly at every mention of 
pacifism and that my pupils interpret this as disapproval, I could make efforts to 
correct this impression. 
Teachers can monitor their own behaviour and presentation in many ways. Check 
lists can be designed against which they can check resources for balance and pupil 
evaluation sheets can reveal what impression they received of a lesson or course. 
Monitoring of that which contributes to the hidden curriculum is important to reveal 
to teachers what otherwise might remain hidden. Pupils can be usefully involved in 
deciding what criteria should be used and what should be examined, and led to 
reflect on how beliefs may be influenced. So while the hidden curriculum 
comprises that which is not overt on any syllabus, it need not all be hidden from 
either teachers or learners. Much can be brought into the open. 
Once aware of influential aspects of the hidden curriculum, it can to some extent be 
subject to control. Teachers can use it to reinforce intended learning and exclude 
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some unintended teaching. Planning should include attention to the hidden 
curriculum. 
A school might, in addition, plan especially for the hidden curriculum. Staff could 
decide to focus especially on the value of impartiality for a period of time. To have 
lessons devoted to the need for impartiality would seem odd and unlikely to have 
the desired effect, but for all teachers to call attention to it during lessons and extra-
curriculum activities, to stress and praise attention to evidence and to exhibit it 
overtly in their dealings with children would be to use the hidden curriculum to 
educate. If the intention of the teachers is made plain, there need be no objection 
that they are engaged in manipulatory practices or exerting undue influence. 
The hidden curriculum ought to be, as far as possible, a vehicle for intended 
learning. It must logically be true that we can never know, and therefore control, 
all that is taught implicitly in school. Seeking to know all that one reveals to pupils 
is on par with a long-sighted person attempting to diagnose the deficiency in her 
own eye. The nature of the sight impairment will interfere with the diagnostic 
procedures. Absolute certainty is unattainable. But this is not to say that nothing 
can be discovered. If the hidden curriculum is influential, teachers ought to 
examine it, using all means available, not relying only on their own assessment. 
What is learnt in school should not be left to chance when it is possible to do 
otherwise. 
I would contend that the hidden curriculum plays a large part in teaching values and 
that consequently it is of great importance in the area of controversial issues. In so 
far as it remains hidden from teachers, it will only accidentally contribute to desired 
learning. To the extent to which it is hidden from pupils, schools risk anti-
educational lessons being learned. Illich (1973) argues that schools inculcate, via 
the hidden curriculum, an uncritical acceptance of the existing social order. 
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Uncritical acceptance of a set of values is antipathetic to teaching on war as a 
controversial issue. 
Whether or not lessons should be set aside for the exploration of war and, if they 
are, whether or not these should be subject based lessons or included in the 
Personal and Social Education programme, is likely to depend on very practical 
considerations. Which is best will vary according to practices in different 
institutions and the particular needs of different children. I should not wish to 
prescribe any one approach to timetabling, but I would maintain that, whatever the 
decision reached, the work should have a cross-curricular dimension in the senses 
outlined. The approach to war ought to be cross-curricular and include attention to 
the hidden curriculum. It should be a whole school matter and planned as such. 
In this chapter the intention has been to show how the controversiality of questions 
raised by war requires that teaching on war adheres to certain principles and 
educational considerations. These have application, not only to the manner in war 
is presented, but also to my next concern - the educators' problems encountered 
when selecting content. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Teaching on War: selection of content 
The content for any subject area is not merely a 'given', such that there is never any 
difficulty in knowing what should be taught. Despite its prescriptive nature, even 
the National Curriculum, does not stipulate exactly what should be addressed in any 
lesson and, 
teachers have not yet been relegated to the role of 
mere operatives who mechanically follow 
instructions handed down to them. (Bonnett, 1994: 
8) 
Certain outcomes are expected, but professional choices have to be made about how 
best these can or should be achieved. 
The content of all courses is selected. Teachers have some professional 
responsibility for the content, and for the criteria applied in deciding on it. The task 
is not unique to teaching on war, but some criteria have particular importance and 
-relevance for planning in this area. 
The backcloth to selecting content for teaching on war is that which lies behind the 
whole approach to teaching war as a controversial issue. Implicit in what has been 
written in Chapter 5 is that content should be chosen in accordance with 
impartiality, if justice is to be done to the controversiality of war. Account must be 
taken of balance, and the content should present a picture reflecting and reinforcing 
the aim of teaching in an unbiased manner. 
Just as it was recognised that to prescribe precise timetabling was inappropriate, so 
now I do not wish to prescribe exactly what should be dealt with on any particular 
course. Again, the search will be for guidelines to infoiin the choice of content. 
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The intention is to identify considerations relevant to all teaching on war, wherever 
it occurs in the curriculum, and not to provide material specific to any single lesson 
or particular cross-curricular needs. 
Nuclear war raises special problems which merit separate scrutiny. These go 
beyond the appropriacy of giving children information about a distinct foini of 
modern warfare, and relate to many of the wider questions which confront the 
educator teaching controversial issues. Although 'nuclear war' may appear to 
suggest specific content, exploration of whether or not the topic should be 
addressed in the classroom throws into sharp relief problems immanent in all 
teaching of controversial issues. It seems fitting therefore that it should be 
examined at the end of this chapter. 
When engaged in education we are commonly held to be developing knowledge and 
understanding, skills, values and dispositions. What would these mean in terms of 
the content of teaching on war? 
I Knowledge and Understanding 
I i) 	 Information 
I take the teaching of knowledge and understanding to mean more than the 
transmission of information when, 
information, typically involves facts being passed on 
from one person to another or others by word of 
mouth, print of something similar. (Bailey, 1984: 
53) 
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This is not to say there is no place for information in teaching, but to note that it 
would be insufficient for education. The development of knowledge and 
understanding in children involves our pupils knowing and understanding for 
themselves, not simply accepting and retaining what someone else has said. It 
involves gaining some grasp of explanations, reasons and evidence, and making 
sense of what is taught so that it is meaningful to the learner. 
Some information, about weapons for example, might be highly relevant to a 
particular discussion with particular children, but to specify which facts ought to be 
learnt by all children has limited value, (Bailey, 1984: 54). It is more important that 
they should know when information is relevant, and how to find out the facts when 
they need to. Knowledge and understanding of war should not be reduced to 
information. 
I ii) 	 Relevant broad areas of knowledge and understanding 
In teaching on war, it is evident that some essential broad areas of knowledge and 
understanding can be identified. In Chapter 4, the importance of introducing pupils 
to the idea that biological factors do not rule all our responses to conflict was 
reiterated, and it must be the case that some consideration of the arguments 
presented in Chapter 2 are necessary if children are to perceive war as a moral 
problem. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated the moral complexity of war and the taking of human life. 
The dilemmas which contribute to this complexity are not self-evident. 
Examination of the Principle of Double Effect showed how a widely accepted and 
apparently reasonable defence of bombing civilians was difficult to uphold on 
224 
closer scrutiny. Introduction to knowledge and understanding of pacifism and just 
war thinking is essential to moral education with respect to war. 
Balance also requires that both war and peace are studied. Hicks is right in saying 
that the just war and international conflicts (including contemporary wars) would 
need attention and that, 
Students should study different concepts and 
examples of peace, 
and, 
look at the work of individuals and groups who are 
actively working for peace. (Hicks, 1983: 17) 
When exploring the objections to Peace Education, it was noted that it has been 
perceived as a necessary corrective to what is conventionally put before children in 
school. Certainly any study of heroic figures should not focus exclusively on those 
known for their courage or success in fighting. If teaching is to be unbiased it must 
include scrutiny of those whose fame rests on their pacifist ideals or their work to 
help the victims of war. Balance may, in Chapter 5, have appeared to be, in some 
respects, an inadequate or vague criterion, but it is not difficult to see that it 
demands some opportunity to address the miseries of battle as well as the glories. 
Stories used with young children should include tales where non-violent means of 
resolving conflicts are successfully employed. Dragons can be outwitted or 
placated without battles at times! To ensure we do not offer only one view of war, 
as an exciting and heroic practice, is not merely to exercise prudence and avoid 
indoctrination, but to take steps to present the world as it is, in its variety. 
In Chapter 4, the central concerns of Peace Education were explored. These 
included ideas of positive and negative peace. Insofar as structural violence might 
result in war, this too would need addressing, if children are to understand that it is 
possible to work to prevent war and for peace. 
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Many writers have suggested particular content which could be used. Various 
papers in Education for Peace (Hicks ed., 1988) contain useful ideas, in addition to 
those put forward in books of a more practical nature such as Conflict and Change 
(Nicholas, 1983) and A Repertoire of Peace Making Skills (Carpenter, 1977). It is 
not necessary to set out more specific lesson ideas here, but teachers should realise 
that teaching materials are published with the express purpose of providing 
alternatives to content which might be thought to suggest that war is the only 
obvious option or to give an improbably rosy view of warfare. 
Areas of knowledge and understanding should be selected according to what is 
deemed essential to the making of moral judgements about war and with regard for 
what is needed to avoid biased teaching. 
I iii) 	 Appropriacy to the age and ability of pupils 
Issues of war vary in their complexity and are not all suitable for teaching with all 
age groups. Account must be taken of pupils"cognitive state' (Hirst & Peters, 
1970: 80), and their readiness to acquire knowledge and understanding in terms of 
ability, prior knowledge, and emotions. There can be no suggestion that graphic 
accounts of the holocaust be presented to six year olds. 
I should also wish to resist the idea that in teaching younger or less able children we 
can always do so by simplifying difficult material, by scaling things down as it 
were. Some things are conceptually difficult in themselves or require considerable 
experience of the world if they are to be properly understood. International 
diplomacy is not reducible to negotiations over pocket money or swopping toys. 
Squabbles in the playground are not an adequate analogy for war and should not be 
presented as if they are. Whilst involvement in decision making in school may 
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give children some idea of what it is to face choices about what should be done for 
the common good, it, 
gives little of the feel of what it is like to confront the 
kind of problem which exercises the state...simply to 
have the power over life and death puts these, 
qualitatively, in a different category. In that sense, 
the macrocosm is not in the microcosm. (Entwistle, 
1969: 192) 
Detailed examination of questions about, for example, patriotism and conscientious 
objection are consequently perhaps best left to the secondary ages, but the primary 
school can begin to develop the knowledge and understanding which is necessary 
to evaluating issues like these. The understanding of what it is to be loyal, and 
what it is to do what one believes to be right may be gradually built up and 
modified, but this process begins very early and can be nurtured in primary 
schools. Not wanting to land a friend in trouble is not a simplified version of 
patriotism, but it is a comprehensible aspect of loyalty and may contribute to later 
understanding of patriotism. 
When choosing content for specific groups of children, account must be taken of its 
appropriacy to their ages and abilities. Teachers' knowledge of their own pupils 
should inform their selection, just as it does in any other lesson planning. 
Nuclear war is among those areas which require particularly sensitive judgement 
with regard to appropriacy, but its inclusion in the content of teaching on war also 
raises other considerations and it is a topic which merits separate scrutiny below. 
Content then should not be restricted to mere information, but ought to include 
those relevant facts without which reflection would be ill founded. Areas of 
knowledge offered should be those representative of diverse aspects of war and 
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necessary to understanding differing moral positions with respect to war. Choice 
of content must be appropriate to the age, circumstances and level of understanding 
of pupils. 
II Skills 
To have a skill is to be able to do something, to know how to. Learning about war 
in an educational context may include the acquisition of skills. Skills thought 
essential are commonly cited as those which Hicks identifies: critical thinking, 
cooperation, empathy, assertiveness, conflict resolution and political literacy, 
(Hicks, 1986: 16). 
It is important that we should develop these in children, but I am not convinced that 
they are all directly relevant to teaching on war or that they are all best characterised 
as 'skills'. 
n•n 
II i) 	 Critical thinking 
Critical thinking is the least problematic of the categories and is clearly vital when 
addressing war as much as any other controversial topic. It is necessary to 
impartiality. Of course our pupils should be taught to, 
be able to approach issues with an open and critical 
mind and be willing to change their opinions in the 
face of new evidence and rational argument, (Hicks, 
1986: 16). 
Being able to approach issues in this way does amount to having certain skills - we 
can practise becoming more reflective and not instantly leaping to conclusions. 
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Learning to put aside, at least momentarily, our prejudices and to cultivate 
objectivity is to learn how to do something, and, together with other skills is best 
learnt from example, explanation, instruction, demonstration and practice. I would 
hope that the development of critical thinking is a central part of any educational 
endeavour. It is important in teaching on war since, in developing it, teachers 
cannot be indoctrinating and are helping children to resist indoctrination. But it 
must be equally important in any education. To claim that it is a skill necessary to 
teaching on war approaches claiming that reasoning is essential. Of course it is, but 
that is part of what it is to engage in education rather than training or conditioning. 
II ii) 	 Political literacy 
The skills of political literacy, in contrast, would seem especially relevant to making 
judgements about war and to influencing public debate, and seem to be 
presupposed in calling for war as a topic within political education. Nevertheless 
doubts are raised when Hicks explains what he means by 'political literacy': 
the ability to influence decision-making thoughtfully, 
both within their own lives and in their local 
community, and also at national and international 
levels. (Hicks, 1986: 16) 
'The ability to influence decision-making' is too broad a notion to be accepted as 
educational. It may be a skill, but it is not necessarily desirable. The thoughtful 
exercise of coercion and charismatic leadership could be broken down into skills, 
but, since they are antithetical to educational ends such as respect for persons, it 
could not be desirable to encourage them in schools. Politicians are often trained to 
acquire a 'sincere' facial expression, to score points in debate and even to adopt 
hairstyles which are assumed to instil confidence in the electorate. Such training 
can be aptly described as the acquisition of skills - but influential as these might be, 
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they have no place in the content of the curriculm. Education is not about teaching 
children how to manipulate others skilfully. 
Furthermore, knowing how to go about influencing decision-making by making 
one's views heard (without manipulation) in the political arena sounds like having 
skills, but is I suspect largely reducible to knowing what to do (propositional 
knowledge rather knowing how) and acquiring the disposition to do it. In other 
words, the ability to influence decision-making is not achieved via predominantly 
skills based learning and I should prefer to omit reference to political literacy as a 
set of skills. 
In referring to 'political literacy', Hicks may be alluding to the ability to 
communicate. Developing the abilities to articulate one's views (and perhaps 
thereby to contribute to decision-making) is likely to be a prerequisite for political 
action and thus important to learn. 
Such abilities are often termed 'skills', but it should be noted that they are not like 
many physical skills which can be learnt through trial and error, rehearsal and 
practice, with minimal instruction and demonstration from a teacher. Presenting 
views coherently is not reducible to very limited skills such as speaking audibly. 
Effective communication has a strong cognitive element. Such abilities should not 
be regarded as if they are completely different or isolated from deeper knowledge 
and understanding. Because so much skills talk in education can suggest that 
abilities are relatively easily taught and learnt in the way that mechanical skills may 
be, it does not seem to me that that political literacy (or even communication) is 
most usefully categorised as a skill. 
Political literacy surely has more to do with understanding what courses of action 
are open to citizens, familiarity with political concepts such as democracy and a 
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grasp of the limitations of political thinking. All this is the stuff of political 
education. If the need for political education in teaching on war, claimed in the 
previous chapter, is accepted, then the call for the political literacy skills may be 
redundant. 
II iii) 	 Assertiveness, cooperation & empathy 
Assertiveness, cooperation and empathy are more easily perceived as necessary to 
the understanding of peace as an alternative to war. Learning these may be 
acquiring attitudes, but being assertive, cooperative and capable of empathy also 
involves skills. Many children need practice in being assertive, in cooperating and 
empathising. It is not enough merely to understand that these ways of being exist 
and are available, desirable options. Knowledge and understanding is often 
insufficient to enable people to be assertive rather than aggressive. One can try to 
cooperate and fail, because one lacks the necessary social skills, but one can also 
practise and learn how to put oneself in another's shoes. Drama and role play 
provide excellent opportunities for the trying out of all these skills. 
Assertiveness, cooperation and empathy are desirable attributes, but they are not of 
equal consequence in all areas of study. They may be helpful in learning 
mathematics and physics, but they are not central to mathematics and physics in the 
way they may be to literature and history. They do have particular relevance to 
learning about war. 
In Chapter 1, it was argued that assertiveness is distinct from aggression in that it 
does not deny the rights of others. War seems to involve overriding people's 
rights, and the understanding that people can negotiate assertively (an 
understanding gained partly by acquiring abilities) is important. Understanding 
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what it is to cooperate and how difficult it can be in practice throws light, not only 
on cooperation as an option, but also on cooperative efforts in the waging of wars. 
Empathy, in addition to knowledge, must be needed if we are to comprehend why 
wars happen and to work towards a more peaceful world. Learning to be assertive, 
to be cooperative and to empathise is not reducible to, but aptly includes the 
acquisition of skills. 
II iv) 	 Conflict resolution 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that Peace Education has been called 'Conflict Studies'. 
Certainly its main aim could be described as teaching how to resolve conflicts 
without recourse to violence. When the focus is narrowed to teaching on war, 
somewhat reluctantly I have to question whether or not conflict resolution, as a skill 
or set of skills could have anything to offer over and above critical thinking, 
assertiveness, cooperation and empathy. Hicks outlines that conflict resolution 
demands that, 
Students should be able to analyse conflicts in an 
objective and systematic way and be able to suggest a 
range of solutions to them. Where appropriate they 
should be able to implement the solutions 
themselves. (Hicks, 1986: 16.) 
Again ' being able to' sounds like knowing how and having skills, and we do talk 
of the skills of analysis. However, the analysis of conflicts is part of what it is to 
think critically about war. It is not a further skill needed. The ability to implement 
solutions is likely to depend on the exercise of assertiveness etc. in public debate. I 
cannot see that anything more is involved when implementation is characterised as a 
skill. 
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Teaching on war, in common with all educative teaching, should include the skills 
of critical analysis. Whether or not it is appropriately characterised as a skill, there 
can be no doubt that political literacy too is vital. Communication, assertion, 
cooperation and empathy may not be of equal relevance in all subject areas, but 
ought to be intentionally developed in a cross curricular approach to the teaching of 
war. 
III Values 
In Chapter 5, the discussion of unbiased teaching suggested that it is unacceptable 
to inculcate any one set of substantive values, whether the teacher's or the school's. 
It was claimed that children should be educated to reflect on the diversity of values 
and come to hold their beliefs about controversial issues for themselves. Although 
it is plain that indoctrinatory or unbalanced teaching should not be employed, the 
question of whether any values should be intentionally taught was not addressed. 
Before exploring which values might be justifiably taught in relation to war, certain 
assumptions need clarification. 
III i) 	 Values education 
There is increasing reference to values education in schools. This is not merely a 
change of terminology, such that the title, Values Education, will replace Personal 
and Social Education or Moral Education in the curriculum (although this might 
well happen). It is surely intended to call attention to the centrality of values in that 
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spiritual, moral, social and cultural development demanded by the National 
Curriculum (1988) and to underline that children should be educated with regard to 
values. 
It is endorsing the view that schools should not be simply training children to 
behave in certain ways or teaching them to believe certain statements of value just 
because teachers say so. 
There is a need to explain how values permeate every 
assumption and shape the selection of material. 
(Barker, 1987: 109) 
Schools should be educating about values, initiating pupils into the sphere of moral 
and other value judgements. 
Part of this initiation must be recognition of the controversial nature of values and 
the diverse values that are actually held. However, it is evident that there is also 
now an assumption that there are some values on which 'our society can agree', 
(National Forum for Values in Education and the Community, 1996: 1) and, if 
these can be identified, that they should be taught. 
III ii) 	 Shared values 
In 1996, SCAA produced, 'Consultation on values in education and the 
community', which reported the findings of the Forum which was composed of 
150 members, representing national organisations with concern for young people or 
education. A questionnaire on the document further broadened the consultative 
process. It can be seen then that, if the values proposed in the document are finally 
endorsed by respondents, they will be widely 'shared'. 
It is made explicit that the statements of value are not intended to be 
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a definitive and complete list of all the values people 
hold, (National Forum for Values in Education and 
the Community, 1996: 1) 
and it was emphasised that, 
the shared values will not necessarily be the values 
that all people believe to be the most important. By 
their nature, for example, 'shared values' do not 
include those distinctive of any particular religious or 
cultural group. (ibid., 1996: 5) 
Evidently, the values sought are those on which agreement seems possible and 
indeed likely. There is no claim that such values are the objects of universal 
consensus, only that there may be agreement on values, 'that schools should 
promote on society's behalf, (ibid., 1996: introduction) 
While broad agreement would, in practical terms, facilitate the teacher's task, it 
would not justify the intentional inculcation of specific values in school. Other 
grounds are needed and I think they can be found. 
III iii) 	 Fundamental values 
Some values seem to be fundamental to understanding morality, democracy and 
education. The statement of values in the consultative document includes: 
We value truth, human rights, the law, justice and 
collective endeavour for the common good of 
society. (National Forum for Values in Education 
and the Community, 1996: 2) 
We value others for themselves, not for what they 
have or what they can do for us.(ibid., 1996: 2) 
and 
We value each person as a unique being of intrinsic 
worth, with potential for spiritual, moral, intellectual 
and physical development and change. (ibid.,: 3) 
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These may be prerequisites of participating fully in a democratic society, of being 
educated and of being a moral agent. A respect for truth must be necessary to being 
educated. The mathematics or science lesson that takes no account of truth and 
falsity could hardly be educational. Valuing the common good, law and justice is 
part of what it is to value democracy. Plainly the intention of the document is to 
promote respect for life as a shared value and this too seems legitimate. 
Respect for human life could perhaps be regarded as 
a universal value. (Silberbauer, 1993: 27) 
This may the case, not merely because contingently there is agreement about it, but 
also because without appreciating a value such as this, it is difficult to see how one 
could understand what it is to be moral agent. 
So these may be values without which there could be no moral education as 
described in Chapter 5, or political education in a democratic state. They are 
fundamental then in being necessary to gaining proper understanding of war. 
III iv) 	 Substantive and procedural values 
A distinction is often made between substantive and procedural values: 
whilst we may want children to learn to choose for 
themselves over differing substantive values, 
procedural values such as 'respect for truth', 
fairness' and 'tolerance are essential for any study of 
politics or peace. (Hicks, 1986: 12) 
Procedural values seem aptly named, for without them the process of coming to 
understand cannot proceed, and they are fundamental in the way claimed above. 
They are fundamental to gaining education and both moral and political 
understanding. 
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Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that procedural values are in no way 
incontrovertible. They are not different from substantive values in this respect. 
Neither are they uncontroversial or neutral, in virtue of being fundamental. 'We 
value human rights' is a statement of value reflecting the desirability of democracy -
an evaluative concept upon which the British, but not every, political system, is 
based. 'We value each person as a unique being of intrinsic worth', is similarly 
basic to moral thinking, but not itself ethically neutral (c.f. Cohen, 1969: 160). 
Because such values are fundamental to the way of life we aspire to in this country, 
they can be rationally recognised and shared, but they too can be and are contested. 
If values can be identified which are fundamental to education, teaching them must 
be legitimate. This is not to suggest schools should inculcate them without 
reference to rationality. Impartiality demands that explanations are given and logic 
attended to. 
III iv) 	 Should substantive values be taught? 
Substantive usually refers to values of a more obviously partisan nature, given the 
procedural framework. It was argued, in Chapter 2, that the prima facie evil of 
killing may be derived directly from the fundamental value of respect for persons, 
but while agreeing on this, people are still very likely to differ in their substantive 
valuing of nuclear deterrence, pacifism, capital punishment and many other issues. 
The value of voting may be intimately related to the fundamental value of 
democracy, but which party one votes for is a substantive matter. 
Unbiased teaching certainly seems to demand that substantive values are not directly 
inculcated for all those reasons connected with the controversial nature of values. 
But this is not to say, because they are not fundamental, they should not be 
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explored in the classroom. Not all teaching is direct instruction or indoctrination. It 
was claimed above that broadly the content of teaching on war should include 
knowledge of different stances taken. Reference to a range of substantive values is 
plainly part of this. Teaching on war should include teaching about values; not just 
about their controversial nature, but about specific substantive values too. 
III v) 	 Teaching the value of peace 
To hold peace as a value seems superficially to be to hold a substantive value, but I 
would argue that understood properly, this is too intimately related with 
fundamental values to be merely substantive. If valuing others as of intrinsic worth 
is a fundamental value in the sense outlined, then the prima facie wrongness of 
killing asserted throughout must be closely associated with this. To kill others 
without justification is to act in a way inconsistent with valuing them as of intrinsic 
worth. It is a prima facie evil and requires justification. War necessarily involves 
killing. Its opposite, peace, must be a prima facie good. I do not suggest that it is 
of absolute value, but that it is valuable. 
It seems to me that the value of peace can be demonstrated and, just as we might 
regard one who could not see that killing is morally objectionable at all as sadly 
lacking in moral understanding, so too we ought to think one who sees nothing 
morally desirable in peace is morally uneducated. Children should not only be 
taught that people value peace, but also they should be taught to value peace 
themselves. 
Once again it is necessary to reiterate what has been said in Chapter 4, that to teach 
the value of peace is not to teach that peace is of overriding value and need not 
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therefore be to exhibit bias towards pacifism. Provided that the teaching is not 
indoctrinatory it need not be coercive. 
Proper account should be taken of the controversial nature and diversity of values, 
but this is not a situation in which balance is relevant. Schools do not have to 
balance their promotion of respect for persons with denigrating others, and it is no 
more necessary to present the view that peace is an evil as if it is of equal worth. 
Children should be alerted to the value of peace and furtheiniore can be justifiably 
encouraged to see that peace is a prima facie good. 
III vi) 	 Value clashes 
The teaching of any controversial issue risks situations where the beliefs of parents 
or others in the wider community come into conflict with what is being taught in 
school. Even if educationalists are agreed on the importance of procedural values, 
people may dispute what they believe is actually being taught. There is fear on the 
one hand of biased teaching and on the other, since people usually want what they 
believe right to be taught, of a failure to tell children what to believe. 
Clashes of value are more than an academic problem for educators. They can cause 
dire practical problems. Diplomacy and negotiation is needed if conflicts of values 
are to be averted or resolved satisfactorily in practice. This is not to accept that only 
compromises which satisfy no-one can result, but it does mean that sensitivity to 
parental attitudes is needed. 
Beliefs about pacifism are likely to be strongly held if they are the root of 
complaints. Disagreement which seems to be an attack on a cherished belief is 
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threatening in a way that argument over facts is not. Our values and beliefs are 
significantly part of who we are and we should recognise this and respect others' 
values. Further, a child's belief that her parents are right may be one of these 
cherished beliefs at primary school age, and we should not recklessly make public 
our disagreement, causing unnecessary distress. We do need to deal gently and 
delicately with children and parents when value clashes are likely to arise, not 
merely to avoid complaints which could escalate into newspaper headlines 
(although awareness of this possibility would be wise!), but also because we 
should respect views which may be part of a person's self-identity. 
What then is to be done if some parents are likely to be horrified at the idea that a 
school should address the moral problems of war ? Without wishing to avoid 
confronting the problem, it is relevant to mention first that many battles between 
parents and schools arise because the parents are insufficiently well-informed about 
what is going on and are under some misapprehension. Making available accurate 
information is obviously inadequate. Not everyone realises they have access to 
what their children are being taught or how to gain that access. The content of what 
is to be taught together with explanation of how the topic will be presented must be 
understood. In the interest of achieving parental support as well as understanding, 
it appears that frank discussion at an open meeting before final decisions on the 
teaching are taken is advisable. This is not simply a matter of good personal 
relations and a strategy more likely to encourage consensus. It also provides a 
forum for genuine discussion, where parents' views can be taken into account and 
teachers' plans modified. Many potential conflicts over what should be taught can 
be pre-empted in practice. 
Nevertheless, despite this, there must always be the possibility that, after delicate 
negotiation and prolonged exchanges of views, a direct clash remains - some 
parents perhaps passionately believe that war is always wrong and oppose any 
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discussion of just war theory while school policy demands that it should be 
discussed. 
There are no good grounds for accepting that teachers qua teachers are the only 
proper arbiters of what should be presented to children in the sphere of values held 
with regard to war, but, by the same token, parents and others do not always know 
better. It was claimed in Chapter 4 that there are no experts on whom we should 
rely in the field of moral values, and this must be so with regard to values 
generally. Expertise, in terms of specialised knowledge and understanding, 
certainly exists, but values education is aimed at developing people's values in the 
light of what experts have to offer, not at blind acceptance of what any one expert 
might maintain. A particular parent might count as an expert on some aspect of 
war, but it would not make that person the only possible arbiter of what ought to be 
taught on war in school. 
It should not be imagined that the difficulty could easily be resolved in practice, if 
teachers were willing to ignore such considerations. Troublesome clashes of values 
are unlikely to be avoided by passing the decision making over to the parents 
themselves. Even if parents were willing to decide for us, The whole nature of 
values makes any consensus unlikely. 
Educationalists may not be best placed to decide on all issues of value, but they are 
well-versed in making decisions on educational values. They do have a particular 
relevant expertise in deciding curriculum issues. If reflection on nuclear war, for 
example, is demonstrably of educational worth, then there are grounds for its 
inclusion even if some people object. 
241 
Plainly children should be introduced to the variety of values held in relation to war. 
While no specific values should ever be merely inculcated, it does seem that certain 
values need to be shown to be fundamental and that the value of peace can 
justifiably be taught. It must be understood that clashes of value are possible, but 
that teachers cannot properly avoid the reponsibility for making value judgements 
about what is taught in schools. 
IV Dispositions and empowerment 
Despite Cox and Scruton's reservations about children being 'encouraged to be 
aware of their responsibility for world disarmament' (Cox & Scruton, 1984: 32), 
young people do need to understand their responsibility and its limits. Kelly 
argues, 
One of the major tasks which education must 
perform in a democratic society is the proper 
preparation of young citizens for the roles and 
responsibilities they must be ready to take on when 
they reach maturity. (Kelly, 1995: 101) 
Part of this preparation must be the acquisition of dispositions to behave in 
accordance with one's beliefs and values. 
The consultation document on values states firmly, 
The Forum felt strongly that because it is the 
expression of our values in behaviour that most 
concerns society, the statement of values should not 
be seen simply as an exercise in abstract moral 
reasoning. The Forum decided, therefore, that the 
values should be presented in such a way as to 
exhibit the relationship between values and 
behaviour. (National Forum for Values in Education 
and the Community, 1996: introduction.) 
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Putting values into practice should also be part of teaching on war as a controversial 
issue. Being able to act responsibly and effectively requires more than intellectual 
appreciation of what courses of action are open and more than practising skills. It 
requires the disposition to accept the importance of war and to act in the light of 
one's beliefs when action is possible. 
This introduces a further element, intrinsic to moral and political education, but 
debated with great vigour with reference to teaching on war. Education in these 
areas is inadequate if confined to the rational and factual. I do not refer here to the 
question of values, but to the notion of empowerment - the idea that it is insufficient 
to understand and hold certain beliefs, and that moral and political education 
demands that one develops the disposition to act in the light of those beliefs and the 
power to do so. It is not enough to appreciate the value of truth if the disposition to 
be truthful, and to seek truth rather than falsity, is not also developed. It is not 
enough to want to pursue one's values if one does not know how to do so. 
Understanding what and how one can contribute and involves empowerment. 
To many people the idea of cultivating dispositions and suggesting that we should 
be giving children the wherewithal to act on them sounds alarm bells. But a 
moment's reflection should quiet them. 
It might be feared that the dispositions in question could include the propensity to 
become a soldier or to join CND. But while pupils might develop these tendencies, 
the dispositions which will serve education on war would not include particularities 
such as these and are likely to be far less controversial. 
Bailey lists some dispositions which will serve a liberal education (Bailey, 1984: 
113). These include the disposition to attend to something or somebody, to 
concentrate on something and to inquire - to try to understand. All would seem 
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extremely useful, even necessary, to learning in school. But the disposition to take 
seriously one's own moral and political decision making, and the disposition to act 
in accordance with it, rather than contrary to one's reasoning, do more than serve 
an educational function. It is not by means of these that we gain moral or political 
education - it is part of what it is to be moral or political. If we have not developed 
these we are not morally or politically educated. I am not claiming that a flippant 
attitude to a certain moral problem or the failure to boycott certain products, when 
you feel you ought, signals a failure in education, but I am saying that without these 
dispositions one cannot act morally or politically. 
Even if it is conceded that the nature of the dispositions we wish to nurture is not 
morally or politically specific, it might be felt that teachers will go beyond their brief 
and teach that one should always engage in action. Of course, also, we want 
people to exercise the virtues and not just to know about them (Bailey, 1984: 103), 
but the fostering of dispositions is not the same as compelling children to do 
something. 
Dispositions are prerequisites for moral and political action, but they do not 
inexorably lead to action. 
A disposition to do something can be witheld even 
after being acquired, but it clearly cannot be 
exercised if it has never been acquired in the first 
place. (Bailey, 1984:_113) 
I have suggested earlier that being able to act is dependent upon knowing what 
actions are available as options and that having certain skills may be helpful. It is 
also important that the disposition to act in accordance with autonomously held 
beliefs is cultivated and that children are empowered to do so. 
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V The academic status of the content of teaching on war 
In Chapter 4 reference was made to Cox and Scruton's allegation that Peace 
Education, in being 'relevant', was not a genuine academic discipline. Whether or 
not the controversial issues relating to war are 'really' academic, and whether or not 
only topics which count as academic should be approached in schools is not, I 
think, central to the discussion here. However, the accusation is not irrelevant. If 
Peace Education is not an academic discipline, it is likely that the content is 
somehow not academic. If the charge could not be refuted, it would pose practical 
problems for planning a coherent approach in the school and might lack credibility 
in the view of parents and school governors. An historical perspective on war 
given in history, probably a genuine academic discipline in the eyes of Cox and 
Scruton, would perhaps pass unquestioned, but debating the morality of war in 
values education might well be ruled out. 
Aspin (1986 and 1987) and White (1988) have countered this objection at length 
and in rigorous detail, demonstrating that the charge is difficult to uphold, not least 
because it is expressedin confusing and implicitly self-contradictory rhetoric. Only 
those arguments which seem to relate to the content of teaching on war will be 
given in this section. 
V i) 	 Should the content be 'remote'? 
The assertion, that academic credibility resides in giving the pupil 'problems too 
remote or too abstract to be comprehended within his (sic) own limited world' 
(cited by Aspin 1986: 123), is open to unfortunate interpretation. It could be taken 
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to mean that children should be studying issues outside their existing cognitive 
famework. 
If that is what they contend, then it is difficult - if not 
impossible to conceive how such understanding 
might ever be attained. (Aspin, 1986: 125). 
As an end in view, to move beyond one's present understanding must be the aim 
for all learners, but to begin the learning process with what is 'too abstract to be 
comprehended' in one's own world would be to make the acquisition of new ideas 
impossible. 
It seems Cox and Scruton cannot mean 'remote' in this sense for they also argue 
that Peace Education is inappropriate in schooling because, 
children have yet to acquire the historical knowledge, 
articulate expression, and grasp of argument that 
would enable them to discuss them profitably. 
(White, 1988: 40). 
This indicates that Cox and Scruton do accept that some already acquired 
knowledge, understanding and skills are relevant to gaining new concepts, skills 
and ways of thinking. The argument here also seems to rest on a view of learning 
as linear, such that if x is necessary to the understanding of y, x must be studied 
first. Logically this must be true, but in a temporal sense, and where x and y are 
broad areas of study, it is often the case that we learn things alongside each other 
(White, 1988: 43). We do not always need to learn x before y in time. 
'Remoteness', I suggest, is not a useful notion to be invoked when 
selecting the content of teaching on war. 
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V ii) 
	
Is it sufficiently complex? 
Cox and others seem to complain that issues of war and peace are too complex to be 
appropriately studied in school and yet to contradict themselves in also scorning 
Peace Education for being a soft option (Cox et al., 1986: 40), lacking that 
complexity which is the hallmark of a 'real' academic discipline. While one might 
swiftly agree that something so easily learnt that all children can grasp it without 
any schooling need not be included on the curriculum, this is evidently not the case 
here. Indeed, the subject matter has been described as complex. Instead these 
critics seem merely to be offering gratuitous abuse, fastening on the term 'soft' with 
its connotation 'unworthy of academic study'. If they do mean that teaching on war 
is easy, and are prescribing the adoption of a 'hardness' criterion, it is difficult to 
see how this stipulation can be applied even to the composition of a very traditional 
curriculum which they apparently favour. If 'hardness' is employed as a criterion 
by which to judge the appropriacy of subjects taught in school, there seems little to 
recommend Latin (advocated elsewhere by Scruton) over Sanskrit (White, 1988: 
43). 
Despite the difficulty of taking seriously claims that the content of teaching on war 
is not part of a genuine academic discipline, such accusations give some measure of 
the horror with which it can be is regarded by some academics and which can 
obscure rational reflection about it. The immense controversiality of nuclear 
warfare as a topic is likely to exacerbate any similar feelings. 
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VI Nuclear warfare 
Nuclear war, although a large area of enquiry, is too specific in its focus to be what 
was intended above by 'broad areas of knowledge and understanding'. 
Nevertheless, it is a subject which raises diverse issues in relation to teaching, and 
its inclusion in the school curriculum is so hotly debated that it cannot be omitted 
from any serious enquiry into what should be taught on war. 
Because nuclear war is thought to be politically sensitive, it may be tempting to omit 
it from the content offered. Teachers often fear repercussions from parents, society 
generally and the media if they broach these subjects in school. This is not a 
completely groundless fear. The Bishop of Salisbury recalls 'the violent reaction in 
some governmental quarters' to the BMA's report on the medical effects of nuclear 
weapons, and warns, 
When one talks about educating people in such 
matters, the response of those in power can be very 
hostile. (The Bishop of Salisbury, 1984: 14) 
In_ proffering advice on the implementation of Peace Education, the NUT 
concludes, 
Teachers will be nervous of what the Heads will say; 
Heads will be anxious lest there are repercussions 
from parents or govenors; even education officers are 
anxious lest they invoke comment from councillors. 
(NUT, 1984: 15) 
Should all reference to nuclear war be avoided on the grounds that parents or others 
are very likely to object strongly? Whether or not potential opposition from parents 
demands that particular topics, such as nuclear war, should be omitted from 
teaching on war is an important question in the light of teachers' fears. Here it will 
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be argued that expediency does not demand that schools avoid the topic of nuclear 
warfare. 
Furthermore, I wish to maintain that it should form part of the content of teaching 
on war. Perhaps it is no longer the topic of hot debate it was in the nineteen sixties, 
but nuclear weapons still exist. To present war without attention to the problems of 
the nuclear age would be to ignore a significant aspect. Since the breaking down of 
the Berlin wall and the signing of non-proliferation treaties, the arms race seems to 
have receded from view, but knowledge and understanding specifically of nuclear 
war is still vital, for a variety of reasons. These too will be examined below. 
VI i) 	 Expediency 
Although disputes with parents and others may have serious consequences for a 
school, and despite the fact that teaching on nuclear war is perhaps more likely to 
cause dissension than some other aspects of controversial issues, it is not obvious 
that such teaching should be excluded from the curriculum. 
Expediency is not necessarily served by its exclusion. This is because the disquiet 
that surrounds nuclear war as the object of study in school often arises for one of 
two reasons. 
Disapproval may focus on the way in which such topics are presented and the 
particular information given. In other words, the unease concerns not the nature of 
the subject matter, but what it is imagined is being said about it. In this case the 
same anxiety could surface with regard to any topic being taught and can only be 
allayed by information sharing, good teaching that commands trust and respect, and 
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perhaps time, showing that children are not all leaving school fanatical supporters 
of unilateral disarmament or whatever is being feared. 
The alternative cause of disapproval may be that nuclear warfare is a politically 
dangerous topic, in the sense that it is believed that addressing it will inevitably 
raise questions about current government policies. In Chapter 3, modern just war 
thinking was seen to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the use of nuclear 
weapons could not be morally justified, and yet Britain remains a nuclear power. 
Worries about a governmental backlash ought to be unnecessary, since our 
government was a signatory to, and thus endorsed, the United Nations statement: 
Governments and governmental and non-
governmental international organisations are urged to 
take steps to develop programmes of education for 
disarmament and peace studies at all levels. (First 
United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, 
1978, Clause 106, cited in NUT, 1984: 6) 
Nevertheless, many teachers are nervous that they will be criticised if they raise 
matters concerning nuclear disarmament. But failure to address these particular 
issues is unlikely to remove this cause for disquiet. Pacifism is not goverment 
policy and, together with many issues concerning the morality of war, could also be 
construed as a politically sensitive subject, yet teaching on war must, as we have 
seen, involve discussion of pacifism if it is to be impartial, unbiased and balanced. 
It was pointed out in Chapter 5 that war is necessarily a political matter. Much 
more than- nuclear war would have to be jettisonned if teaching war as a 
controversial issue were to exclude all politically delicate matters. It must be a 
mistake to think that teachers can pre-empt criticism merely by omitting one aspect 
of war. 
In maintaining that excluding reference to certain aspects of war will not placate 
certain objectors, there is no intention to imply that prudential censorship ever ought 
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to be an overriding determinant of the content of the curriculum - only to make plain 
that even expediency will not be served by the omission of this particular topic. 
Prudence may suggest that teachers should take especial care to explain their 
reasons for presenting nuclear war in the classroom, but this is not only a matter of 
expediency. Good practice surely demands it, as claimed above, in the exploration 
of value clashes. 
Justification for addressing nuclear issues in teaching on war is now required to 
show that not only need nuclear war not be omitted, but that there are good reasons 
for its inclusion. 
VI ii) 	 It is a key issue 
UNESCO listed the 'maintenance of peace; types of war; disarmament' as one of 
the seven 'major problems of mankind that all students should study', (cited in 
NUT, 1984: 11). Nuclear war may be the greatest problem of our age. Whether it 
is or not, it is believed to be enormously important: 
since today a large proportion of the population feels 
that the peace and security problem is of the utmost 
importance (whether it is or not), that problem has de 
facto (be it justified or not) become a first-order 
moral problem for Western democracies. (Jacobsen, 
1984: 51) 
The public concern, which can find its expression in complaints about teaching 
which addresses nuclear warfare, may be one reason for engaging in that teaching: 
Increased awareness of the threat of nuclear 
annihilation both increases the demand for teachers to 
cover peace and disarmament issues in the classroom 
and at the same time makes their task more 
controversial. (NUT, 1984: 6) 
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Nuclear war is a key issue in modern life, relevant to all. Children ought to be 
educated to address it for, as Pike and Selby point out, 
It smacks of dangerous elitism to to suggest that only 
those able and prepared to continue education beyond 
16 should have the opportunity to reach an informed 
understanding of key global issues. (Pike & Selby, 
1986: 47). 
While nuclear weapons continue to be held in any country, they must be a 
significant factor in international diplomacy. The dropping of nuclear bombs is a 
matter relating to the common interest, in the widest possible sense, to the interest 
of the whole world. If children are to be prepared to contribute in the political 
forum, informed understanding is essential. 
Given that Britain is a nuclear power still, nuclear warfare presents a number of 
political problems. In 1981, Ryle claimed these went beyond wars. 
Nuclear war is now so important an issue, that the 
Economy and collapse of British Industry are 
secondary, though not unrelated problems. Indeed, 
if the nuclear industry disappeared its immense assets 
could support 10 - 100 times the number of jobs in 
other areas of industry, could revitalise a wide range 
of activities and put in hand the production needed to 
solve the many problems which we, and particularly 
the Third World, face. (Ryle, 1981: 31) 
The economic situation may have improved for Britain in recent years, but the 
economic cost of retaining nuclear weapons has not. If young people are to solve 
other world problems, they need to be educated with regard to nuclear war. 
VI iii) 
	
It poses distinctive moral problems 
The potential for indiscriminate and disproportionate use, noted in Chapter 4, puts 
nuclear arms, alongside chemical and biological weapons, in a different category 
from other arms. Their unpredictable effects pose distinctive moral questions about 
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war, which cannot be explored without direct reference to such weapons. Whether 
or not their use, even as a threat, could ever be morally justifiable appeared 
improbable. 
Exploration of just war thinking might provide a necessary balance to pacifism, but 
itself raises problems. Modern just war thinking led to the conclusion that nuclear 
deterrence is morally unacceptable (noted in Chapter 4) - in other words, a policy to 
which our government is publicly committed - is morally wrong. 
Modern history includes events in World War II and reflection on the morality of 
nuclear weapons cannot be evaded: 
When children learn about Hiroshima, it soon 
becomes abundantly clear that this kind of warfare is 
not limited to military targets but also waged against 
civilian populations with rib attempt to protect 
children, women or old people. At this stage 
children's worst fears become credible - separation 
from parents being linked with terrible injuries, 
radiation sickness, starvation and death. (Jones & 
Saunders, 1984: 2) 
Moral consideration of nuclear weapons seems unavoidable for the teacher dealing 
with war, partly because because it includes distinctive issues in modern just war 
thinking and partly for more pragmatic reasons - children are likely to raise these 
very issues without prompting. 
VI iv) 	 Children's concern about nuclear war 
There is evidence that nuclear war in particular was a matter of concern to young 
people in the nineteen eighties. 
When asked the two questions - Which of the 
problems facing this country worries you most? 
Which of the problems facing the whole world 
worries you most? - a national sample of 10- to 17- 
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year-olds in Britain showed a diverse range of 
concerns. (Guardian 1987). In answer to the first 
question unemployment was most frequently 
mentioned, followed closely by nuclear weapons and 
war... In answer to the second question famine and 
poverty were most often mentioned, followed again 
by nuclear weapons and war. (Hicks, 1988: 3) 
Tizard cites research done in America which showed that, 
Less than half (40 per cent) rated nuclear conflict as 
their major worry, although at some point in the 
questionnaire the great majority expressed some 
anxiety about the issue. (Tizard, 1984: 64) 
When the Avon Education Peace Project carried out a survey of attitudes to nuclear 
weapons among English secondary school children in four comprehensive schools, 
of the 561 young people participating, it was found that 91% would not expect to 
suvive in a nuclear war and 46% actually expect to die in a nuclear war (Jones & 
Saunders, 1984: 3). That this was a cause for considerable anxiety is evident in 
some of the written comments quoted in the report of the survey: 
When I was in Junior school my friend said there 
was going to be a nuclear war I had nightmares 
untill (sic) I discovered it wasn't true. (aged 11/12 in 
Jones & Saunders, 1984: 10) 
and 
I learnt about nuclear war when I was about 10. I 
felt very scared indeed and I still am. (aged 11/12 
ibid.: 4) 
That children are concerned about the prospect of nuclear war is not sufficient 
justification for its presence on the curriculum, but it does suggest that it is not 
perceived as 'irrelevant' and inappropriate for the reasons quoted as an objection to 
some subject matter described in Chapter 4. 
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VI v) 	 Addressing nuclear war be in the classroom may 
alleviate distress 
Reid recalls how at a meeting of teachers, 
there was heated disagreement about whether the real 
horrors of nuclear war should be presented to 
children of primary age. Children it was argued did 
not have the emotional resources to cope with the 
possibility of nuclear war. (Reid, 1984: 127) 
Cox and Scruton share this anxiety, (Cox & Scruton 1984: 25). The fears 
expressed by them and the teachers may in fact be dismay over the way in which 
they imagine such matters are to be presented, and these could be allayed by 
pointing out that attention should be paid to appropriacy (noted earlier in this 
chapter) in the selection of that knowledge and understanding which is put before 
children in school. However, this will not always be the case. 
Some aspects of warfare which could be studied are likely to be emotionally 
disturbing, but this may be exactly why they should be addressed in schools - a 
justification for it rather than a strong objection to it. It can be argued that teaching 
on nuclear war in schools will not provoke distress, but reduce it. 
In reflecting on the the potential for despair when imagining the horrors of nuclear 
warfare, Holbrook quotes a child's poem written in school, of which the following 
is the final stanza: 
We did not want to make war. 
While others fought, we prayed. We were neutral 
But they dropped their bombs on us. 
The birds are still now: 
And so is everything else. 
(Susan Broadhurst.) 
He concludes: 
By contemplating the possibilities of doom in this 
way, and in exploring their own involvement in 
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human hate, young people can, I believe, go on to 
discuss and explore the ways in which human beings 
may hopefully tackle the urgent problems of peace 
and living together. (Holbrook, 1982: 4) 
In 'Education about nuclear issues: is there any hope?', White stresses that teaching 
about such issues, 
would also include an attempt to deal with the fears 
and apprehensions that young people have about 
nuclear matters, 
and that, 
it at least has the potential to make people feel that it 
is in their power to make changes, (White, 1987: 
23). 
Teaching should surely not carelessly add to pupils' emotional distress. Certainly 
where children already experience anxiety about war, it must be important not to 
increase it, for educational reasons at least since, 
It is not at all clear that increasing their anxiety will 
stimulate thought, or change their attitudes, although 
this may occur in some cases. Beyond a certain 
level, anxiety overwhelms the capacity to think. 
(Tizard, 1984: 65) 
We want children in school to think clearly and to improve their thinking. 
But it need not be assumed that raising such issues in school will necessarily add to 
children's emotional turmoil and thus impair their powers of reasoning. 
The finding that a sizeable proportion of children as 
young as ten years old see nuclear war as likely, 
even if their development is not damaged by this 
worry, suggests that teachers need not be too 
concerned about raising such a terrifying subject with 
them. (Tizard, 1984: 64) 
Teachers then may not need to fear that they are initiating terror by mentioning a 
topic that their pupils are already aware of. Moreover, if they are already worried, 
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accurate information might dispel much irrational anxiety, and the sharing and 
expression of worries could be emotionally beneficial. 
From the Avon survey cited above, it is evident that some of the worries of these 
children were based on discoveries made outside the educational environment, and 
not as a result of teaching in school. The concept of nuclear war is already familiar 
to them: 
Even children's programmes, comics and toys 
...now often feature some form of computer warfare, 
the threat of total extermination by alien forces and 
even mushroom clouds.' (Jones & Saunders, 1984: 
2) 
Children are generally aware of the existence of nuclear arms, but often have little 
understanding of the facts. Tizard notes that, 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that very young 
children may have bizarre and confused conceptions 
about nuclear war (Tizard, 1984: 70). 
It does seem probable that suitable knowledge and understanding fostered in an 
educational environment can diminish ill-founded fears. But I would not wish to 
justify the inclusion of nuclear issues solely on what might be seen as therapeutic 
grounds or to maintain that it will always make children feel better. Whilst 
dispelling that ignorance on which profound anxiety is based can be part of 
education, education should not be identified with therapy. 
VI vi) 	 Children should care about nuclear war 
It may seem that actually children are not anxious or concerned in the way implied 
above. White may be correct in suggesting that many children exhibit little interest 
in nuclear matters (White, 1984: 27). 
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However, this could be true for psychological reasons which may, 
include avoidance ('I don't want to think/hear about 
it'), resignation ('If it happens, it happens') and a 
blocking of feeling. (Tizard, 1984: 65) 
Jones and Saunders quote comments from children which appear to reflect these 
psychological strategies: 
'I don't let the thought enter my mind and I don't 
care because nobody else does' (aged 14/15), 
'there is nothing we can do about it' (aged 13/14) 
and 
'There's no real need to worry because if there is a 
war we will all die anyway.' (aged 13/14) 
(cited in Jones & Saunders, 1984: 4) 
Should education arouse concern where children apparently have none? 
Not all fears about the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons are without a rational 
base. Indeed, for those previously ignorant, understanding the effects of nuclear 
bombs may engender profound concern where there was none before. It is one 
thing to talk of addressing concerns children bring into the classroom, but quite 
another to appear to add to their worries. And yet perhaps children should care. If 
they do not, we must ask whether or not this is appropriate. 
Not to feel grief at the death of a dear friend would be a sign of something wrong, 
an unusual lack of one set of emotions. It may not be the teacher's role to try to 
deal with this, but teachers should certainly be worried and consult with 
professionals who might be able to advise. It is at least possible that a completely 
uncaring attitude to nuclear war is analogous to a lack of appropriate emotion. 
It cannot be maintained that it would be likely to affect a person's life in the way an 
inability to experience grief might be presumed to, and there can be no justification 
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for calling in child psychologists for this reason alone. However, one might well 
wonder what a pupil who did not care in the least about the prospect of nuclear war 
knew about the subject. If not caring one way or another is a consequence of not 
knowing, and if it is knowledge worth having, then the school's responsibilities 
might extend to providing the knowledge and thereby potentially adding to a pupil's 
worries. This is not to suggest that teachers should frighten children who would 
otherwise have been fearless, but to point out that knowing can be worthwhile and 
yet uncomfortable. 
To care seriously about something is not necessarily to be subject to the fears which 
numb and impair thinking. Education is not aimed at terrifying children, but can, 
include an attempt to deal with the fears and 
apprehensions that young people have about nuclear 
matters. (White, 1987: 23) 
Debilitating anxiety can be assuaged by sensitive teaching, rather than exacerbated 
(although not always nor for all people). At the same time, it is possible to come to 
appreciate the serious implications of nuclear weapons without succumbing to 
uncontrollable panic or mindless despair. 
Teachers may have a responsibility to encourage caring about nuclear war. If the 
reported claims about not caring spring from a feeling of impotence and are 
expressions of avoidance, resignation or blocking feeling, as Tizard (1984: 65) 
explained they might, then perhaps they should be addressed directly. 
VI vii) 	 Public enlightenment 
Jacobsen sees mechanisms, 'of the denial and repression type' (Jacobsen, 1984: 
55), as barriers to the public enlightenment he advocates and points out that these 
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need to be overcome if greater knowledge of nuclear matters is to be encouraged. 
He argues that, 
ignorance is not only bad in itself in a nation of 
supposedly educated people, it is also a threat to 
democracy in an age when facts about weapon 
technology and foreign policy are growing 
increasingly complex. (Jacobsen, 1984: 51) 
It may then be part of the teaching role to contribute to breaking down the barriers, 
not in the interest of psychological therapy, but in order to educate for, as well as 
within, a democracy. 
Participant democracy requires citizens who can contribute to and further debate on 
nuclear warfare. We do need to address at least the prerequisites for arriving at 
informed opinions in school. Children will undoubtedly learn about nuclear war 
outside the classroom, but this is unlikely to be adequate. What Keeble has to say 
about the arms race has broad relevance to nuclear war in general: 
The arms race is too rarely mentioned in the 
classroom. Yet it has immense implications for all of 
us and all of our information about it has been 
received through the channels of the mass media. 
(Keeble, 1984: 50) 
Schools can provide more. Scientific literacy, for example, is needed for 
understanding the likely effects of a nuclear war and thus to be able to begin to 
evaluate the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons. For many of us, the opportunity 
for gaining scientific literacy is during our schooling. 
Particular controversy may surround the inclusion of nuclear warfare in the content 
of education, nevertheless it should now be clear that there are positive reasons why 
nuclear war ought to comprise part of the content of teaching on war. 
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In summary, nuclear warfare is a 'key global issue' which I would argue is still 
important in all our lives and should not be ignored in schools for fear of criticism. 
It presents distinctive moral problems in modem just war thinking, it is a topic 
about which there is and should be serious concern, and it ought to be one area of 
knowledge and understanding explicitly raised in education about war. 
The grounds for teaching content related to nuclear war are intended to include the 
fact that many pupils are concerned about nuclear war, and that not to educate on a 
topic of this grave significance will have pernicious effects, one of which may be 
unnecessarily to perpetuate extreme anxiety which might impair autonomous 
decision-making. 
If nuclear war is a key global issue and a matter of public debate, then we want 
children to be able to reflect with clarity on the subject, not numbed or panic 
stricken by the very thought. Insofar as such education contributes to overcoming 
fears incited by ill-informed accounts in the wider world, propagated by families, 
friends, and the media, nuclear war should be examined in school. 
Teaching on war can be part of the hidden curriculum or made explicit in lessons. 
The content we choose to put before children in school is likely to reflect our 
values, and it can reinforce or contradict the lessons we intend to teach. The 
selection of content must be made impartially with regard to what we judge children 
will need and with a view to balance. The choice should both reflect, and help 
pupils to appreciate, the diversity of beliefs about the morality of war, enabling 
them to develop their own values. Those areas of knowledge, skills, values and 
dispositions which are prerequisites for learning the moral and political implications 
of war must be taught if education about war is give people the opportunity to work 
for a more peaceful world. 
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Bern-and Russell believed, 
To abolish war altogether is not impossible; indeed, 
so far as technical considerations are concerned, it is 
far more possible now than at any former time. It is 
also more important, since war is a greater menace 
than it was, and will be a greater menace than it is. 
The obstacles to the abolition of war are of three 
kinds, political, economic, and psychological; all 
three are serious and cannot be removed quickly. 
(Russell, 1936: 172) 
He explains that 'psychological' obstacles can only be removed by 'education, 
moral and intellectual', (Russell, 1936: 179). Exploration of the principles and 
considerations which should inform teaching on war has shown that removing 
political obstacles too is largely dependent on education, and that education can 
contribute to the eradication of psychological barriers. Not all who are educated 
will wish to further peace, but it must be unlikely that anyone will be able to 
influence moral and political opinion on war without education. 
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CONCLUSION 
War is a great evil, perhaps the greatest that human beings face. Certainly the very 
scale of the loss of human life in modern warfare, even when waged by 
conventional methods, is unparalled. If anything is to be done to minimise the 
destruction that is war, teaching on war in schools is crucial. This thesis attempts 
to delineate the moral complexity of war and to show how it relates to the proper 
treatment of war in the classroom. 
To bring about less war and more peace in the world must be to reduce the evil. 
This presupposes that war is a human activity over which control can be exercised, 
and that, 
biology does not condemn humanity to war. 
(The signatories to The Seville Statement on Violence 
in Groebel & Hinde, 1989: xv) 
In the first chapter, examination of prevalent beliefs that humans inevitably engage 
in international war because they are in some sense naturally aggressive, 
demonstrated that war is not beyond human agency. Unless this is understood 
there will be no awareness that we have some choice with regard to war. Without 
this understanding, one is effectively deprived of the option, and cannot decide in 
favour of peace or work for it. The task of revealing the limits of purportedly 
'scientific evidence' is best started in schools, since it is here that most people gain 
their knowledge of science. 
Once recognised not to be merely the product of an uncontrollable impulse, war is 
susceptible to moral judgement. I have argued that war is undeniably a moral 
matter, and agree with Norman, that 
	 central problem of war is that it involves 
the killing of others: 
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War is the deliberate killing and maiming of human 
beings in vast numbers. And though the physical 
acts of war, such as shooting and bombing, do not 
normally involve any discrimination between the 
intent to kill and the attempt to maim, it is, I think, 
the fact of killing that is morally fundamental. 
(Norman, 1995: 37 - 38) 
It was claimed in Chapter 2 that, although the intentional taking of human life is a 
prima facie moral ill, nevertheless it could not be the case that it is always wrong. 
No sound premises were found on which the inviolability of life could be based. 
Moral sensitivity and reasoning do not necessarily point to pacifism as the only 
acceptable stance on war. If suicide and voluntary euthenasia are ever morally 
tolerable, respect for autonomy might not preclude the killing of fighting soldiers. 
Given this, the possibility that there can be morally justifiable wars must be 
allowed. There may never yet have been a just war, but this does not affect the 
possibility that some evils are greater than war and can only be eradicated by war. 
Although just war thinking does not so much provide a justification for war as 
prescribe conditions to limirit, reflecting the moral climate through the ages, it is an 
important attempt to reduce the destructive effects. The conditions, outlined in the 
third chapter, identify and proscribe wars and acts of war which are felt to be 
morally unjustifiable. It may be impossible to use some twentieth century 
weaponry without killing innocents, and it might appear that therefore all wars 
today must be morally deplorable and the alternatives available bleak - either we 
pursue just causes by unjust means or we embrace pacifism, refusing to act in good 
cause. But human beings make decisions with regard to declaring wars and decide 
how to pursue them. The pressures influencing choice may be great, but they are 
not inevitably overwhelming. Governments can and do decide to reject certain 
methods of prosecuting wars. The Geneva Protocol (1925) and the banning of 
chemical and biological weapons (1969) bear witness to this. 
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Citizens in democratic states share in the moral responsibility for the way in which 
wars are waged. Decisions about war are serious and the area of debate complex. 
Young people need to be educated on the issues if they are to have the opportunity 
of contributing. Pacifism, just war theory and modern just war thinking cannot be 
ignored. These should be part of the vocabulary of the educated person. Moral 
education can furnish the conceptual understanding essential to evaluating war, but 
reflection specifically on the philosophical difficulties of pacifism and just wars 
should be encouraged: 
To take seriously that notion that there may be indeed 
some occasions when extraordinary means may be 
used, and to reflect that these may be expected to be 
rare indeed, may help to move moral debate over 
contemporary war. (Johnson, 1984: 190) 
In recent years, Peace Education, constituted an attempt to provide systematic 
teaching on these matters, with the declared aim of working towards a more 
peaceful world. This significant contribution to teaching on war in school could not 
be sensibly ignored. Investigation of what was intended and evaluation of the 
objections to it in Chapter 4, were both useful in deciding how teaching on war 
ought to be approached in schools, what should be kept in mind and what the real 
dangers are. Evidently_ there is a need to make clear the option of non-violent 
conflict resolution and to recognise that we cannot avoid addressing the value of 
peace. Attention was drawn to fears that teaching will be biased, amounting to 
propaganda or indoctrination, that it will not aid the search for greater peace, and 
that it will not be relevant to children in school. For the educator, the problems are 
not confined to those inherent in the morality of war. They include anxieties about 
educational practice. Guidelines for teaching on war must be sought in the light of 
these too. 
Because issues of war are inherently contestable, it was concluded in Chapter 5 that 
they should be taught as controversial issues and their controversial nature 
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understood. If educators are to avoid merely transmitting their own opinions, 
teaching on war ought to be unbiased and attention should be paid to balance. 
Exploration of these notions revealed that both conceptual and practical problems 
attend them, but that nevertheless they are useful. The principle of impartiality was 
identified as that which should underlie all teaching on war. Although the idea of 
neutrality was found to be confusing, it was established that procedural neutrality 
could be employed to overcome the practical difficulty of teachers' personal 
influence affecting their pupils' ability and willingness to express and develop their 
own value judgements about war in discussion. 
How war should be presented in school also involves the question of where it 
should figure on the curriculum. I argue that, since it is a matter of such moral 
importance and complexity, that it must be part of moral education. It is not enough 
to know that beliefs about war vary. Practice in evaluating moral claims is needed 
and this is the province of moral education. We need to do, 
more than describe the judgements and justifications 
that people commonly put forward. We can analyse 
these moral claims, lay bare the principles that they 
exemplify. We can reveal commitments that go 
deeper than partisan allegiance and the urgencies of 
battle; for it is a matter of evidence, not a pious wish, 
that there are such commitments. (Walzer, 1977: 
xxix) 
If children are to be able to contribute to public debate and effect any change, 
political education too must be important. In order to ensure that people really have 
the option to exert influence in a democratic society, they must receive education 
about ways and means in the political sphere. The reduction of war, or its 
abolition, is not simply something to be reflected upon in the abstract. 
Understanding, of the political situation and of how political changes can be 
brought about, combined with moral judgement is necessary because, 
It is obvious that we will not abolish war simply by 
altering states of mind. It is necessary to find better 
political arrangements and to find some way of 
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reducing the dangers created by the existence of 
nation states. But political changes are not totally 
separate from changes in our thinking: the causal 
influence goes both ways. One change must be to 
stop regarding killing in war as almost by magic 
immune from moral criticism. (Glover, 1977: 285) 
It was claimed in the introduction that, insofar as teachers engage in any discussion 
about it with their pupils, they will be contributing to teaching on war. Clearly, war 
cannot be confined to specific areas of the curriculum nor mentioned only by certain 
teachers. It is inevitably a cross-curricular matter. It is also plain, that whether or 
not the moral and political implications of war are explicitly taught in Personal and 
Social Education or in other lessons, learning about it will occur via the hidden 
curriculum. Consequently it must be emphasised that the principles of coherence 
and consistency should be kept in mind in planning the whole school approach. 
In being educated in relation to war, children need to acquire the knowledge and 
understanding, skills, values and dispositions which are needed to influence 
political decision-making in practice. Content of teaching on war should be selected 
in line with the principles of impartiality, coherence and consistency, but other 
considerations are also germane. 
I maintain that the content should not be restricted to information, and that it should 
be balanced, such that the broad areas of knowledge and understanding do not 
present a one-sided picture of war. The suitability of content to the particular pupils 
being taught must be considered and, 'in appropriate contexts this will include a 
discussion of nuclear issues, of war and militarism', (NUT, 1984: 15). 
Being moral requires that one is capable of conducting one's life in accordance with 
autonomously held moral values, and that one has the disposition to do so. War 
poses questions both of individual significance ('Should I join the armed forces?) 
and relating to the public interest ('Should our country disarm?). These are 
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questions about what should be done. A further consideration which should inform 
teaching on war is the need to differentiate between nurturing desirable skills and 
dispositions which empower pupils and teaching them what course of action they 
ought to pursue. 
Treating war as a controversial issue demands that children are initiated into the 
whole sphere of values, but I would also add that the value of peace is fundamental 
and can legitimately be taught alongside other 'shared values' (SCAA, 1996) 
provided that due care is taken to avoid indoctrinatory practices. It cannot be the 
case that teachers are entitled to teach pupils that they ought to value peace above all 
or work for peace in specific ways. The whole point is that we cannot be sure what 
ought to be done and must each come to our own judgements. That is why 
teaching on war in an educational environment is so vital. Nevertheless killing and 
waging war are prima facie evils and peace a good - this much can legitimately be 
taught. 
Schools provide, for most people, their best opportunity for acquiring the relevant 
knowledge and understanding. In the classroom controversial issues can be 
explored and views tested against other opinions. The educational aims of teachers 
and their professional expertise can give children protection from propaganda, peer 
group pressure and mindless acceptance of the apparent status quo. 
Investigation of the morality of war confirms the view that war ought to be 
addressed in schools explicitly as a controversial issue, thus ensuring that everyone 
has the opportunity to reflect on it in a specifically educational environment. 
So much seems plain, but this enquiry has necessarily been limited. Its focus on 
dealing with war in the classroom made explicit that teaching on war is not a simple 
matter and that the role of all teachers, whatever their special subject or 
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responsibility, is vital. The whole question of how teachers might best be prepared 
to play their part could not be addressed within the thesis, but this omission should 
not be taken to indicate that it is not of importance. Indeed, scrutiny of war in the 
classroom has implicitly revealed the need for attention to the issues in teacher 
education. 
Dealing with controversial issues in school may long have been a feature of teacher 
training courses, but there is no reason to suppose that the particular difficulties of 
teaching on war will always be raised. Values education is likely now to figure 
conspicuously in teacher education in Britain, but again this does not mean that the 
value of peace or values in relation to war will necessarily be discussed. 
Furthermore, although values education undoubtedly raises questions of 
philosophical importance, and intending or inservice teachers are likely to be alerted 
to these, the demise of most of the courses entitled 'Philosophy of Education' in 
this country suggests that few will be well-prepared to grapple with them. Of 
course philosophy of education is taught, but in a variety of guises. Cambridge 
University continues to include compulsory and relatively substantial courses in 
initial teacher training with that title, but in many institutions the philosophical 
perspective may be subsumed under 'Moral Education', 'Values Education', 
'Professional Studies' or 'Ethics for Teachers'. While not wishing to suggest that 
philosophical rigour is automatically diluted by the use of a different label, it must 
be likely that the uniquely philosophical approach increasingly escapes many or that 
it fades against the insistence of the practical for some students. 
Philosophy, at least a basic grounding in moral philosophy and philosophy of 
education, should be an integral part of the education of all teachers, not an optional 
study nor one associated with particular curriculum areas in which war might be 
presumed relevant. Not only is war, and possibly any other controversial issue, 
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evidently a cross-curricular matter as suggested above, but also the ethical 
perspective has relevance in almost all subjects. In Chapter 5 it was noted that 
scientists and historians would have particular contributions to make to teaching on 
war, but, of all the specialisms, perhaps only mathematics can be adequately taught 
without reference to moral implications. That is to say the content of mathematics 
appears to be an autonomous sphere, an abstract which need not relate to human 
interaction. The actual enterprise of teaching mathematics or anything else cannot, 
of course, be isolated from ethical concerns and all teachers therefore ought to be 
appropriately prepared in their training to appreciate and pursue moral questions. 
All teachers need initiation into philosophical thinking since these are not simple 
matters.. Exploration of the problems posed by war for educators highlights the 
dangers of ignoring philosophy and the risk of misrepresenting issues in the 
classroom. 
In Chapter 1 it was pointed out that the moral status of war is not self-evident to 
everyone. It may be necessary to highlight the ethical aspects of war for teachers, 
in order to bring about good practice in schools. Appreciation and evaluation of 
attempts to justify both pacifism and war demand some sophistication of 
philosophical understanding, and their implications are not easily understood 
without some intellectual grasp of ethics. If teachers are to foster understanding of 
the ethical dilemmas, they must have access to a philosophical framework. 
However thoughtful, reflection on killing in war is likely to remain at the level of 
'common sense' in the absence of distinctively philosophical analysis. Examination 
of, for example, Double Effect in Chapter 3 revealed that a principle which 
superficially appears to provide justification for knowingly causing the deaths of 
civilians has little force when subjected to deeper philosophical scrutiny. Teachers 
must be able to confront the moral problems of war with more than well-intentioned 
'common sense' if children are to have the chance properly to seek ethical 
solutions. 
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The field is open for empirical research to discover what form of education most 
satisfactorily prepares teachers to address war in the classroom. The question 
cannot be pursued here, but neither can it be profitably tackled without reference to 
the principles and considerations which ought to circumscribe the enterprise of 
teaching on war. Philosophical attention too is needed to ensure that the 
appropriacy of content and methodology is not lost from sight in the desire to 
identify and promote that which 'works in practice'. Practical solutions should not 
be dislocated from the values which permeate education. They should be seen 
within the broader framework set by the ends in view, and appraisal of these ends 
is in part a philosophical matter. Equally, how teachers ought to be educated is not 
merely a question of what can be shown to be most efficient in purely practical 
terms: the means themselves are open to moral evaluation. 
War does need to be specifically included in teacher education, if the topic is to be 
properly dealt with on the curriculum, and teachers may need to be prepared to 
reflect on further issues which could not be considered in this thesis. Here the 
concern was with international warfare, but the morality of taking hostages, 
terrorism and civil insurrection are hard to ignore when talking about war with 
young people today. The philosophical skills and understanding teachers gain, 
whether in their initial training, in inservice courses or higher degrees, must be 
sufficient to the task of confronting new problems their pupils may raise. A 
continuing dialogue, between philosophers of education and teachers, is needed if 
teaching on war is to address many of the relevant issues adequately. 
However indirectly, the consequences of war affect everyone. Children are surely 
entitled to an education which enables them to tackle moral dilemmas relevant to 
their lives. The educated person is one who is able to recognise the moral 
dimension of war and engage with it. The education offered in schools by teachers 
must take account of this. 
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It has not been my claim that the furtherance of international peace ought to be the 
main aim of teaching on war, only that unless war is presented in an educational 
manner in the classroom many children will grow up without the understanding or 
capacity to work towards greater peace in the world. It is only as a result of 
educated reflection that further moral restrictions on war are likely to come into 
effect. Teaching on war, which is properly educational, is vital for, 
Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the 
minds of men that the defences of peace must be 
constructed. (UNESCO, 1945, quoted in Mitchell, 
1978: 35) 
272 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ali, Sahrar (1997) 'The Society's New Chair', a discussion with Richard Norman, 
in Philosophy Today, No. 24. 
Andrews, R. (1984) 'The Bomb in the Classroom: Developments in Peace 
Education', 
in J. White (ed.) Lessons before Midnight, 
Bedford Way Paper No. 19, 
London, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1979) 'War and Murder', 
in G. E. M. Anscombe Ethics, Religion and Politics, 
Collected Philosophical Papers Volume III, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981) 'Mr. Truman's Degree', 
in G. E. M. Anscombe Ethics, Religion and Politics, 
Collected Philosophical Papers Volume III, 
Oxford, BIsil Blackwell. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981) 'The Justice of the Present War Examined' 
in G. E. M. Anscombe Ethics, Religion and Politics,  
Collected Philosophical Papers Volume III, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Aristotle (1975) The Nicomachean Ethics, 
London, Oxford University Press. 
Aspin, D. (1987) 'Peace studies and "education": a rejoinder to Scruton', 
in C. Tubb (guest ed.) Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 17 No. 1. 
n.n 
Aspin, D. (1986) 'Peace studies in the curriculum of educational institutions: an 
argument against indoctrination', 
in J. Wellington (ed.) Controversial Issues in the Curriculum, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Atkinson, R. F. (1965) 'Instruction and indoctrination', 
in R. D. Archimbault (ed.) Philosophical Analysis and Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Augustine, (1963) The City of God, 
abridged & translated by J. W. C. Wand, 
London, Oxford University Press. 
Bailey, C. (1984) Beyond the Present and the Particular, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Bailey, C. (1975) 'Neutrality and rationality in teaching', 
in D. Bridges & P. Scrimshaw (eds.) Values and Authority in Schools, 
London, Hodder & Stoughton. 
Bailey, C. (1973) 'Teaching by Discussion and the Neutral Teacher', 
draft paper given at Homerton College, Cambridge. 
Baker, J. A., The Bishop of Salisbury, (1984) 'The future and the bomb', 
in J. White (ed.) Lessons before Midnight, 
Bedford Way Paper No. 19, 
London, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Barker, B. (1987) 'Teaching Controversy', 
in Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 17 No. 2. 
Barrow, R. (1978) Radical Education, 
London, Martin Robertson. 
Bateson, P. (1989) 'Is aggression instinctive?', 
in J. Groebel & R. A. Hinde (eds.)  Aggression and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Bays, D. (1982) The Silent Killers, 
London, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 
Beardsmore, R.W. (1969) Moral Reasoning, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Beresford, R. (1982) Peace - The Teaching of John Paul 
London, Catholic Truth Society. 	 nnn 
Bonnett, M. (1994) Children's Thinking, 
London, Cassell. 
Blake, N. & Pole, K. (1983) Dangers of Deterrence, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Blake, N. & Pole, K. (1984) Objections to Nuclear Defence, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Bridges, D. (1986) 'Dealing with controversy in the school curriculum: a 
philosophical perspective', 
in J. Wellington (ed.) Controversial Issues in the Curriculum, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Bridges, D. (1982) 'So truth be in the field...? approaches to controversy in World 
Studies teaching', 
in D. Hicks & C. Townley (eds.) Teaching World Studies, 
London, Longman. 
Bridges, D. & Scrimshaw, P. (1975) Values and Authority in Schools, 
London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
Brown, S. C. (ed.) (1975) Philosophers Discuss Education, 
London, Macmillan. 
Burnley, J. (1988) 'Conflict', 
in D. Hicks (ed.) Education for Peace, 
London, Routledge. 
Byrd, P. (1887) 'Peace Studies: a case for careful development', 
in C. Tubb (guest ed.) Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 17 No. 1. 
Carpenter, S. (1977) A Repertoire of Peacemaking Skills, 
Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development, 
privately published ? no place or publisher given. 
Carrington, B. & Troyna, B. (eds.) (1988) Children and Controversial Issues, 
Lewes, Falmer Press. 
n•n 
Church of England, Board for Social Responsibility. (1982) The Church and the 
Bomb, 
London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
Clough, N. (1987) 'All aboard the spaceship: some views of children on conflict and 
justice', 
in C. Tubb (guest ed.) Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 17 No. 1. 
Cohen, B. (1969) 'The problem of bias', 
in D. Heater, The Teaching of Politics, 
London, Methuen. 
Cohen, M., Nagel, T. & Scanlon, T. (eds.) (1974) War and Moral Responsibility, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Cox, C. & Scruton, R. (1984) Peace Studies: a Critical Survey, 
London, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies. 
Cox, C. et al. (1986) Whose Schools? A Radical Manifesto, 
London, Hillgate Group. 
Crick, B. (1969) The introducing of politics', 
in D. Heater, The Teaching of Politics, 
London, Methuen. 
Crick, B & Heater, D. (1977) Essays in Political Education, 
Ringmer, Falmer Press. 
Crick, B. & Porter, A. (1978) Political Education and Political Literacy, 
London, Longman. 
Curle, A. (1984) 'The nature of peace', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education, 
Cowbridge, D. Brown & Sons Ltd. 
Darwin, C. (1872) The Origin of the Species, 
London, Odhams Press. 
Davies, R. (1984) Children and the Threat of Nuclear War, 
Occasional Paper No. 8, 
S. Martin's College Lancaster. 
Dearden, R. F. (1976) Problems in Primary Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Dearden, R. F. (1984) Theory and Practice in Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Dubik, J. M. (1982) 'Human Rights, Command, Responsibility and Walzer's Just 
War Theory', 
in Philosophy and Public Affairs Jounal,  Vol. II No. 4. 
Dugard, J. (1983) 'International Terrorism and the Just War', 
in D. Rapoport and J. Alexander (eds.) 
The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, 
New York, Pergamon. 
Dworkin, R. (1993) Life's Dominion, 
London, Harper Collins. 
276 
Ehrenreich, B. (1997) Blood Rites, 
London, Virago. 
Elliott, J. (1973) 'Neutrality, Rationality and the Role of the Teacher', 
draft paper given at Homerton College, Cambridge. 
Entwistle, H. (1969) 'Educational theory and the teaching of politics', 
in D. Heater (ed.) The Teaching of Politics.  
London, Methuen. 
Fell, G. (1988) 'Peace', 
in D. Hicks (ed.) Education for Peace, 
London, Routledge. 
Finn, G.P.T. (1990) 'Children and Controversial Issues', 
in Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol.20. No. 1. 
Ford, J. C. (1970) 'The Morality of Obliteration Bombing', 
in R. Was serstrom (ed.) War and Morality, 
Belmont, California, Wadsworth. 
Francis, D. (1989) Straight, 
London, Michael Joseph. 
Gallie, W. B. (1978) Philosophers of Peace and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Gander, T.J. (1987) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare, 
London, Ian Allen. 
Gardner, W. (1969) 'Political Socialisation', 
in D. Heater (ed.) The Teaching of Politics, 
London, Methuen. 
Garver, N. (1975) 'What violence is', 
in R. Wasserstrom (ed.) Today's Moral problems, 
New York, Macmillan. 
Glenn Gray, J. 'The enduring appeals of battle', 
in R. Wasserstrom (ed.) Today's Moral problems, 
New York, Macmillan. 
Glover, J. (1977) Causing Death and Saving Lives, 
Penguin Books, London. 
277 
Goldstein, J. H. (1989) 'Beliefs about human aggression', 
in J. Groebel & R. A. Hinde (eds.)  Aggression and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Gregory, I. & Woods, R. (1970) 'Indoctrination', 
in Proceedings of the the Annual Conference, 
The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. 
Gregory, I. & Woods, R. (1974) 'Valuable in Itself, 
in Education, Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 5. 
Gribble, J. (1969) Introduction to Philosophy of Education, 
Boston, Allyn and Bacon. 
Grisez, G. (1975) 'Abortion: Ethical Arguments', 
in R. Wasserstrom (ed.) Today's Moral problems, 
New York, Macmillan. 
Groebel, J. & Hinde, R.A. (eds.) (1989) Aggression and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Groebel, J. & Hinde, R.A. (1989) 'The problem of aggression', 
in J. Groebel & R. A. Hinde (eds.) Aggression and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Grotius (1925) De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, 
trans. in No. 3, vol. 2, The Classics of Intention, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Halstead, M. (1985) Making Sense of Peace Studies, 
unpublished paper. 
Halstead, M. (1987) 'Woven into the existing curriculum": a case study of peace 
education', 
in C. Tubb (guest ed.) Cambridge Journal of Education,  Vol. 17 No. 1. 
Hampshire, S. (1983) Morality and Conflict, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Hare, R. M. (1974) 'Rules of War and Moral Reasoning', 
in M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon War and Moral Responsibility, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Hare, W. (1985) Controversies in Teaching, 
Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books. 
278 
Harris, J. (1986) 'The facts of life: controversial medical issues in the curriculum', 
in J. Wellington (ed.) Controversial Issues in the Curriculum, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Heater, D. (ed.) (1969) The Teaching of Politics, 
London, Methuen. 
Hicks, D. (ed.) (1988) Education for Peace, 
London, Routledge. 
Hicks, D. (1987) 'Education for Peace: principles into practice', 
in C. Tubb (guest ed.) Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 17 No. 1. 
Hicks, D. (1983, revised 1986) Studying Peace: The Educational Rationale, 
Occasional Paper No. 4, 
S. Martin's College Lancaster. 
Hicks, D. (1988) 'World Studies, Education for peace, Development education', 
in S. Forrester (ed.)  Peace and Security,  
A Directory of Social Change Publication. 
Hicks, D. & Fisher, S. (1984) 'World Studies 8 -13', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education, 
Cowbridge, D. Brown & Sons Ltd. 
Hicks, D. & Townley, C. (eds.) (1982) Teaching World Studies, 
London, Longman. 
Higgs, H. (1987) 'Self-conscious science: is this peace education?' 
in C. Tubb (guest ed.) Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 17 No. 1. 
Hinde, R. A. (1989) 'The problem of aggression', 
in J. Groebel & R. A. Hinde (eds.)  Aggression and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Hirst, P. H. (1974) Knowledge and the Curriculum, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Hirst, P. H. & Peters, R. S. (1970) The Logic of Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Holbrook, D. (1982) Education for Peace, 
London, Quaker Peace and Service. 
Hollins, T. (1964) Aims in Education, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
Huntingford, F. A. (1989) 'Animals fight but do not make war', 
in J. Groebel & R. A. Hinde (eds.)  Aggression and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Mich, I. (1974) Deschooling Society, 
London, Penguin. 
Jacobsen, B. (1984) 'The Negation of Apathy', 
in J. White (ed.) Lessons before Midnight, 
Bedford Way Paper No. 19, 
London, Institute of Education, University of London. 
James, W. (1970) 'The Moral Equivalent of war', 
in Wasserstrom (ed.) War and Morality, 
Belmont, California, Wadsworth. 
Johnson, J. T. (1984) Can modern war be just?, 
USA, Yale University. 
Jones, S. & Saunders, H. (1984) Growing Up In The Nuclear Age: An Interim 
Report on a Survey of Schoolchildren's Attitudes to Nuclear Weapons, 
published by The Avon Peace Project. 
Joseph, Sir Keith (1984) Speech to the National Council for Women Of Great Britain 
Conference, in Educating People for Peace, 
National Council of Women of Great Britain. 
Kainz, H. P. (ed.) (1987) Philosophical Perspectives on Peace, 
London, Macmillan. 
Keeble, R. (1984) 'Media images of violence and peace', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education, 
Cowbridge, D. Brown & Sons Ltd. 
Keegan, J. & Holmes, R. (1985) Soldiers, 
London, Hamish Hamilton. 
Kelly, A. V. (1995) Education and Democracy, 
London, Paul Chapman. 
Kenny, A. (1984) 'Better Dead than Red', 
in N. Blake & K. Pole (eds.) Objections to Nuclear Defence, 
London, Routledge. 
280 
Knox, J. (1984) 'The Religious Context of a Peace Curriculum', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education,  
Cowbridge, D. Brown & Sons Ltd. 
Lackey, D. (1979) 'Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence', 
in J. Rachels (ed.) Moral Problems, 
New York, Harper & Row. 
Lister, I. (1984) 'Peace Education and Political Education', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education, 
Cowbridge, D. Brown & Sons Ltd. 
Lorenz, K. (1966) On Aggression, 
London, Methuen. 
Louch, A. (1983) 'The Immorality of a Belief, 
in D. Rapoport and J. Alexander (eds.) 
The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, 
Pergamon. 
Machiavelli, N. (1979) The Art of War, 
London, Penguin Books. 
Machiavelli, N. (1961) The Prince, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Maclntyre, A. (1985) After Virtue, 
London, Duckworth. 
n•n 
Maclntyre, A. (1990) Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 
London, Duckworth. 
Maclntyre, A. (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 
London, Duckworth. 
Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Mackinnon, D. M. (1981) Creon and Antigone: ethical problems of nuclear warfare, 
London, The Menard Press. 
Mantynen, H. (1978) Is Peace Education Just a Piece of Education? 
unpublished paper given at conference in Orivesi, Finland. 
Marks, J. (1984) Peace Studies in our Schools: Propaganda for Defencelessness, 
London, Women and Families for Defence. 
McKenna, J. (1979) 'The Just War', 
in J. Rachels (ed.) Moral Problems, 
New York, Harper & Row. 
McLaughlan, T. (1992) 'Citizenship, Diversity and Education: a philosophical 
perspective', 
in Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 21 No. 3. 
McMahan, J. (1993) 'War and peace', 
in P. Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Merton, T. (1968) Faith and Violence, 
Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press. 
Midgley, M. (1979) Beast and Man, 
London, Routledge. 
Midgley, M. (1984) 'The debate over aggression', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education, 
Cowbridge, D. Brown & Sons Ltd. 
Midgley, M. (1994) The Ethical Primate, 
London, Routledge. 
Midgley, M. (1984) 'Fatalism, Fantsy and Fear', 
in J. White (ed.) Lessons before Midnight, 
Bedford Way Paper No. 19, 
London, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Midgley, M. (1984) Wickedness, 
New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Mill, J.S. (1968) 'Of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible', 
in Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government,  
London, Dent. 
Mitchell, W. R. ( 1978) Education for Peace, 
Belfast, Christian Journals Ltd. 
282 
Morrison, A. (1987) 'Educating for Peace', 
in J. Thacker, R. Pring & D. Evans (eds.)  Personal, Social and Moral  
Education in a changing world, 
NFER - Nelson. 
Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Nagel, T. (1974) 'War and Massacre', 
in M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon War and Moral Responsibility, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Nagel, T. (1986) 'Death', 
in P. Singer, (ed.) Applied Ethics, 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
Narveson, J. (1979) 'Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis', 
in J. Rachels (ed.) Moral Problems, 
New York, Harper & Row. 
Narveson, J. (1979) 'Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis', 
in Wasserstrom (ed.) War and Morality, 
Belmont, California, Wadsworth. 
National Forum for Values in Education and the Community, (1996) 
Consultation on values in education and the community, 
London, SCAA. 
NichOlas, F. (1983) Conflict and Change: A Resource Book for the Middle School 
Years, 
proof copy. 
Norman, R. (1990) 'Absolutism and nuclear deterrence', 
in Cogito, Vol. 4 No. 1. 
Norman, R. (1988) 'The Case for Pacifism', 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol.5 No.2. 
Norman, R. (1995) Ethics, Killing and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Nottinghamshire LEA, (1981) The Development of a Curriculum for Peace Education: 
report of the working party, 
Nottingham, Nottinghamshire County Council. 
Nyberg, D. (1975) The Philosophy of Open Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
NUT (1984) Education For Peace, 
London, National Union of Teachers. 
NUT (1985) Peace and Disarmament. 
London, National Union of Teachers. 
O'Connell, J. (1984) Key ideas in Peace Studies', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education, 
Cowbridge, D. Brown & Sons Ltd. 
Parfit, D. (1986) Reasons and Persons, 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
Paskins, B. & Dockrill, M. (1979) The Ethics of War, 
London, Duckworth. 
Pax Christi, (1980) Winners All. 
London, Pax Christi. 
Peters, R. S. (1967) The Concept of Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Peters, R. S. (1970) Ethics and Education, 
London, Allen and Unwin. 
Pike, G. & Selby, D. (1986) 'Global education', 
in J. Wellington (ed.) Controversial Issues in the Curriculum, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Plato (1955) The Republic, trans. H.D.P.Lee 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Pope, A. (1735) 'Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot', 
in J. Butt (ed.) 1963 The Poems of Alexander Pope, 
London, Methuen. 
Popper, K. (1945) The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I, 
London, Routledge. 
284 
Pottenger J.R. (1983) 'Liberation Theology', 
in D. Rapoport and J. Alexander (eds.) 
The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, 
New York, Pergamon. 
Pring, R. (1984) Personal and Social Education in the Curriculum, 
Sevenoaks, Hodder & Stoughton. 
Rachels, J. (1986) The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 
New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Rachels, J. (1986) The End of Life, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Rachels, J. (ed.) (1979) Moral Problems, 
New York, Harper & Row. 
Rawls, J. (1972) A Theory of Justice, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Regan, G. (1994) Historical Blunders, 
Enfield, Guiness. 
Regan, T. (1975) 'A defense of pacifism', 
in R. Wasserstrom (ed.) Today's Moral problems, 
New York, Macmillan. 
Reid, C. (ed.) (1984) Issues in Peace Education, 
Cowbridge, D. Brown and Sons Ltd. 
Reid, C. (1984) 'Objections to Peace Education and some answers from experience', 
in C. Reid (ed.) Issues in Peace Education,  
Cowbridge, D. Brown and Sons Ltd. 
Rose, S., Kamin, L.J. & Lewontin, R.C. (1981) Not in our Genes, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books. 
Rudduck, J. (1986) 'A strategy for handling controversial issues in the secondary 
school', 
in J. Wellington (ed.) Controversial Issues in the Curriculum, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Russell, B. (1936) Which Way to Peace?, 
London, Michael Joseph. 
Russell, F. H. (1975) The Just War in the Middle Ages, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Ruston, R. (1981) Nuclear Deterrence - Right or Wrong?, 
London, Catholic Information Services. 
Rutter, M., Maugham, P. & Ouston, J. (1979) 
Fifteen thousand hours: secondary schools and their effects on children, 
London, Open Books Publishing. 
Ryle, G. (1963) The Concept of Mind, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Ryle, M. (1981) Towards the Nuclear Holocaust, 
London, The Menard Press. 
Schools Council (1970) The Humanities Project: an introduction to the Schools 
Council/Nuffield Humanities Project, 
Heinemann. 
Silberbauer, G. (1993) 'Ethics in small-scale societies', 
in P. Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Singer, P. (ed.) (1986) Applied Ethics, 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
Singer, P. (ed.) (1993) A Companion to Ethics, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Singer, P. (1973) Democracy and Disobedience, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Singer, P. (ed.) (1994) Ethics, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Singer, P. (1983) The Expanding Circle, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Singer, P. (1994) Rethinking Life and Death, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
286 
Smart, J.J.C. & Williams, B. (1973) Utilitarianism for and against, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Snook, I.A. (1972) Indoctrination and Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Snook, I. A. (ed.) ( 1972) Concepts of Indoctrination: philosophical essays, 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Stradling, R., Noctor, M. & Baines, B. (1984) Teaching Controversial Issues, 
London, Edward Arnold. 
Straughan, R. (1982) Can We Teach Children To Be Good?, 
Hemel Hempstead, Allen & Unwin. 
Teichman, J. (1986) Pacifism and the Just War, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Thacker, J. (ed.) (1983) Peace Education: perspectives 11, 
Exeter University. 
Tizard, B. (1984) 'Problematic Aspects of Nuclear Education', 
in J. White (ed.) Lessons before Midnight, 
Bedford Way Paper No. 19, 
London, Institute of Education, University of London. 
n.n 
Toffler, A. & Toffler, H. (1993) War and Anti-War, 
London, Little, Brown & Co. 
Uniacke, S. (1994) Permissible Killing, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Van Eyken, A. (1991) 'The survival of the fittest' 
in Cogito, Vol. 5,-No. 3. 
The U.S. Bishops (1983) The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and our 
Response, 
The US Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, 
S.P.C.K. 
Vanderhaar, G. (1983) Nonviolence in Christian Tradition, 
London, Pax Christi. 
Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars, 
London, Basic Books. 
287 
Walzer, M. (1970) 'Moral Judgment in Time of War', 
in R. Wasserstrom (ed.) War and Morality, 
Belmont, California, Wadsworth. 
Warnock, M. (1986) The education of the emotions', 
in D. Cooper (ed.) Education, Values and Mind: Essays for R. S.  
Peters, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Warnock, M. (1975) 'The Neutral Teacher', 
in S. C. Brown (ed.) Philosophers Discuss Education, 
London, Macmillan. 
Wasserstrom, R. (ed.) (1975) Today's Moral Problems, 
New York, Macmillan. 
Wasserstrom, R. (ed.) (1970) War and Morality, 
Belmont, California, Wadsworth. 
Wasserstrom, R. (1970) 'On the morality of War', 
in R. Wasserstrom (ed.) War and Morality, 
Belmont, California, Wadsworth. 
Weaver, A. (1988) Making for Peace, 
St. Albans, Brentham Press. 
Welch, D. (1993) Justice and the Genesis of War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Wellington, J. (ed.) (1986) Controversial Issues in the Curriculum, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Wellington, J. (1986) 'The nuclear issue in the curriculum and the classroom', 
in J. Wellington (ed.) Controversial Issues in the Curriculum, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
White, J. (1967) 'Indoctrination', 
in R. S. Peters (ed.) The Concept of Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
White, J. (1990) Education and the Good Life, 
London, Kogan Page. 
288 
White, J. (ed.) (1984) Lessons Before Midnight: Educating for Reason in Nuclear 
Matters, 
Bedford Way Paper 19, 
London, Institute of Education, University of London. 
White, J. (1995) Personal Wellbeing in a Secular Universe, 
London, Institute of Education, University of London. 
White, P. (1983) Beyond Domination: an essay in the Political Philosophy of 
Education, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
White, P. (1988) 'Countering the Critics', 
in D. Hicks (ed.) Education for Peace, 
London, Routledge. 
White, P. (1987) 'Education about nuclear issues: is there any hope?', 
in C. Tubb (guest ed.) Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 17 No. 1. 
White, P. (1984) 'Facing the Nuclear Issues: A task for Political Education', 
in J. White (ed.) Lessons before Midnight, 
Bedford Way Paper No. 19, 
London, Institute of Education-, University of London. 
White, P. (ed.) (1989) Personal and Social Education; Philosophical Perspectives, 
London, Kogan Page. 
Williams, B. (1981) Moral Luck, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Williams, B. (1995) Making Sense of Humanity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson, E.O. (1978) On Human Nature, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Wilson, J. (1964) 'Education and indoctrination', 
in T. Hollins (ed.) Aims in Education, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
Winter, J. M. (1989) 'Causes of War', 
in J. Groebel & R. A. Hinde (eds.)  Aggression and War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Yarwood, R. & Weaver, T. (1988) 'War', 
in D. Hicks Education for Peace, 
London, Routledge. 
